तर्क संग्रहः

TARKA SAṀGRAHA

With the
Dīpika of Aṇṇambhaṭṭa and Notes

Translated by

Swami Virupakshananda

Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras

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Sri Ramakrishna Math
Mylapore, Madras 600 004

Published by
The President
Sri Ramakrishna Math
Mylapore, Chennai-4

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III-2M 3C-6-2001
ISBN 81-7120-674-3

Printed in India at
Sri Ramakrishna Math Printing Press
Mylapore, Chennai-4
email : srkmath@vsnl.com

Books can be Ordered at
www.sriramakrishnamath.org

Preface to the Second Edition

The first edition of this important Nyāya treatise was quite popular and has been out of print for some years.

In this new edition, Swami Virupakshananda, the translator, has added a useful introduction and has thoroughly revised the script. He has provided more notes, which have all been shifted to the end of the book. The text of the commentary has been given in Devanagari.

We hope this edition too would be welcomed by all lovers of Indian philosophical literature.

Sri Ramakrishna Math *Publisher*
Madras 600 004
1 August 1994

Preface to the First Edition

We have great pleasure in placing before our readers, Swami Virupakshananda's lucid English translation of *Tarka-saṁgraha* and of *Dīpikā* the brilliant commentary on it by Annaṁbhaṭṭa.

Tarka, as the Indian system of logic is called, is not an intellectual pastime for the pedant but a fine and precise tool for the philosopher who probes to discover the Ultimate Truth. While the *Tarka-saṁgraha* is meant primarily to unlock the doors of the twin-darsana of Nyaya-Vaisheshika, it is also the master key that has been used by the Acharyas of the other darsanas—the Sānkhya and Yoga, Mīmamsa and Vedānta. All Indian philosophy is characterised by the application of a rigorous logic that often looks hair-splitting to the untrained layman; but it is the very subtlety and vigour of the logic that has enabled the different metaphysical systems to stand the test of time and the tide of fashion. When the common reader peruses a commentary of Sri Sankara, for instance, he often wonders why the great Acharya wastes his time and our patience by quibbling at length on points that convey no significance to us. But when we become familiar with the rules of Tarka, we shall be able to appreciate the integrity that compels the master-mind to analyse so thoroughly the logical implications of a statement or term. Sri Sankara often deals with verities that defy verbalisation,

but when words have to be used to communicate a truth, he is particular that there is no vagueness or looseness in the terms employed or the arguments pressed into service. He points out that right Tarka is necessary to apprehend the Highest and warns us against the temptations of false Tarka—*tarkyatām mā kutarkyatām.*

It is hoped that this lucid translation of *Tarka-saṁgraha* and the *Dīpikā* by Swami Virupakshananda will enable the reader to enjoy our traditional philosophical texts better.

Sri Ramakrishna Math
Madras 600 004
2 October 1980

Publisher

Translator's Note

As I was studying the *Tarka-saṁgraha* with the *Dīpikā* under the able guidance of Śri V.R. Kalyāṇa Sundara Śāstri of Madras, *Sāhityaviśārada, Sāhityaśiromaṇi, Vedāntaśiromaṇi, Bhāṣyabhāvajña,* it occurred to me that a lucid and simple translation of the Text and the *Dīpikā* in English would be of immense help to the students of the Text. Accordingly, the English translation of the work first appeared serially in the *Vedānta Kesarī,* a cultural and philosophical monthly organ of the Ramakrishna Math, Madras, a few years back. With all humility I must submit that but for the encouragement and help from the learned Śāstri, it would never have appeared in its present form. I am also much indebted to Śrī V.K. Dongre Śāstri of Hyderabad, *Vidvān, Paṇḍita pravara,* for having given me his unstinted guidance and help in elucidating many points in the course of my re-editing the work.

This is the first time a full English translation of the *Dīpikā* appears in English. Even as it was being serialised in the *Vedānta Kesarī* with annotations, it was found much useful to the students reading for M.A. Sanskrit in the Madras University. Many teachers and students of Sanskrit, particularly of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pressed me hard to bring out the translation in a book form to make it available to the teacher-student

community. The result is the present edition. To facilitate the study of the Text even by those who do not know Sanskrit, a word-for-word transliteration of the Text with meaning is given. My grateful thanks are due to Mr. R.S.N. Rāmakṛṣṇan of Ravaṇasamudram who has very kindly gone through the entire revised manuscript before it was sent to the Press.

The *Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annaṁbhaṭṭa is the most popular introductory work on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of Indian Philosophy. There are a few English expositions of this work, the most notable being *A Primer of Indian Logic* by Prof. S. Kuppuswāmi Śāstri. Śrī Y.V. Athālye's annotated edition of the English translation of the Text by Śrī M.R. Bodas is also well known. Both these works have been consulted and made use of by the present translator in preparing this translation. A French exposition of the same Text by A. Foucher, *Le Compendium des Topiques*—Tarkasaṁgraha d' Annaṁbhaṭṭa (Paris, 1949) also shows the importance of the work.

Tarka-saṁgraha with its expository gloss, called the Dīpikā, is an introductory treatise by Annaṁbhaṭṭa to the study of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣka. A native of Andhra, Annaṁbhaṭṭa is said to have flourished in C. 1600 A.D. He was the son of Meligiri Tirumalarāya, younger brother of Sarvadeva, and a pupil of Brahmendra Sarasvatī in *Advaita,* of Vīreśvara of Varanasi in *Vyākaraṇa,* and Viśwanātha in *Mīmāṁsā.* He was a scholar in *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā, Vyākaraṇa* and *Advaita* and has written a number of learned commentaries on them. The better known among them are his commentaries on Bhaṭṭa Someśvara's *Nyāya Sudhā,* on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī,* on Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma Sūtras,* on *Kaiyyaṭa's Pradīpa* and

on Jayadeva's *Manyāloka*. But his *Tarka-saṁgraha* with his expository gloss on it, called the *Dīpikā*, is the most popular introductory handbook on Indian Logic, the study of which is considered indispensable to the students of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems of Philosophy. *Tarka-saṁgraha* with its *Dīpikā* contains the essence of both the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* schools of Thought. Hence, the term *Tarka-saṁgraha* does not mean merely logic as it is generally understood to be. As Annaṁbhaṭṭa himself explains it in his *Dīpikā*, it is a compendious elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and such other ontological categories of the *Vaiśeṣika* system of Philosophy accepted by the *Nyāya* school of Thought.

The translator will consider his labours amply rewarded if this work proves to be of some help to the students of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* Philosophy and to the lovers of Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy in general.

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Introduction

"काणादं पाणिनीयं च सर्वशास्त्रोपकारकम्"— Kāṇādaṁ Pāṇinīyaṁ ca sarva śastra upakārakaṁ —
"Logic and grammar are indispensable aids for every branch of Knowledge."

The term Indian logic is usually rendered by the Sanskrit equivalents आन्वीक्षिकी, न्यायविस्तर, न्यायदर्शन, तर्कशास्त्र and प्रमाणशास्त्र. In anglicised form it is generally known as 'Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika' system. Indian Logic is आन्वीक्षिकी or न्यायविस्तर or न्यायदर्शन in the sense that it is a philosophical system of which methodical reasoning or investigation of knowledge got through observation or perception and trustworthy verbal testimony forms the central theme. It is pre-eminently the science of ratiocination or तर्कशास्त्र. It is also described as the Pramāṇa Śāstra or the epistemological science (ie the theory of the method or grounds of knowledge), chiefly concerned with valid knowledge and its sources. At a very early stage in the history of Indian logic, the Vaiśeṣika stress on the inductive phase of inference came to be synthesised with its deductive phase in the Nyāya theory of syllogistic reasoning. So, Indian logic is also usually described as *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* system (ie Nyāya Realism + Vaiśeṣika - ie Atomistic Pluralism).

The beginning

The story of India's philosophical systems is a story of India's quest for Truth and of attempts to construct suitable ways and approaches to Truth. Also, on careful scrutiny, we can discern in all this quest and attempts, almost from the beginning, *two tendencies, the intuitionistic* and *the rationalistic,* and *two chief aims - the achievement of Dharma and the realisation of Brahman.* One Rg-Vedic seer boldly intuited the 'monistic absolute' in the well-known verse "आनीद्वातम् स्वधया तदेकम्" (Rg.V. X-129-2). "That One breathed breathlessly by Itself." At the same time, we also find another sage exhorting rationalistically, "सङ्गच्छध्वं संवदध्वम् सं वो मनांसि जानताम्" "Meet one another, discuss and understand your minds" (Rg.V.-X 191-2). These two tendencies came to exhibit themselves throughout the Vedic age, in close association with the two aims mentioned above. On one side, as a result of the influence of the rationalistic tendency on the ritualistic aspect of the Veda, in due time, there emerged Jaimini's system of पूर्वमीमांसा. And on the other side, the combined workings of the intuitionistic and rationalistic tendencies in the direction of spiritual insight and knowledge of truth led to the emergence of the Upaniṣadic philosophy of 'आत्मन्'. Here we find a strong emphasis on the efficacy and value of intuition, which culminated in Bādarāyaṇa's system of Vedānta. The dominant feature of the Upaniṣadic philosophy is its monistic absolutism, and this led up to rationalistic reactions of various types, representing collateral and casual phases of upaniṣadic thought. Some of them came to be systematised later on: a) in the dualism and realism of Kapila's सांख्य and the allied discipline

of Patanjali's योग; b) in the pluralistic rationalism of Kaṇāda's वैशेषिक and its complementary न्याय of Gautama; c) yet others emerging as anti-vedic rebels in the form of the Jaina स्याद्वाद,(May-be-ism), the विज्ञानवाद (Idealism) and शून्यवाद (Nihilism) of the Buddhists, and the Cārvāka materialism.

The birth of the system:

We can trace the first rumblings of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system in the well-known three-fold scheme of self-culture leading to Self-realisation in the Upaniṣadic text "आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यो श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।" (Br. IV-5). Thus it is generally accepted that hearing (Śravaṇa) or initial comprehension represents the inaugural stage, investigation and discussion with the help of reason (मनन) represent the central stage and constant contemplation (निदिध्यासन) stands for the culminating stage. When deliberate attempts at reasoning become common, a timely warning is given by the formidable teacher of the Kaṭha upaniṣad, Death (Yama) that 'Self-realisation cannot be got through ratiocination or Tarka (नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया) only. The philosophical debates that were carried on under the auspices of Ajātaśatru and Janaka, indicate that during the period of the Upaniṣads, some logical doctrines should have not only begun to appear but also progressed beyond the nebulous stage.

Before the end of the Upaniṣadic period and prior to the advent of the Buddha, the Vedic scriptures embodying the results of the intuitive insight of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic seers had asserted their authority so far as to pursuade a large section of rationalistic thinkers to agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities. Smṛtikārās like Manu and Yājñavalkya

emphatically recognised the importance and value of logical reasoning for a correct comprehension of Dharma as taught by the Vedas. Another section of rationalistic thinkers who did not agree to play a subordinate role to scriptural authorities, perhaps developed and expounded rationalistic doctrines on independent lines, without subjecting themselves to the thraldom of Vedic religion and philosophy. Some of these doctrines perhaps shaped themselves into Sāṅkhya thought of the pre-Buddhistic stage, with a marked degree of hostility to Vedic ritualism. Some other doctrines of this kind gave rise to the pre-Buddhistic logic and metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika with a special leaning in favour of the deductive reasoning based on observation and analysis, and with a simple rationalistic scheme of two sources of valid knowledge — perception and inference (प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान).

About the 5th century B.C. when the antivedic movements of the Buddhism rose and began to spread, the exponents of Vedic philosophy and religion keenly felt the need for showing greater accommodation to rationalistic modes of thought. The rationalistic sources available for Vedic religion and philosophy had to be pooled together and kept fit for defensive and offensive use, as against the impact from collision with avaidika developments, like the disquieting nihilistic excesses of early Buddhism. Thus, the Nyāya of the Vedic exegesis and the logic and metaphysics of the early anti-vedic Vaiśeṣika came to fraternise with each other and gave rise to two sister schools of philosophical reasoning — the Vaiśeṣika school mainly concerned with *inductive observation and analysis,* inferring general laws from particular instances, and the Nyāya School chiefly

concerned with the formulation and elucidation of the principles of ratiocination on the basis of inductive reasoning. The doctrines of these two schools were systematised and redacted in the form of Nyāya Sūtras and Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, in all probability, not later than the middle of the fourth century B.C. The author of Nyāya Sūtras is known as Gautama and of Vaiśeṣika Sūtras as Kaṇāda. Gautama is otherwise known as अक्षपादः and Kaṇāda as उलूकः and काश्यपः । अक्षपादः was the personal name and गौतम the gotra name of the author of the Nyāya-Sūtras and कणाद and उलूक are the personal names and काश्यप the gotra name of the author of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, in the same way as the पक्षिलस्वामिन् is the personal name and वात्स्यायन the gotra name of the author of न्याय भाष्य. The Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras and the Nyāya-Sūtras were redated between the middle of the fourth century B.C., perhaps towards the end of the fourth century B.C., the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras being earlier than the Nyāya-Sūtras (refer p.no. XV to XXV of section III of Introduction to *A Primer of Indian Logic* - Part I by Maha-Mahopadhyaya S. Kuppuswami Sastry. Published by P. Varadachary & Co., 8, Lingi Chetty Street, Madras. 1932).

The names of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya may be connected with the two aspects of sound reasoning — the analytic or inductive aspect which mounts up from particulars (विशेष) to the general or universal (सामान्य) and the synthetic or deductive aspect which moves on from the universal (सामान्य) to the particular (विशेष). This inter-relation of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya came to be conceived of as two sister systems in spite of their differences on the metaphysical side. The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya are not restricted in their scope and aim

to logic in a narrow sense. Like other Indian systems, these two form self-contained philosophical disciplines of a complex character, with a distinctive central theme, correlated to their special goal. *The final cessation of all miseries* (अपवर्ग) *is the goal of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya.* The Vaiśeṣika stresses the analytical side of reasoning and furnishes the metaphysical background and the inductive basis of the Nyāya system. With the Vaiśeṣika material, suitably modified in minor details, the Nyāya builds up a complete system of epistemology and logic, combined to some extent with psychology, ethics, ontology and religion. Such, a mixed composition of Indian philosophical systems is due not to any lack of appreciation of differences of value in different things, but rather to the cultural outlook of India, which is dominated by an intense desire to synthesise all the departments of knowledge in a scheme of progressive realisation of life's ends culminating in final emancipation (मुक्तिः), conceived of as the summum bonum.

The importance of Nyāya:

Methodical reasoning, involving a critical investigation of knowledge got through perceptual experience and verbal testimony, ie अनुवीक्षा *with the help of the five - membered scheme of syllogistic expression* (न्याय *or* पञ्चावयव वाक्य), *forms the distinctive contribution of the Nyāya to philosophical thought.* Since its first redaction, the Nyāya System has permanently secured for itself a position of importance in the Hindu scheme of Vedic religion and philosophy, chiefly by the ancillary role which it has assumed in its relation to the Veda. The extant basic works of Nyāya are Gautama's Nyāya Sūtras, the Nyāya Bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana, otherwise known as पक्षिलस्वामिन्, and the

न्यायवार्तिक by Udyotakara. In the न्याय भाष्य and other works there is sufficient evidence to conclusively show that Dignāga, the famous Buddhistic logician, adversely criticised the Nyāya-Bhāṣya. Vātsyāyana is the earliest known writer who drew pointed attention to the reason why Gautama's Nyāya came to be regarded as the science of "epistemology and logic (प्रमाणशास्त्र, आनुवीक्षिकी, or न्यायशास्त्र)." Vātsyāyana indicates in the very first sentence of his Bhāṣya how valid thinking (प्रमा) and fruitful doing (अर्थक्रिया) serve as each other's axle in each other's wheels and how they constitute 'real living' with all its complexity in the pluralistic universe of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika realism. It is also worth noting that it is Vātsyāyana who first explained how the entire epistemological scheme of pramāṇas could be synthesised in a valid syllogistic expression and how, for this reason, logic proper just came to exercise a profound influence over the whole realm of philosophical thought in India. About the 6th century A.D. or in the former half of the seventh century, Udyotakara wrote his न्याय-वार्तिक the earliest extant commentary on Nyāya Bhāṣya. Udyotakara's great service to Nyāya consists in his successful endeavour to lift it up from the slough into which it was thrown by Dignāga's confutation of Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya.

After Udyotakara the philosophical contest between the anti-vedic and pro-vedic sides of the Nyāya thought was keenly carried on by great Buddhistic logicians like Dharma Kīrti, Dharmottara, and Ratnakīrti and eminent Brahmanical logicians like Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Bhāsarvajña and Udayana. Vācaspati himself has given 841 A.D. as the date of the composition of his index to Gautama's Sūtras, called न्याय सूची निबन्ध.

Vācaspati is famous for his polymathic learning and dispassionate philosophical outlook. He is the author of many important and authoritative treatises, mainly in the nature of expository and critical commentaries on almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. His ब्रह्मतत्त्व समीक्षा on Maṅḍana Miśra's ब्रह्मसिद्धिः and भामती on Saṁkara's Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya, represent the Advaita system. His तत्वकौमुदी on सांख्य and वैशारदी on योग-भाष्य represent the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system; and his न्याय सूची निबन्ध and न्याय वार्तिक तात्पर्य टीका represent the Nyāya system. There is evidence to show that Bhāmatī should have been his latest work. In his न्याय वार्तिक तात्पर्य टीका he renders intelligible the difficult portions of the न्याय वार्तिक and incidentally discusses several obscure portions of the न्याय भाष्य and the Nyāya Sūtra, in accordance with the Nyāya tradition handed down to him by his Nyāya teacher Trilocana. For the monumental contribution which he made to Nyāya in his तात्पर्य टीका he came to be known as the तात्पर्याचार्य in Nyāya literature. He justly claims, in his तात्पर्य टीका the special credit for having redeemed from oblivion Udyotakara's work, which came to be regarded very old and was nearly forgotten in the ninth century A.D. Jayanta's chief contribution to Nyāya is his Nyāya Mañjarī. This work is of the nature of an elaborate वृत्ति (expository gloss) on select Sūtras of Gautama. Jayanta himself says that the न्याय मञ्जरी was so well appreciated by his contemporaries that he came to be recognised as the वृत्तिकार of न्याय. Bhāsarvajña, who flourished perhaps about the beginning of the tenth century A.D. is the author of an important Nyāya work called न्याय सार and the distinctive feature of this work is its epistemology which deviates in certain respects from established Nyāya tradition as for instance,

discarding of उपमान as a distinct प्रमाण and in recognising six हेत्वाभास-s including अनध्यवसित. Udayanācārya is the greatest Naiyāyika of the 10th century A.D. At the end of one of his works, लक्षणावली he has given 984 A.D. as the date of its composition. Besides his erudite commentaries on प्रशस्तपाद's Bhāṣya and Vācaspati's तात्पर्य टीका किरणावाली and तात्पर्य परिशुद्धि, he wrote three important Nyāya works - the प्रबोधशुद्धि otherwise called न्याय परिशिष्ट, the आत्म तत्त्वविवेक - otherwise called बौद्ध-धिक्कार and the न्याय कुसुमाञ्जलि. The first of these three works contains an elucidative and illustrative exposition of the subtleties of Jāti (futile respondence) and Nigrahasthāna (Vulnerable points) in accordance with the dialectics of early Nyāya. The Ātma-Tattwa Viveka is a brilliant exposition of the Nyāya metaphysics with particular reference to the Nyāya conception of the self (Jīva) and contains a forcible refutation of the Buddhistic doctrines of momentariness (क्षण भङ्ग) and voidness (शून्यता). The कुसुमाञ्जलि is Udayana's masterpiece. It is devoted to refutation of the anti-theistic theories maintained by the Vedistic, Sāṅkhya, nihilistic and naturalistic schools of his age, and to the amplification and vindication of the Nyāya theism, chiefly on the basis of the creationistic view of causation. Udayana's theistic argument consists of two main parts: one part arguing towards values, design and causation in the sense of creation and the other part arguing to God from values, design and creation. His monumental contribution to Indian theism has secured for him the high rank of Nyāyācārya.

The period of growth of Nyāya:

The greatest Nyāya work which was written after Udayana is the तत्वचिन्तामणि by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. In this

monumental work, Gaṅgeśa utilised all the constructive, expository, critical and polemical material in the earlier works of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and gave the final shape and turn to the logic and metaphysics of Nyāya. In treating the various topics of Nyāya, the earlier writers usually adopted the categoristic method, which was inaugurated by Gautama. This method, as expounded by Vātsyāyana, consists in enumeration and classification (uddeśa or vibhāga) of definition (लक्षण), careful investigation and discussion (परीक्षा). Varadarāja's तार्किकरक्षा is the latest work (about 1100 A.D.) on Nyāya, which adopts the old categoristic method in accordance with the Nyāya-Sūtras and Bhāṣya. It was Gaṅgeśa who replaced this old method by what may be described as the epistemological method or the Pramāṇa method, which definitely shifted the emphasis from the categoristic treatment of the topics (पदार्थाः) of Nyāya to the epistemological treatment of the four means of valid cognition (प्रमाणानि) recognised by the Naiyāyikas. Thus, the Nyāya-Śāstra, which had remained hitherto a mere Padārtha-Śāstra for all practical purposes, was turned into a full-fledged प्रमाण शास्त्र in Gaṅgeśa's तत्वचिन्तामणि and in this partly lies the epoch-making character of this monumental work on Nyāya. That the Tattwa chiṅtāmaṇi serves as the basic work on which the whole literature of what is commonly known as Navya-Nyāya (modern Nyāya) rests is also another reason for regarding it as an epoch-making work. The Tattvacintāmaṇi, or the Maṇi as it is popularly known, consists of four main divisions represented by the four chapters (khāṇḍa) on perception (प्रत्यक्ष), inference (अनुमान), assimilation in the sense of analogising (उपमान) and verbal testimony (शब्द). In the course of an elaborate elucidation and discussion

of the nature and objective reach and content of these four pramāṇas, the relevent topics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system are considered in the main in comparison with kindred topics of other philosophical systems. Pakṣadharamisra, otherwise known as Jayadeva wrote a commentary called Āloka (आलोक) on the Maṇi (मणि). Vardhamānopādhyāya, the only son of Gaṅgeśa according to tradition, was also a reputed Naiyāyika of this period. He wrote several learned and illuminating works, generally known as prakāśa in the form of commentaries on Udayana's treatises, Gaṅgeśa's Maṇi and Vallabhācārya's Nyāya līlāvatī (न्यायलीलावती). Jayadeva's pupil, Rucidatta, was also a logician of considerable repute and was the author of a well-known commentary called मकरन्द on Vardhamāna's प्रकाश.

About the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th century, there flourished वासुदेव सार्वभौम, the greatest Naiyāyika of the period. He had the unique privilege and glory of having taught Nyāya to four of the greatest personalities of the 16th century, viz Caitanya, the greatest Vaiṣṇava teacher and reformer of Bengal in the 16th century; Raghunātha, otherwise known as तार्किकशिरोमणि (the crest-jewel of all logicians); Raghunandan, a famous Bengali lawyer; and Kṛṣṇānanda, a reputed Tantrika, who was a great authority on the different forms and charms of शक्ति cult. तर्क शिरोमणि Raghunātha was admittedly the greatest logician of the 16th century. He wrote several treatises on Nyāya, mostly in the form of commentaries and the greatest and the most famous of his works is the *Dīdhiti* (दीधिति), an expository and critical commentary on Gaṅgeśa's Maṇi. Mathurānātha was the most famous of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's pupils and wrote authoritative commentaries on the मणि and

दीधिति. Jagadīśa and Gadādhara were the greatest exponents of Navya-Nyāya as represented by the Maṇi and the Dīdhiti and flourished in the earlier part of the 17th century. The most important works of Jagadīśa and Gadādhara are studied carefully by those students who seek to specialise in Navya-Nyāya and they are regarded as constituting an indispensable discipline of high value to every scholar who wishes to be recognised as a sound sāstrin.

Synchretic School:

In the latter part of the 17th century, the Nyāya scholars interested themselves chiefly in the interpretation of the earlier and later works on Nyāya and in the production of Introductory books. शंकर मिश्र, विश्वनाथ पञ्चानन and अन्नंभट्ट are three of such scholars. Saṁkara Miśra wrote a commentary on the Jagadīśī (जगदीशी) and a comprehensive commentary called the Upaskāra (उपस्कार) on कणाद सूत्र. Viśvanātha Pancānana wrote a commentary on the Nyāya Sūtras in 1634; and he is famous as the author of the popular hand-book of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, called the Bhāsāparichheda (भासापरिच्छेद) or कारिकावली, which consists of 168 easy verses, accompanied by his own commentary called the न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली.

Annaṁbhaṭṭa, the writer of तर्कसंग्रह was an Andhra scholar who flourised in the latter part of the 17th century. He was a reputed scholar and a polymath. In the sphere of Pūrva Mīmāṁsa and Vedāṅta, he wrote a massive commentary called the राणकोज्जीवनी on Bhaṭṭa Someśvara's न्यायसुधा otherwise known as राणकद and a commentary on Brahma-Sūtras. He wrote an easy commentary on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī and an extensive

commentary called उद्योतन (Uddyotana) on Kaiyaṭa's प्रदीप. In the sphere of न्याय-वैशेषिक system he wrote a learned commentary called Siddāñjana on Jayadeva's मन्यालोक *as also the most popular hand-book of Indian logic, called the* तर्कसंग्रहः and its expository and supplementary gloss called the दीपिका. The name तर्कसंग्रह is interpreted by Annaṁbhaṭṭa himself as a *compendious elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and such other ontological categories of the Vaiśeṣika system, which are accepted by the Nyāya.* Thus the तर्कसंग्रह with दीपिका fulfils the object mentioned in the concluding verse "कणाद न्याय मतयोः बालव्युत्पत्ति सिद्धये । अन्नंभट्टेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसंग्रहः ॥"

"Annaṁbhaṭṭa has written this treatise called तर्कसंग्रह with the object of introducing beginners to a study of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems of Gautama and Kaṇāda."

Concluding Remarks:

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system originated in the rationalistic tendency of the Upanisadic age. The original current of rationalistic thought came to be broken into two systems, the Vedistic Nyāya and the anti-vedistic Vaiśeṣika. After some time, there was a rapproachment between these two schismatic developments. The Vaiśeṣika emphasis on the inductive side of reasoning, together with its realism and pluralism, served as the basis for the development of the Nyāya theory of deductive reasoning thought of as a well-defined scheme of syllogistic expression. All along the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya have been treated as sister systems (समान तंत्र) with a common rationalistic stress and realistic background, in spite of certain epistemological and ontological differences. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika is a

self-contained system of philosophy. Its roots strike deep into its pluralistic realism. Its scheme of external relation, its theory of truth and error, and its creationistic view of causation constitute its mainstay. Its thought-measuring devices and precise formulas form its ever-spread and never-fading foliage. Its fruit is the virile, though negativistic, doctrine of अभाव (non-existence) and अपवर्ग (final liberation). Its chief solace and comfort is in its rationalistic theism, with its demi-urgic, omnipotent and omniscient Īśvara. Its chief boast is its logical and dialectic machinery, which the believers and the heretics alike, the Āstikas and the Nāstikas alike, cannot do without. Whoever knows Nyāya, knows the प्रमाण; he is a प्रमाणवित्, a philosopher in the strict sense, according to Indian tradition.

Based on "*A Primer of Indian Logic* by महामहोपाध्याय विद्यावाचस्पति S. Kuppuswami Sastri; M.A., T.E.S. Published by P. Varadachary & co., 8, Lingi Chetty Street, Madras in 1932.

SECTION I

ENUMERATION (*Uddeśa*)

Opening Prayer:

निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम् ।
बालानां सुखबोधाय क्रियते तर्कसंग्रहः ॥ १ ॥

Nidhāya, enshrining; *hṛdi,* in my heart; *viśveśam,* the Lord of the universe; *vidhāya,* tendering; *guruvandanam,* salutations to the preceptor; *bālānām,* of the beginners; *sukhabodhāya,* for easy comprehension; *kriyate,* is composed; *tarkasaṁgrahaḥ,* the compendium elucidating the nature of substances etc.

1. Devotedly meditating on the Lord of the universe in my heart, and offering my salutations to the preceptor, I proceed to compile the book (known as) the Tarkasaṁgraha for the easy comprehension of the beginners.[1]

विश्वेश्वरं साम्बमूर्तिं प्रणिपत्य गिरां गुरुम् ।
टीकां शिशुहितां कुर्वे तर्कसंग्रहदीपिकाम् ॥

चिकीर्षितस्य ग्रन्थस्य निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यर्थं शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतिबोधितकर्तव्यताक-इष्टदेवतानमस्कारात्मकं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षायै ग्रन्थतो निबध्नंश्चिकीर्षितं प्रतिजानीते । **निधायेति** । ननु मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वं नास्ति । मङ्गले कृतेऽपि किरणावल्यादौ समाप्त्यदर्शनात्, मङ्गलाभावेऽपि कादम्बर्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनाच्च अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां व्यभिचारादिति चेत् न । किरणावल्यादौ विघ्नबाहुल्यात्समाप्त्यभावः । कादम्बर्यादौ ग्रन्थाद्बहिरेव मङ्गलं कृतमतो न व्यभिचारः । ननु मङ्गलस्य (ग्रन्थादौ) कर्तव्यत्वे

किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् न । शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतेरेव प्रमाणत्वात् । तथा हि मङ्गलं वेद-बोधितकर्तव्यताकमलौकिकाविगीतशिष्टाचारविषयत्वाद्दर्शादिवत् । भोजनादौ व्यभिचार वारणाय अलौकिकेति । रात्रिश्राद्धादौ व्यभिचारवारणाय **अविगीतेति** । शिष्टपदं स्पष्टार्थम् । न कुर्यान्निष्फलं कर्म इति जलताडनादेरपि निषिद्धत्वात् । तर्क्यन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्ते इति तर्काः द्रव्यादिपदार्थास्तेषां संग्रहः सङ्क्षेपेण स्वरूपकथनं क्रियत इत्यर्थः । कस्मै प्रयोजनायेत्यत आह । **सुखबोधायेति** । सुखेनानायासेन यो बोधः पदार्थज्ञानं तस्मा इत्यर्थः । ननु बहुषु तर्कग्रन्थेषु सत्सु किमर्थमपूर्वोऽयं ग्रन्थः क्रियत इत्यत आह । **बालानामिति** । तेषामतिविस्तृतत्वाद्बालानां बोधो न जायत इत्यर्थः । ग्रहणधारणपटुर्बालः न तु स्तनन्धयः । किं कृत्वा क्रियत इत्यत आह । **निधायेति** । विश्वेशं जगन्नियन्तारम् । हृदि निधाय नितरां स्थापयित्वा सदा तद्ध्यानपरो भूत्वेत्यर्थः । गुरूणां विद्यागुरूणां, वन्दनं नमस्कारं, विधाय कृत्वेत्यर्थः ॥

Dīpikā:

Prostrating before the Lord of the Universe, who is one with the Divine Mother and is the master of words. I begin the commentary called Tarkasaṁgraha Dīpika, which will benefit beginners. To achieve the unhindered completion of the treatise that is desired to be undertaken, and also as an instruction to the students, the author pays his devout homage to his Chosen Deity with an appropriate Propitiatory Verse (*Maṅgala śloka*) at the very commencement of the treatise. This time-honoured practice is enjoined by the Vedic Text as is inferred from the authority derived from the observances of good people.[2]

Objection: Now, a propitiatory verse does not possess the efficacy to accomplish unhindered completion (of the treatise); because, it is seen that books like Kādambarī etc., are incomplete though they were undertaken with appropriate propitiatory verses, while works like Kiraṇāvalī etc., were completed without any hindrance even though no propitiatory verses were incorporated at the beginning. Thus, there is deviation in the law of 'positive and negative factors.'[3]

Reply: It is not so; because the non-completion is due to the abundance of obstacles in works like Kādambarī etc. (i.e., the propitiatory verse was not capable of overcoming

the obstacles since the latter overwhelmed the former). In books like Kiraṇāvalī etc., the propitiatory prayer was done by the author extraneously (i.e., mentally or in his previous birth) without incorporating the same in the book. Therefore, there is no deviation.[4]

Question: But what is the authority for the necessity to incorporate the invocatory verse (at the beginning of a treatise)?

Answer: Vedic injunction inferred from the observation of good practices of virtuous men is verily the authority. Propitiation is known to have been enjoined in the Vedic Text because it is (a) a topic that cannot be known from sources other than the Vedas (*alaukika*), (b) is uncensured (*avigīta* in the Dharma Śāstras), and (c) is the object of the observances by virtuous men, like the *Darśa* etc. In order to aviod deviation in (daily practices like) eating etc propitiatory prayer is said to be *alaukika* (because eating etc are also the objects of observances by virtuous men and are uncensured. To guard against this deviation, *alaukika* is inserted). The term *avigīta* is inserted to remove overapplication in obsequial rites etc. performed during night. The word *śiṣṭa* (good man) is used only for clarity (and is not superfluous) because it is said: 'One should not engage oneself in fruitless labour,' as even striking water without any purpose is prohibited in the scriptures.

Exposition or elucidation is *Tarka.* The meaning is: It is a compendious elucidation of the nature of the seven ontological categories beginning with substance. What is the purpose? The answer is: *sukha bodhāya,* for the easy comprehension, ie by studying which an easy comprehension of the knowledge of the categories is obtained.

Question: For what purpose is this new work undertaken when there are already many *tarka granthas* in existence?

Answer: *Bālānām* - for beginners; the meaning is that the beginners are unable to grasp the elucidation of the nature of categories since in those books (already in existence) it is treated in great detail. *Beginner* is one who is dexterous in grasping and retaining in memory (the elucidation of the

nature of categories etc), and not one who is merely a suckling (but has studied grammar, poetry etc).

Question: By doing what is this (work) composed?

Answer: *Nidhāya,* devoutly meditating in the heart the Lord who is of the nature of Auspiciousness and who is the Controller of the Universe, and offering salutations to the teachers of knowledge (*this treatise is composed*).

2. Classification of the categories (which are the Reals):

द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाऽभावाः सप्तपदार्थाः ॥ २ ॥

Dravya, substance; *guṇa,* quality; *karma,* action; *sāmānya,* generality; *viśeṣa,* particularity; *samavāya,* inherence; *abhāva,* negation; (are the) *sapta,* seven; *padārthāḥ,* categories.

2. Substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence, and negation are the seven categories.

पदार्थान् विभजते । **द्रव्येति** । पदस्यार्थः पदार्थः इति व्युत्पत्त्याभिधेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम् (लभ्यते) । ननु विभागादेव सप्तत्वे सिद्धे सप्त (पद) ग्रहणं व्यर्थमिति चेत्, न अधिकसंख्याव्यवच्छेदार्थकत्वात् । नन्वतिरिक्तः पदार्थः प्रमितो वा न वा । नाऽद्यः प्रमितस्य निषेधायोगात् । न द्वितीयः प्रतियोगिप्रमितिं विना निषेधानुपपत्तेरिति चेत्, न । पदार्थत्वं द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वव्याप्यमिति व्यवच्छेदार्थकत्वात् (सप्तग्रहणम्) । ननु सप्तान्यतमत्वं सप्तभिन्नभिन्नत्वमिति वक्तव्यम् । सप्तभिन्नस्याप्रसिद्धया कथं सप्तान्यतमत्वव्याप्तिनिश्चय इति चेत्, न । द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वं नाम द्रव्यादिभेदसप्तकाभाववत्त्वम् । अतो दोषविरहात् । एवमग्रेऽपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

Dīpikā:

Categories are being enumerated. *Category* is a thing corresponding to a name. In the light of this derivation, the general definition of categories is *an object named or denoted by the corresponding word.*

Objection: Since by classification itself we get seven categories, the use of the word *sapta* is superfluous.

Reply: Not so; because, the insertion of the word *sapta* is used to exclude a larger number.

Objection: Is then, the additional category (ie the eighth category sought to be precluded) a known entity or is it unknown? It cannot be the former, for, a known object cannot be held as having no existence at all; it cannot be the latter too; for, how can an unknown object be repudiated when the knowledge of its counter-entity has not become the content of one's mind at all?[5]

Reply: It is not so; because, by *padārthatva* (ie the fact of being a category) is meant the fact of categoriness being pervasive of any one of the seven categories beginning with substance. Thus, the term *sapta* serves the purpose of exclusion (of a larger number).[6]

Objection: If it is so, *any-one-ness* (in each of the seven categories) must be admitted to mean *differenceness from what is other than the seven.* But since a thing other than the seven is unknown, how can the *pervasion of any-one-ness* be determined (ie only if there exists an eighth *padārtha* it would be possible for it to be other than all those seven. When the eighth *padārtha* itself is unknown, there cannot be the one which is different from seven)?

Reply: It is not so; because, any-one-ness in each of the seven categories beginning with substance means the non-existence of difference of seven categories beginning with substance in any one category. As such there is no defect in the above statement. Further, it has to be interpreted similarly whenever occasions arise.[7]

3. Classification of substance:

तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ॥ ३ ॥

Tatra, of these; *dravyāṇi,* the substances (are); *pṛthivī,* earth; *ap,* water; *tejaḥ,* light; *vāyu,* air; *ākāśa,* ether; *kāla,* time; *dik,* space; *ātma,* soul; *manas,* mind; *nava eva,* nine only.

3. Of the seven categories, the substances are only

nine, viz, earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind.

द्रव्यं (द्रव्याणि) विभजते । **तत्रेति** । तत्र द्रव्यादिमध्ये । द्रव्याणि नवैवेत्यन्वयः । कानि तानि इत्यत आह । **पृथिवीति** । ननु तमसो दशमद्रव्यस्य विद्यमानत्वात्कथं नवैव द्रव्याणीति । तथा हि । नीलं तमश्चलतीत्यबाधितप्रतीतिबलान्नीलरूपाधारतया क्रियाधारतया च तमसो द्रव्यत्वं तावत् सिद्धम् । तत्र तमसो नाकाशादिपञ्चकेऽन्तर्भावः रूपवत्त्वात् । अत एव न वायौ, स्पर्शाभावात् सदागतिमत्त्वाभावाच्च । नापि तेजसि, भास्वररूपाभावात् उष्णस्पर्शाभावाच्च । नापि जले, शीतस्पर्शाभावात् नीलरूपवत्त्वाच्च । नापि पृथिव्यां, गन्धाभावात् स्पर्शरहितत्वाच्च । तस्मात्तमो दशमद्रव्यमिति चेत्, न । तमसस्तेजोऽभावरूपत्वात् । तथा हि । तमो न रूपिद्रव्यमालोकासहकृतचक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वा-दालोकाभाववत् । रूपिद्रव्यचाक्षुषप्रमायामालोकस्य कारणत्वात् । तस्मात् प्रौढप्रकाशकतेजस्सामान्याभावस्तमः, तत्र नीलं तमश्चलति इति प्रत्ययो भ्रमः । अतो नव द्रव्याणीति सिद्धम् । द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वं गुणवत्त्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् । लक्ष्यैकदेशावृत्तित्वमव्याप्तिः । यथा गोः कपिलत्वम् । अलक्ष्ये लक्षणस्य वर्तनमतिव्याप्तिः । यथा गोः शृङ्गित्वम् । लक्ष्यमात्रावृत्तित्वमसंभवः । यथा गोरेकशफवत्त्वम् । एतद्दूषणत्रयरहितधर्मो लक्षणम् । स एवासाधारणधर्म इत्युच्यते । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमनियतत्वमसाधारणत्वम् । व्यावर्तकस्यैव लक्षणत्वे व्यावृत्तावभिधेयत्वादौ चातिव्याप्तिरतस्तद्वारणाय तद्भिन्नत्वं धर्मविशेषणं देयम् । व्यवहारस्यापि लक्षणप्रयोजनत्वे तन्न देयम् । व्यावृत्तेरपि व्यवहारसाधनत्वात् । ननु गुणवत्त्वं न द्रव्यलक्षणम्, आद्यक्षणावच्छिन्नघटे उत्पन्नविनष्टघटे चाव्याप्तेरिति चेत्, न । गुणसमानाधिकरणसत्ताभिन्नजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । नन्वेवमपि एकं रूपं रसात्पृथक् इति व्यवहाराद्रूपादावतिव्याप्तिरिति चेत्, न । एकार्थसमवायादेव तादृशव्यवहारोपपत्तौ गुणे गुणानङ्गीकारात् ।

Dīpikā:

Substance is being divided by the Text: *tatra*. ....Among the seven categories, substances are only nine. What are they? The answer is given in the Text: *Earth*.... etc.

Objection: How can substances be enumerated as only nine when a tenth substance, *darkness* (*Tamas*) exists? The substance *darkness* is proved since it is the substratum of colour and movement that arises from the irrefutable knowledge, *blue darkness moves*. Moreover, darkness cannot be included in

any one of the five substances beginning with ether because of the absence of *rūpa* in them; not in air, because of the absence of touch and of constant motion in darkness; nor does darkness get included in light because of the absence of brilliant colour and hot-touch; nor in water as it is devoid of cold-touch and as it is also the substratum of blue colour; nor in earth, owing to the absence of odour and as it is devoid of touch. Therefore, *darkness* is the tenth substance.

Reply: Not so; because, darkness is of the nature of the negation of light. Nor can darkness be a substance having colour for the simple reason that the presence of light is an essential factor in perceiving a substance having colour, whereas darkness is perceived only when there is no light. Darkness is, therefore, nothing but the general absence of intense and powerful luminous light. Here the cognition: *blue darkness moves* is erroneous knowledge. Thus it is proved that substances are only nine.[8]

The general definition of substance is *something possessing the genus substanceness* (*dravyatva*), or *possessing a quality.* Partial inapplication (*avyāpti*) is non-application of the definition to some of the things defined, eg the brownness of a cow.[9] Overapplicability (*ativyāpti*) is the application of the definition to things not intended to be defined, eg the horn of a cow.[10] A definition which is wholly inapplicable to any of the things defined is total inapplicability (*asambhava*), eg the uncloven hoof of a cow.[11] So, that attribute alone can be a definition which is free from these three types of defects, eg the definition of a cow as an animal having dewlap. This is called the special characteristic mark of a cow. 'Special characterness' (*Asādhāraṇatva*) consists in being reciprocally co-extensive with the adjunct that delimits the scope of things sought to be defined (ie it is a characteristic mark that covers all things denoted by the definition). To explain: wherever there is cowness which is the delimiting adjunct of the cow, there is also dewlap and where there is no cowness there is also no dewlap. This is reciprocal co-existence (*samaniyatatva*).[12]

Objection: Since the function of definition is the exclusion of the thing defined from everything other than itself, this definition of definition (*asādhāraṇatva*) suffers from the defect of overapplicability in *vyāvṛtti* and *abhidheyatva.*

Reply: To avoid this overapplicability in *itarabheda* and *abhidheyatva,* the attribute, *other than itarabheda and abhidheyatva* must be added to *asādhāraṇatva.* If it is said that *vyāvahārika lakṣaṇa* (ie the definition that is the cause of conventional usage of words) is also the definitum to *asādhāraṇatva,* then, we need not add (the attribute of *tadbhinnatvam*) because, *vyāvṛtti* is the cause of conventional expression of words like *cow* etc.

Objection: The general definition of substance cannot be as *that possessing quality,* since it suffers from the defect of partial applicability in a jar in the first moment of its creation and destruction.[13]

Reply: Not so; because of the desirability of amplifying the definition as that which possesses the generic attribute (which is less comprehensive) different from existence (*sattābhinna, sattā* being more comprehensive) and which co-exists at the same time with quality in the same substratum.[14]

Objection: Even then, in conventional usages like, *one colour, different from taste,* etc there is overapplicability in *colour* etc.

Reply: Not so; because, such conventional usages are current only because of *ekārthasamavāya*; and also because the statement *quality exists in quality* is unacceptable.[15]

4. Classification of Quality:

रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्श-संख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोग-विभाग-परत्वा-ऽपरत्व-गुरुत्व-द्रवत्व-स्नेह-शब्द-बुद्धि-सुख-दुःखेच्छा द्वेष-प्रयत्न-धर्माधर्म-संस्काराः चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणाः ॥ ४ ॥

Rūpa, colour; *rasa,* taste; *gandha,* odour; *sparśa,* touch; *saṅkhyā,* number; *parimāṇa,* magnitude; *pṛthaktva,* separateness; *saṁyoga,*

conjunction; *vibhāga,* disjunction; *paratva,* remoteness; *aparatva,* proximity; *gurutva,* heaviness; *dravatva,* fluidity; *sneha,* viscidity; *śabda,* sound; *buddhi,* cognition; *sukha,* pleasure; *duḥkha,* pain; *icchā,* desire; *dveṣa,* dislike; *prayatna,* volition; *dharma,* merit; *adharma,* demerit; *saṁskārāḥ,* (and) tendencies (are the); *caturviṁśati,* twentyfour; *guṇāḥ,* qualities..

4. Colour, taste, odour, touch, number, magnitude, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscidity, sound, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and tendency are the twenty-four qualities.

गुणान्विभजते । **रूपेति** । द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सति सामान्यवान् गुणः । गुणत्वजातिमान्वा । ननु लघुत्वकठिनत्वमृदुत्वादीनां विद्यमानत्वात् कथं चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणा इति चेत्, न । लघुत्वस्य गुरुत्वाभावरूपत्वान्मृदुत्वकठिनत्वयोः अवयवसंयोगविशेषत्वात् ।

Dīpikā:

Qualities are sub-divided by the statement in the Text: *rūpa.....* Quality is that which *possesses generality while at the same time being quite different from substance and actions;*[16] or, it is that *which possesses the generic attribute, qualityness.*[17]

Objection: Since the existence of qualities like levity, softness, hardness etc is known, how can the qualities be enumerated as twenty-four only?

Reply: They are not included because lightness is of the nature of the absence of heaviness, while softness and hardness are simply various degrees of density of contact among the parts.

5. Classification of Action (Karma-Vibhāga):

उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्च कर्माणि ॥ ५ ॥

Utkṣepaṇa, upward motion; *apakṣepaṇa,* downward motion; *ākuñcana,* contraction; *prasāraṇa,* expansion; *gamana,* motion (are the); *pañca karmāṇi,* five actions.

5. Action is of five kinds; they are: upward motion, downward motion, contraction, expansion and motion from one place to another.

कर्म विभजते । **उत्क्षेपणेति** । संयोगभिन्नत्वे सति संयोगासमवायिकारणं कर्म कर्मत्वजातिमद्वा । भ्रमणादीनामपि गमने अन्तर्भावान्न पञ्चत्वविरोधः ॥

Dīpikā:

Action is being sub-divided by the Text: *utkṣepaṇa.....* *Action* is the *non-inherent cause of conjunction while being quite different from conjunction* (ie action itself is not conjunction); or, it is that *which possesses the genus of Action (Karmatvajātimān).*[18]

Objection: Since other kinds of *actions* like *gyration* exist, the enumeration of *action* as five is inappropriate.

Reply: Not so; since *actions* like *gyration* etc are also included under *motion,* there is no contradiction with the enumeration of *action* as five.[19]

6. Classification of Generality:

परमपरं चेति द्विविधं सामान्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

Param, more comprehensive; *aparam,* less comprehensive; *ca,* and; *iti,* thus; *dvividham,* two-fold; *sāmānyam,* (is) generality.

6. Generality is of two kinds; the more comprehensive, and the less comprehensive.

सामान्यं विभजते । **परमिति** । परमधिकदेशवृत्ति । अपरं न्यूनदेशवृत्ति । सामान्यादिचतुष्टये जातिर्नास्ति ॥

Dīpikā:

Generality is being sub-divided by the Text: *param.....* That which pervades more space is the more comprehensive, and that which pervades less space is the less comprehensive. There is no *generality* in the four categories beginning with *generality.*[20]

7. Particularities:

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता एव ॥ ७ ॥

Nityadravyavṛttayaḥ, abiding in eternal substances (are); *viśeṣāḥ,* particularities; *tu,* but; *anantāḥ eva,* innumerable indeed.

7. But, particularities abiding in eternal substances are innumerable indeed.

विशेषं विभजते । **नित्येति** । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयपरमाणवः आकाशादिपञ्चकं च नित्यद्रव्याणि ।

Dīpikā:

Particularities are being divided by the Text: *nitya....* The atoms of four substances beginning with earth (prthivī) and the five substances beginning with ether (*ākāśa*) are the eternal substances (in which particularities inhere).[21]

8. Inherence:

समवायस्त्वेक एव ॥ ८ ॥

Samavāyaḥ, inherence; *tu,* but; *eka eva,* one only.

8. But inherence is only one.

समवायस्य भेदो नास्तीत्याह । **समवायस्त्विति** ।

Dīpikā:

By the Text: *Inherence...,* it is said that there is no difference in *inherence.*[22]

9. Classification of Negation:

अभावश्चतुर्विधः - प्रागभावः, प्रध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावः, अन्योन्याभावश्चेति ॥ ९ ॥

Abhāvaḥ, negation; *caturvidhaḥ,* fourfold; *prāgabhāvaḥ,*

antecedent negation; *pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ,* destructive negation; *atyantābhāvaḥ,* absolute negation; *anyonyābhāvaḥ,* mutual negation; *ca iti,* and thus.

9. Negation is fourfold: antecedent negation; destructive negation; absolute negation and mutual negation.

अभावं विभजते । **प्रागभावेति ।**

Dīpikā:

Negation is being sub-divided in the Text: *abhāva.....*[23]

SECTION II
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBSTANCES

1. Earth:

तत्र गन्धवती पृथिवी । सा द्विविधा-नित्याऽनित्या च । नित्या परमाणुरूपा । अनित्या कार्यरूपा । पुनस्त्रिविधा शरीरेन्द्रिय विषयभेदात् । शरीरमस्मदादीनाम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं घ्राणम् । तच्च नासाग्रवर्ति । विषयो मृत्पाषाणादिः ॥ १ ॥

Tatra, of these; *gandhavatī,* possessing odour; *pṛthivī,* the earth (is); *sā dvividhā,* it is two-fold; *nityā anityā ca,* eternal and non-eternal; *nityā paramāṇurūpā,* eternal is the atomic; *anityā kāryarūpā,* non-eternal is the product; *punaḥ trividhā,* again threefold; *śarīra-indriya-viṣaya bhedāt,* due to its division into body, organ, (and) object; *śarīram asmadādīnām,* body is that like ours; *indriyam gandhagrāhakam ghrāṇam,* the organ is the cogniser of smell (known as) the olfactory sense; *tat ca nāsāgravarti,* and that abides at the tip of the nose; *viṣayo mṛtpāṣāṇādiḥ,* objects are clay, earthy stones etc.

1. Of the substances, earth is that which has odour (as its inherent) quality. It is of two varieties; eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is the atomic and non-eternal is the product. Again, it is threefold: body, organ, and object. Body is that like ours; that which grasps odour is the olfactory organ and it abides at the tip of the nose. The earthy objects are like clay, stone and such other things.

तत्रोद्देशक्रमानुसारात् प्रथमं पृथिव्या लक्षणमाह । **तत्रेति** । नाम्ना पदार्थसंकीर्तनमुद्देशः । उद्देशक्रमे च सर्वत्रेच्छैवं नियामिका । ननु सुरभ्यसुरभ्यवयवाख्ये द्रव्ये परस्परविरोधेन गन्धानुत्पादादव्याप्तिः । न च तत्र गन्धप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । अवयवगन्धस्यैव तत्र प्रतीतिसंभवेन चित्रगन्धानङ्गीकारात् किं चोत्पन्नविनष्टघटादावव्याप्तिरिति चेत् न । गन्धसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । ननु जलादावपि गन्धप्रतीतिरिति चेत् न । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पृथिवीगन्धस्यैव तत्र भानाङ्गीकारात् । ननु कालस्य सर्वाधारतया सर्वेषां लक्षणानां कालेऽतिव्याप्तिरिति चेत् न । सर्वाधारताप्रयोजकभिन्नसंबन्धेन लक्षणत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । पृथिवीं विभजते । **सा द्विविधेति** । नित्यत्वं ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् । अनित्यत्वं ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वम् । प्रकारान्तरेण विभजते । **पुनरिति** । आत्मनो भोगायतनं शरीरम् । यदवच्छिन्नात्मनि भोगो जायते तद्भोगायतनम् । सुखदुःखसाक्षात्कारो भोगः । शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनः संयोगाश्रयत्वमिन्द्रियत्वम् । शरीरेन्द्रियभिन्नो विषयः । एवं च गन्धवच्छरीरं पार्थिवशरीरम्, गन्धवदिन्द्रियं पार्थिवेन्द्रियम्, गन्धवान् विषयः पार्थिवविषय इति तत्तल्लक्षणं बोध्यम् । पार्थिवशरीरं दर्शयति । **शरीरमिति** । इन्द्रियं दर्शयति । **इन्द्रियमिति** । गन्धग्राहकमिति प्रयोजनम् । घ्राणमिति संज्ञा । नासाग्रेत्याश्रयोक्तिः । एवमुत्तरत्र ज्ञेयम् । पार्थिवविषयं दर्शयति । **मृत्पाषाणादीति** ।

Dīpikā:

Following the Nyāya order of exposition, the characteristic mark of *earth* is defined next to enumeration of categories etc. *Uddeśa* is enumeration of categories by naming them. One's intent alone is the regulator in the sequence of enumeration.[24]

Objection: Now, in a substance composed of parts having fragrant and foul smell, there is the *non-birth* of odour owing to the two kinds of odour being mutually incompatible. So, here is the defect of partial applicability of the definition.[25] Nor can it be said that, in that case, apprehension of odour in the substance is rendered impossible, because the smell experienced in the component parts will certainly be apprehended in the substance also. Further, variegated odour is unacceptable to the Siddhāntin.[26] Also, there is partial applicability (of the definition in the earthy products like) jar etc. just created and destroyed.[27]

Reply: Not so; (ie there is no defect of partial applicability

in products just produced and destroyed); because, of the desirability of amplifying the definition as *that which possesses a generic attribute less comprehensive than substanceness while co-existing with odour in the same substratum.*

Objection: In water also odour is apprehended. So, here is overapplicability (because even water etc besides earth possess odour).

Reply: Not so; because, the apprehension of odour in water is due to the contact of minute particles of earth mixed with it and this can be proved by applying the method of affirmation and negation.[28] Odour appears to be present in water owing to the relation of *saṁyukta samavāya* (ie inherence in a thing which has come into contact with another thing).

Objection: All the definitions suffer from the defect of over-applicability in *Time* since *Time* is the container of everything (because everything exists in *Time*).

Reply: No such defect occurs since each definition has to be defined by its relation to substance other than its relation to *Time* (and *Space*) which are the essential factors, since they are the supports of everything.

Earth is being divided by the Text: *sā dvividhā....* Eternality is being non-liable to destruction. Non-eternality is being liable to destruction. Earth is further classified by the Text: *punaḥ....* *Body* is the seat of the soul for experiences (of the fruits of actions, good, bad, and mixed). That (ie the body) which delimits the soul in which enjoyments take place, is the seat of enjoyment. Enjoyment is the immediate experience of pleasure and pain. *Organ* is being the substratum of contact with mind which causes knowledge, while not being the substratum of any manifested special quality except sound. *Object* is that which is different from body and organ. Thus, a body having smell, is the *earthy body,* an organ producing the knowledge of odour is the *earthy organ,* and an object possessing odour is the *earthy object.* The respective characteristic marks (of body, organ, and object) are thus to be understood. *Earthy body* is shown by the Text: *śarīram....* The *earthy organ* is

indicated by the Text: *indriyam.... Gandhagrāhakam* in the Text indicates the necessity of the organ to apprehend odour. *Ghrāṇam* in the Text indicates the name of the organ. *Nāsāgravarti* in the Text indicates the seat of the organ. These terms are to be understood in similar ways hereafter too (whenever they occur). *Viṣaya* in the Text indicates earthy objects like clay and stone.

2. Water: (ap)

शीतस्पर्शवत्यः आपः । ता द्विविधाः नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्याः परमाणुरूपाः । अनित्याः कार्यरूपाः । पुनः त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं वरुणलोके । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं जिह्वाग्रवर्ति । विषयः सरित् समुद्रादिः ॥ २ ॥

Śītasparśavatyaḥ āpaḥ, water (is a thing) having cold touch; *tāḥ dvividhāḥ,* it is two-fold; *nityāḥ,* eternals; *anityāḥ,* non-eternals; *ca,* and; *nityāḥ paramāṇurūpāḥ,* eternals are of the nature of atoms; *anityāḥ kāryarūpāḥ,* non-eternals are of the nature of products; *punaḥ trividhāḥ,* again it is threefold; *śarīra-indriya-viṣaya-bhedāt,* owing to difference in body, organ (and) object; *śarīram varuṇaloke,* body is in the region of Varuṇa; *indriyam,* organ; *rasagrāhakam,* (is that) which apprehends taste; *rasanam,* (it is the) gustatory organ; *jihvāgravarti,* it is located at the tip of the tongue; *viṣayaḥ,* (the) object; *sarit samudrādiḥ,* river, sea and the like.

2. Water is that which has cold-touch. It is of two kinds: eternals and non-eternals; eternals are of the nature of atoms and non-eternals are of the nature of products; it is again of three varieties: body, organ, and object. Its body is in the region of Varuṇa; organ is the gustatory sense by which one perceives savour, and it is located at the tip of the tongue. Objects are rivers, oceans and the like.

अपां लक्षणमाह । **शीतेति** । उत्पन्नविनष्टजलेऽव्याप्तिवारणाय शीतस्पर्शसमाना-धिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमत्त्वं विवक्षितम् । "शीतं शिलातलम्" इत्यादौ जलसंबन्धादेव शीतस्पर्शभानमिति नातिव्याप्तिः । अन्यत्सर्वं पूर्वरीत्या व्याख्येयम् ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text gives the characteristic mark of water: *Śīta....* To remove partial applicability in water just produced and destroyed, the definition of water should be interpreted *as having the generic attribute which is less comprehensive than substanceness,* and *which has the same substratum with cold touch.*[29] Further, there is no overapplicability in slabs of stones where coldness is felt because, the feeling of cold touch in them is owing to the presence of water in the stone.[30] Everything else has to be interpreted as before.

3. Light: (Tejas)

उष्णस्पर्शवत् तेजः । तच्च द्विविधं, नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यं परमाणुरूपम् । अनित्यं कार्यरूपम् । पुनः त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं आदित्यलोके प्रसिद्धम् । इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णताराग्रवर्ति । विषयः चतुर्विधः, भौम-दिव्य-औदर्य-आकरज भेदात् । भौमं वह्न्यादिकम् । अबिन्धनं दिव्यं विद्युदादि । भुक्तस्य परिणामहेतुरौदर्यम् । आकरजं सुवर्णादि ॥ ३ ॥

uṣṇasparśavat, having hot touch; *tejaḥ,* (is) light; *tat ca,* and that (is); *dvividham,* two-fold; *nityam anityam ca,* eternal and non-eternal; *nityam paramāṇurūpam,* eternal is of the nature of atom; *anityam kāryarūpam,* non-eternal is of the nature of product; *punaḥ trividham,* again, it is threefold; *śarīra-indriya-viṣaya bhedāt,* owing to division into body, organ and object; *śarīram ādityaloke,* body is in the solar region; *prasiddham,* is wellknown; *indriyam,* organ; *rūpagrāhakam,* (which) perceives colour; *cakṣuḥ,* (is the) eye; *kṛṣṇatārāgravarti,* (and it) is located

in the forepart of the black pupil; *viṣayaḥ,* object *caturvidhaḥ,* (is) fourfold; *bhauma,* earthy; *divya,* heavenly; *audarya,* gastric; *ākaraja,* mineral; *bhedāt,* due to division into; *bhaumam,* the earthy (variety); *vahnyādikam,* fire etc,; *abindhanam,* produced by watery fuel; *divyam,* is heavenly; *vidyudādi,* lightning etc; *bhuktasya,* of food eaten; *pariṇāmahetuḥ,* the cause of transformation; *audaryam,* (is) the gastric fire; *ākarajam,* produced in mines; *suvarṇādi,* gold and the like.

3. Light is that which has hot touch. And, that is of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is of the nature of atom and the non-eternal is of the nature of the product. It is again of three kinds: body, organ, and object. The body is wellknown in the solar region. The organ is the (visual sense) eye which perceives colour and it has for its seat the forepart of the dark pupil of the eye. The object is of four kinds: earthy, heavenly, gastric and mineral. The earthy variety is the common fire and the like; lightning produced from watery fuel is the heavenly variety; the gastric variety is that which causes digestion of food eaten; lustrous metals like gold etc belong to the mineral variety.

तेजसो लक्षणमाह । **उष्णस्पर्शवदिति** । 'उष्णं जलम्' इति प्रतीतेस्तेजः संयोगानुविधायित्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः । विषयं विभजते । **भौमेति** । ननु 'सुवर्णं पार्थिवं' पीतत्वाद्गुरुत्वात् हरिद्रावत् इति चेत् न । अत्यन्तानलसंयोगे सति घृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशादर्शनेन, जलमध्यस्थघृतादौ तन्नाशादर्शनेन च असति प्रतिबन्धके पार्थिवद्रवत्वनाशाग्निसंयोगयोः कार्यकारणभावावधारणात्सुवर्णस्य अत्यन्तानलसंयोगे सत्यनुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वाधिकरणत्वेन पार्थिवत्वाऽनुपपत्तेः पीतद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशप्रतिबन्धकतया द्रवद्रव्यान्तरसिद्धौ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाधिकरणतया जलत्वानुपपत्तेः रूपवत्तया वाय्वादिष्वनन्तर्भावात्तेजसत्वसिद्धिः । तस्योष्णस्पर्शभास्वररूपयोरुपष्टम्भक पार्थिवरूपस्पर्शाभ्यां प्रतिबन्धादनुपलब्धिः । तस्मात् सुवर्णं तैजसमिति सिद्धम् ।

Dīpikā:

The characteristic mark of light is given in the Text: *Uṣṇa....* There is no defect of overapplicability in the knowledge: *This water is hot*; because, such knowledge arises in water owing to the contact of fire with water. Object is classified by the Text: *Bhauma....*

Objection: Gold is an earthy product, because, it possesses yellowish colour and is heavy like turmeric etc.

Reply: Not so; because, on the observation of the fact that fluidity in earthy substances like clarified butter vanish when extreme heat is applied; while the fluidity of clarified butter placed in the midst of water does not vanish even when subjected to extreme heat (as long as there is water), we arrive at an understanding of an effect-cause relation between the destruction of fluidity in an earthy substance and contact with fire in the absence of any counter-acting agent. When extreme heat is applied to gold, the fluidity of melted gold is not destroyed even in the absence of a counteracting agent. Therefore, gold is not an earthy substance. This is proved by the presence of a distinct fluid substance in the yellow metal possessing the capacity to obstruct the destruction of fluidity (even when heat is applied). Nor can it be water since fluidity in gold is only occasional (whereas water has its fluidity as its natural quality); nor can gold be included in air etc since gold possesses colour. Gold is, therefore, light. Here, the feeling of heat and bright colour (natural to light) are not apprehended due to the obstruction caused by the colour and touch of the supportive earthy particles. Thus is proved that gold is light (belonging to mineral variety).

4. Air (Vāyu)

रूपरहितः स्पर्शवान् वायुः । स द्विविधः नित्यः अनित्यश्च । नित्यः परमाणुरूपः । अनित्यः कार्यरूपः । पुनः त्रिविधः शरीरेन्द्रियविषय भेदात् । शरीरं वायुलोके । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं

त्वक् सर्वशरीरवर्ति । विषयो वृक्षादिकम्पनहेतुः । शरीरान्तःसंचारी वायुः प्राणः । स च एकोऽपि उपाधिभेदात् प्राणापानादिसंज्ञां लभते ॥ ४ ॥

rūparahitaḥ, devoid of colour; *sparśavān,* (but) possessing touch; *vāyuḥ,* (is) air; *saḥ dvividhaḥ,* it is two-fold; *nityaḥ anityaśca,* eternal and non-eternal; *nityaḥ paramāṇurūpaḥ,* eternal is of the nature of atom; *anityaḥ kāryarūpaḥ,* non-eternal is of the nature of product; *punaḥ trividhaḥ,* again, it is three-fold; *śarīra-indriya-viṣaya bhedāt,* owing to division into body, organ, (and) object; *śarīram vāyuloke,* body is in the region of air; *indriyam sparśagrāhakam tvak,* organ is the sense of touch which apprehends touch; *sarvaśarīravarti,* (and is) spread all over the body; *viṣayaḥ,* the object; *vṛkṣādikampana-hetuḥ,* is the cause of tremor of trees etc; *śarīrāntaḥ-sañcārī vāyuḥ prāṇaḥ,* vital air is the air that circulates within the body; *sa ca eko'pi,* and that, though one; *upādhibhedāt,* due to differences in conditions; *prāṇa-apāna-ādisaṁjñām,* names of prāṇa, apāna, etc; *labhate,* it gets.

4. Air is that which possesses touch but is without colour. It is two-fold: eternal and non-eternal. The eternal is of the nature of atom; the non-eternal is of the nature of product. Again, it is three-fold; owing to its classification into body, organ and object. Body is found in the world of wind-god; organ is the tactile organ by which one apprehends touch, and it is spread over the whole body; object is the cause of tremor of trees etc. The air that circulates within the body is the vital breath. Though one, it is denoted variously as prāṇa, apāna, etc owing to different situations.

वायुं लक्षयति । **रूपरहितेति** । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय स्पर्शवानिति । पृथिव्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय रूपरहितेति । प्राणस्य कुत्रान्तर्भाव इत्यत आह । **शरीरेति** । **स चेति** । एक एव प्राणः स्थानभेदात्प्राणापानादिशब्दैः व्यवह्रियत इत्यर्थः । स्पर्शानुमेयो

वायुः । तथा हि - योऽयं वायौ वाति सति अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्श उपलभ्यते स क्वचिदाश्रितः गुणत्वाद्रूपवत् । न चास्य आश्रयः पृथिवी उद्भूतस्पर्शवत्पार्थिवस्योद्भूत-रूपवत्त्वनियमात् । न जलतेजसी अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवत्त्वात् । न विभुचतुष्टयम् सर्वत्रोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मनः परमाणुस्पर्शस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् । तस्माद्यः प्रतीयमानस्पर्शाश्रयः स वायुः (एव) । ननु वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात् घटवत् इति चेत् न । उद्भूतरूपस्योपाधित्वात् । 'यत्र द्रव्यत्वे सति बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वं, तत्र उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम्' इति *साध्यव्यापकत्वम्* । पक्षे *साधनाव्यापकत्वम्* । न चैवं तप्तवारिस्थतेजसोऽपि अप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिः इष्टत्वात् । तस्माद्रूपरहितत्वाद्वायुरप्रत्यक्षः । इदानीं कार्यरूपपृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्योत्पत्तिविनाशक्रमः कथ्यते । ईश्वरस्य चिकीर्षावशात्परमाणुषु क्रिया जायते । ततः परमाणुद्वयसंयोगे द्व्यणुकमुत्पद्यते । त्रिभिरेव द्व्यणुकैस्त्र्यणुकमुत्पद्यते । एवं चतुरणुकादिक्रमेण महती पृथिवी; महत्य आपः, महत्तेजः, महान्वायुरुत्पद्यते । एवमुत्पन्नस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य संजिहीर्षावशात् क्रियया परमाणुद्वयविभागे द्व्यणुकनाशः । इत्येवं पृथिव्यादिनाशः । असमवायिकारणनाशात् द्व्यणुकनाशः । समवायिकारणनाशात् त्र्यणुकनाश इति संप्रदायः सर्वत्रासमवायिकारणनाशात् द्रव्यनाश इति नवीनाः । किं पुनः परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते—जालसूर्यमरीचिस्थं सर्वतः सूक्ष्मतमं यत् द्रव्यं उपलभ्यते तत्सावयवं चाक्षुषद्रव्यत्वाद्घटवत् । त्र्यणुकावयवोऽपि सावयवः महदारम्भकत्वात्कपालवत् । यो द्व्यणुकावयवः स परमाणुः । स च नित्यः, तस्यापि कार्यत्वे अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । सृष्टिप्रलयसद्भावे 'धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् ।' इति श्रुतिरेव प्रमाणम् । 'सर्वकार्यद्रव्यध्वंसोऽवान्तरप्रलयः । सर्वभावकार्यध्वंसो महाप्रलयः' इति विवेकः ।

Dīpikā:

The characteristic mark of air is given in the Text: *rūpa....* To remove overapplicability in ether etc air is defined as *possessing touch.* To remove overapplicability in earth etc it is defined as *without colour.* The question, *wherein is the inclusion of vital air,* is answered by the Text: *In the body....* Vital Breath is only one; but owing to its different locations (within the body), and due to its different functions, it is known by various names as prāṇa, apāna etc.[31]

Air is inferred by the sense of touch. The *neither-hot-nor-cold touch* that we feel when the wind blows must reside in some substance as it is a quality like colour (because of the universal principle that a quality always resides in a certain

substance); earth cannot be its (ie of touch) substratum; because, as a rule, all earthy substances having manifested touch have also manifested colour (while air has no manifested colour); nor can it reside in water and light because it is neither cold nor hot; nor can it reside in the four all-pervading substances (ether, time, space and soul), for if it resides in them, then it ought to be found everywhere; nor does it reside in mind, because, if it did, then (the mind being atomic) touch residing in atom (cannot be felt), it being beyond apprehension by the senses. Therefore, that which is revealed to us as the substratum of touch is air.

Objection: Air is visible, because, it is the substratum of perceptible touch, like a jar.

Reply: It is wrong; because, of the defect of adventitious condition (*upādhi*) of manifested colour.[32] Here, in the argument, *Air is visible, because it is the substratum of perceptible touch,* the reason is defective owing to the necessary condition of having manifested colour (for rendering a thing perceptible). All substances possessing perceptibility produced by an external sense organ have in them manifested colour, like a jar. Here, *manifested colour* is pervasive of the thing to be proved (ie perceptibility). But, manifested colour is not found wherever there is the substratum of perceptible touch; here, there is the non-pervasiveness of the reason in the subject.[33] By this, there should be no objection to the statement that the heat that is present in hot water is imperceptible (because of the above argument that only things possessing manifested colour are perceptible); because that is desired by the Naiyāyikas. Therefore, air is imperceptible, because it is devoid of colour.

Origin and Dissolution of the four Mahā Bhūtas:

Now is being explained the process of creation and dissolution of the material universe produced from the four tangible substances beginning with earth. Owing to the Creative Will of the Omnipotent God, motion is first produced in the atoms. Then, from the conjunction of two atoms a Dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) is produced. Then, as a consequence of conjunction

of three Dyads, a Triad (*tryaṇuka*) is formed. Similarly, with four Triads, a Quadrate (*caturaṇaka*) is produced, and so on and on until the great masses of gross earth, water, light, and atmosphere are formed. When the dissolution of the products of substances thus created is desired by the Omnipotent Lord, motion is produced dividing the monads. Owing to this, the contact between two atoms is destroyed whereupon the destruction of the Dyad takes place. The Dyad being destroyed, there follows the disintegration of Triads, Quadrates and so on until the entire created masses of earth etc are destroyed. The traditional view is that due to the dissolution of the non-intimate cause between the two atoms, a Dyad is destroyed. Then, due to the destruction of the intimate cause, subsequent products like the Triads etc are disintegrated. But the modern Naiyāyikas hold the view that everywhere the disintegration of the products of substances takes place as a result of the dissolution of the union between two atoms owing to the destruction of the non-intimate cause.[34]

Proof for the existence of atoms (Paramāṇu):

What again is the proof of the existence of the atoms? This is answered as follows: The finest particle of mote perceived floating in a sunbeam is a structure consisting of component parts as it is a substance which is visible to the eye, like a cloth. Even a component part of a Triad (a Dyad) is a composite whole made up of parts because it produces the large magnitude (a Triad), just like a thread.[35] An atom is that which forms a part of a dyad and it is eternal. Otherwise, if we assume the atom also to be a product of still smaller parts, it would result in the defect of endless regression. And also the hypothesis that the mountain Meru and the mustard seed are of equal size will remain unsolved.[36]

Proof for creation and dissolution:

Question: What is the authority to establish the theory of creation and dissolution?

Answer: The passages from the Vedic texts like: *The Lord created the world as in previous cycles,* etc are the authority.

The destruction of all *product substances* beginning with binary molecule up to the great mass of earth possessing the grossest dimension etc is known as the *intermediary dissolution*. The destruction of all positive categories is the great dissolution or universal dissolution, *mahāpralaya*.[37]

5. Ākāśa:

शब्दगुणकमाकाशम् । तच्चैकं विभु नित्यञ्च ॥ ५ ॥

śabdaguṇakam, having sound as the distinctive characteristic; *ākāśam,* is ether; *tat ca ekam,* and that is one; *vibhu,* all-pervading; *nityam ca,* and eternal.

5. *Ākāśa* is that which is characterised by the distinctive quality of sound. And it is one, all-pervading, and eternal.

आकाशं लक्षयति । **शब्दगुणकमिति** । नन्वाकाशमपि पृथिव्यादिवन्नाना, किं नेत्याह । **तच्चैकमिति** । भेदे प्रमाणाभावादित्यर्थः । एकत्वादेव सर्वत्र शब्दोपलब्धेर्विभुत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यमित्याह विभ्विति । सर्वमूर्तद्रव्यसंयोगित्वं विभुत्वं, मूर्तत्वं परिच्छिन्नपरिमाणवत्त्वं क्रियावत्त्वं वा । विभुत्वादेव आत्मवन्नित्यमित्याह । **नित्यं चेति** ।

Dīpikā:

Ākāśa is being indicated by the Text: Śabda.... The question whether ether also is many like the earth etc is answered by the Text: *tat ca ekam - and that is one.* The implied idea is that no diversity can be accepted in *ākāśa* for lack of proof. Sound being perceived everywhere, it is one, and all-pervading. This is stated by the Text: *vibhu.* Contact with all corporeal objects is *all-pervasion, Corporeality* is the quality of having definite dimensions; or, it is that possessing motion. Being all-pervasive, *ākāśa* is also eternal like the soul.[38]

6. Time:

अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः । स चैको विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥ ६ ॥

atīta-ādi, (terms) like past etc; *vyavahārahetuḥ,* the cause of conventional expression; *kālaḥ,* is time; *sa ca ekaḥ* and that is one; *vibhuḥ nityaḥ ca,* all-pervading and eternal.

6. Time is the special cause of conventional expression of words like past etc and it is one, all-pervading, and eternal.

कालं लक्षयति । **अतीतेति** । सर्वाधारः कालः सर्वकार्यनिमित्तकारणम् ।

Dīpikā:

Time is being indicated by the text: *Atita.* Time is the substratum of everything and is also the instrumental cause of all effects.[39]

7. Dik (space or direction):

प्राच्यादिव्यवहारहेतुर्दिक् । सा चैका विभ्वी नित्या च ॥ ७ ॥

prācya ādi, (terms) like east etc; *vyavahārahetuḥ,* cause of expression; *dik,* (is) direction; *sā ca ekā,* it is one; *vibhvī,* all-pervading; *nityā ca,* and eternal.

7. Direction is the cause of conventional expressions like east etc and is one, all-pervading, and eternal.

दिशो लक्षणमाह । **प्राचीति** । दिगपि कार्यमात्रनिमित्तकारणम् ।

Dīpikā:

The text defines direction as *prācī*... Direction is also the instrumental cause of all effects.[40]

8. Ātmā (Soul):

ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा । स द्विविधः परमात्मा जीवात्मा च । तत्रेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः परमात्मैक एव । जीवात्मा प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नो विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥ ८ ॥

jñāna-adhikaraṇam, the substratum of knowledge; *ātmā,* is

the soul; *sa dvividhaḥ,* it is two-fold; *paramātmā jīvātmā ca,* the supreme soul and the individual soul; *tatra īśvaraḥ,* of these, the omnipotent; *sarvajñaḥ,* omniscient; *paramātmā,* the supreme soul; *eka eva,* is one only; *jīvātmā,* the individual soul; *pratiśarīram bhinnaḥ,* is different in each body; *vibhuḥ,* (is) all-pervading; *nityaḥ ca,* and (is) eternal.

8. The soul is the substratum of knowledge. It is two-fold: the supreme soul and the individual soul. Of these, the supreme soul is omnipotent and omniscient and one only. The individual soul is different in each body, is all-pervading, and eternal.

आत्मनो लक्षणमाह । **ज्ञानेति** । आत्मानं विभजते । **स द्विविध इति** । परमात्मनो लक्षणमाह । तत्रेति । नित्यज्ञानाधिकरणत्वमीश्वरत्वम् । नन्वीश्वरसद्भावे किं प्रमाणम् । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्धि बाह्यमान्तरं वा । नाद्यः अरूपिद्रव्यत्वात् । न द्वितीयः आत्मसुखदुःखादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानं लिङ्गाभावादिति चेत् न । अङ्कुरादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद्घटवत् इत्यनुमानस्यैव प्रमाणत्वात् । उपादानगोचरापरोक्ष-ज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वं कर्तृत्वम् । उपादानं समवायिकारणम् । सकलपरमाण्वादिसूक्ष्मदर्शित्वात्सर्वज्ञत्वम् । यः सर्वज्ञः स सर्ववित् इत्यागमोऽपि तत्र प्रमाणम् । जीवस्य लक्षणमाह । **जीव इति** । सुखाद्याश्रयत्वं जीवलक्षणम् । ननु मनुष्योऽहं ब्राह्मणोऽहम् इत्यादौ सर्वत्राहंप्रत्यये शरीरस्यैव विषयत्वाच्छरीरमेवात्मेति चेत् न । शरीरस्यात्मत्वे करपादादिनाशे शरीरनाशादात्मनोऽपि नाशप्रसंगात् । नापीन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वम्, 'योऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहमिदानीं स्पृशामि' इत्यनुसन्धानाभावप्रसङ्गात् । अन्यानुभूतेऽर्थे अन्यस्यानुसंधानायोगात् । तस्माद्देहेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो जीवः सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात्प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नः । स च न परमाणुः । सर्वशरीरव्यापिसुखाद्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मध्यमपरिमाणवान् तथा सति अनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गेन कृतहानाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मान्नित्यो विभुर्जीवः ॥

Dīpikā:

The characteristic mark of the soul is defined by the Text: *jñāna....* Again, the text divides it: *sa dvividhaḥ....* The Text *tatra* seeks to define the characteristic mark of the supreme soul. Lordlines consists in being the substratum of eternal knowledge.

Objection: What is the proof for the existence of Īśvara? Perception cannot be the proof. If, however, perception is presumed to be the proof, then, is it external perception (ie perceivable by the external sense-organ, the eye) or is it internal perception (ie perceived by the mind)? Not the first, because, He is a substance without colour, nor could He be the latter, because He is distinct from the feelings of pain, pleasure, etc felt by the individual soul; nor can it be said that He can be inferred, owing to lack of similar instance to support the inference; nor the Vedic testimony (can prove His existence) for lack of Vedic texts establishing His existence.

Reply: No; it is not so; because earth, sprouts etc are caused by some agent since they are products like a jar. Thus, the existence of Īśvara is proved by inference. *Agent is one who possesses an immediate knowledge of the inherent causal apparatus, a will to act, and an effort.* Inherent cause is the material cause. Omniscience consists in possessing a direct knowledge of all subtle substances, atoms etc. Vedic texts like, *He who is the Omniscient is also the immediate knower of everything* etc are the proofs to establish the existence of Īśvara.[41]

The text gives the characteristic mark of the individual soul: *jīva*.... The characteristic mark of the human soul consists in its being the abode of pleasure, pain, etc.

Objection: This body itself is the soul, because, everywhere, the body itself is taken to be the object of the consciousness *I* when one says, *I am a man, I am a brāhmaṇa,* etc.

Reply: It is not so; if body be the soul, then the inevitable destruction of the soul has to be accepted when the body is destroyed with the destruction of hands, feet, etc. Nor can the sense organs be the soul, because in that case, there cannot occur the recollection *I who saw the pot is the same I now touching it;* for, what was experienced by one in the past cannot be recollected by another. Therefore, the soul is quite distinct from the body and the organs. Also,

(we have to admit) that there are as many human souls as there are bodies for the reason of variety of experiences of pleasure, pain, etc (as otherwise we cannot account for the variety of experiences of happiness, misery, etc in those bodies). It is not of atomic magnitude, because, the experience of pleasure etc is felt all over the body; nor is it of any intermediate magnitude, for, if so, the soul would be liable to destruction in which case the assumption that every action the soul performs during its sojourn on earth will perish without yielding its fruit and that it will enjoy the fruits of deeds which it has not performed, becomes peremptory. Therefore, the individual soul is eternal and all-pervading.

9. Manas (Mind):

सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः ।
तच्च प्रत्यात्मनियतत्वादनन्तं परमाणुरूपं नित्यं च ॥ ९ ॥

sukha-ādi, pleasure etc; *upalabdhisādhanam indriyam,* the organ which is instrumental in obtaining; *manaḥ,* (is) mind; *tat ca,* and that (is); *prati-ātmaniyatatvāt,* being linked with each soul; *anantaṁ,* (is) infinite; *paramāṇurūpaṁ,* atomic; *nityaṁ ca,* and eternal.

9. Mind is the (internal) organ which is the instrument in obtaining the knowledge of pleasure etc. It, being linked up with each human soul, is innumerable, atomic and eternal.

मनसो लक्षणमाह । **सुखेति** । स्पर्शरहितत्वे सति क्रियावत्वं मनसो लक्षणम् । तद्विभजते । **तच्चेति** । एकैकस्यात्मन एकैकं मन इत्यात्मनामनेकत्वान् मसोऽप्यनेकत्वमित्यर्थः । **परमाणुरूपमिति** । मध्यमपरिमाणवत्त्वे अनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः । ननु मनो विभु स्पर्शरहितत्वे सति द्रव्यत्वादाकाशादिवदिति चेत् न । मनसो विभुत्वे आत्ममनः संयोगस्याऽसमवायिकारणस्याभावाज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसंङ्गः । न च विभुद्वयसंयोगोऽस्त्विति वाच्यम् । तत्संयोगस्य नित्यत्वेन सुषुप्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात्, पुरीतद्व्यतिरिक्तस्थले आत्ममनः संयोगस्य सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात् । अणुत्वे तु यदा

मनः पुरीतत् प्रविशति तदा सुषुप्तिः यदा निस्सरति तदा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरित्यणुत्वसिद्धिः ।

Dīpikā:

Mind is defined as that which possesses activity while being devoid of touch.[42] Mind should be taken to be different in different individuals. Individuals are innumerable and, correspondingly, minds also are innumerable. Mind cannot be of intermediary magnitude, as in that case, it will be non-eternal.[43]

Objection: We say, mind is not atomic, but all-pervading; because, it is a substance devoid of touch, like ether.

Reply: If mind is presumed to be all-pervading, then, there will occur no cognisability on account of the absence of the non-intimate cause that brings about the contact between the soul and mind. Nor can it be argued, 'Let there be contact between two all-pervading substances. What is wrong with it?' Because, if this view-point is accepted, the occurrence of absolute absence of deep sleep has to be accepted inasmuch as the contact between two all-pervading substances is eternal. The contact of soul and mind always exists except in a small region of the nerve centre. The mind can enter the nerve centre only if it is of atomic size, and cause sleep. When the mind emerges out of the nerve centre, cognition arises; this establishes the magnitude of the mind as atomic.

SECTION III

DEALING WITH THE CHARACTERISTIC MARK, DIVISION AND EXAMINATION OF THE TWENTY FOUR QUALITIES[44]

1. Colour (rūpa):

चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो गुणो रूपम् । तच्च शुक्लनीलपीतरक्तहरितकपिशचित्र भेदात्सप्तविधम् । पृथिवीजलतेजोवृत्ति । तत्र पृथिव्यां सप्तविधम् । अभास्वरशुक्लं जले । भास्वरशुक्लं तेजसि ॥ १ ॥

cakṣurmātragrāhyaḥ, apprehended by the eye alone; *guṇaḥ,* the quality; *rūpam,* (is) colour; *tat ca,* and that (is); *śukla,* white; *nīla,* blue; *pīta,* yellow; *rakta,* red; *harita,* green; *kapiśa,* brown; *citra,* variegated; *bhedāt,* due to difference; *saptavidham,* (is) sevenfold; *pṛthivī,* earth; *jala,* water; *tejaḥ,* light; *vṛtti,* (they) reside (in); *tatra pṛthivyām,* of these, in earth; *saptavidham,* (all the) seven varieties (reside); *a-bhāsvara-śuklam,* pale-white variety; *jale,* (resides) in water; *bhāsvara-śuklam,* bright white variety; *tejasi,* (resides) in light.

1. Colour is the quality apprehended only by the eye. It is again of seven kinds due to its division into white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown, and variegated. It exists in earth, water, and light. Of these, all the seven varieties exist in earth. In water, pale-white variety is found; and, in light, bright-white variety resides.

रूपं लक्षयति । **चक्षुरिति** । संख्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रपदम् । रूपत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । नन्वव्याप्यवृत्तिनीलादिसमुदाय एव चित्ररूपमिति चेत् न । रूपस्य व्याप्यवृत्तित्वनियमात् । ननु चित्रपटे अवयवरूपस्यैव प्रतीतिरिति चेत् न । रूपरहितत्वेन पटस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसंगात् । न च रूपवत्समवेतत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रयोजकं गौरवात् । तस्मात्पटस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या चित्ररूपसिद्धिः । रूपस्याश्रयमाह । **पृथिवीति** । आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति । **तत्रेति** ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines colour: *Cakṣur....* The term *only* is added to the definition to avoid the defect of overapplicability in number etc.[45] To avoid overapplicability in the generic attribute of colour (*rūpatva*) the term *special quality* is inserted in the definition. It is admitted that the same organ which apprehends a quality apprehends its *jāti* also. The term *special quality* is inserted to avoid overapplicability in the contact of light with wall. Though the contact is a quality, it is not a special quality.

Objection: Variegated colour is nothing but the mixture of several colours like blue etc which pervade only a part of objects. (So, why recognize it as a distinct colour?)[46]

Reply: It cannot be so; because, of the invariable law of colour being a *quality that resides in the entire object.*[47]

Objection: Instead of admitting of a separate single variegated colour why not accept that only through the different colours of its component parts a piece of cloth is apprehended as having different colours?

Reply: If this argument is accepted, then cloth would be non-perceptible inasmuch as cloth itself possesses no colour.[48]

Objection: If the above argument is accepted, it will lead to a conclusion that a piece of cloth is not possessing any colour. A piece of cloth possesses colour but not directly. There is close contact between cloth and its threads (in the same sense in which a clay-made-pot is accepted to have inseparable contact with clay); so, here too, cloth possesses the colour on account of its being *samaveta* (inherent or

inseparably united) in its components, ie threads in which colour exists.

Reply: Accepting such a condition for perceptibility is cumbersome, and is not preferable to the usual reasoning of *rūpavatva* (having colour). Therefore, we must recognise an independent variegated colour to account for the perceptibility of a variegated piece of cloth. Non-pervasiveness (*avyāpya vṛttitvam*) of a thing is the characteristic property of being existent in the same substratum with its absolute negation.

The Text explains the substratum of colour: *Pṛthivī*.... The substratum is again divided by the Text: *Tatra*....

2. Taste (rasa):

रसनग्राह्यो गुणो रसः । स च मधुराम्ललवणकटुकषायतिक्तभेदात् षड्विधः । पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः । तत्र पृथिव्यां षड्विधः । जले मधुर एव ॥ २ ॥

rasanagrāhyaḥ, apprehended by the tongue; *guṇaḥ,* the quality; *rasaḥ,* (is) savour; *sa ca,* and that (is); *madhura,* sweet; *āmla,* acid; *lavaṇa,* saline; *kaṭu,* pungent; *kaṣāya,* astringent; *tikta,* bitter; *bhedāt,* due to difference; *ṣaḍvidhaḥ,* (is) six-fold; *pṛthivī, jala, vṛttiḥ,* it resides in earth (and) water; *tatra,* of these; *pṛthivyām,* in earth; *ṣaḍvidhaḥ,* six varieties (reside); *jale,* in water; *madhura eva,* only sweet taste (is found).

2. Savour is the quality apprehended by the gustatory organ; it is of six varieties: sweet, acid, saline, pungent, astringent and bitter. Taste subsists in earth and water. Of these, earth has all the six varieties while water has only the sweet variety.

रसं लक्षयति । **रसनेति** । रसत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । रसस्याश्रयमाह । **पृथिवीति** । आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति । **तत्रेति** ।

Dīpikā:

The text gives the definition of savour: *rasanā*.... To avoid

the defect of overapplicability in the generic attribute of savour (*rasatva*), the word *quality* is inserted in the definition. The substratum of savour is shown by the Text: *Pṛthivī*.... The substratum is further explained by its division: *pṛthivyām*....

3. Odour (gandha):

घ्राणग्राह्यो गुणो गन्धः । स द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च । पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः ॥ ३ ॥

ghrāṇagrāhyaḥ, apprehended by the nose; *guṇaḥ,* the quality; *gandhaḥ,* (is) odour; *sa dvividhaḥ,* it is two-fold; *surabhiḥ,* fragrant; *asurabhiḥ ca,* and foul; *pṛthivīmātra vṛttiḥ,* (it) resides in earth only.

3. Odour is the quality perceived by the olfactory organ. It is twofold; fragrant and foul. It subsists in earth alone.

गन्धं लक्षयति । घ्राणेति । गन्धत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines odour: *ghrāṇa*.... To avoid the defect of overapplicability in the generic attribute of odour (*gandhatva*), the term *quality* is inserted in the definition.

4. Touch (Sparśa):

त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यो गुणः स्पर्शः । स च त्रिविधः शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतभेदात् । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवृत्तिः । तत्र शीतो जले । उष्णस्तेजसि । अनुष्णाशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वोः ॥ ४ ॥

tvagindriyamātragrāhyaḥ, apprehended by the tactile organ alone; *guṇaḥ,* the quality; *sparśaḥ,* (is) touch; *sa ca trividhaḥ,* and that is three-fold; *śīta,* cold; *uṣṇa,* hot; *anuṣṇā-śīta,* lukewarm; *bhedāt,* due to difference; *pṛthivī,* earth; *ap,* water; *tejaḥ,* light; *vāyu,* air; *vṛttiḥ,* (reside) in; *tatra,* of these; *śītaḥ,* cold;

jale, (is) in water; *uṣṇaḥ,* hot; *tejasi,* in light; *anuṣṇāśītaḥ,* lukewarm; *pṛthivīvāyvoḥ,* reside in earth and air.

4. Touch is the quality perceived by the tactile organ alone. It is threefold: cool, hot, and lukewarm. It resides in water, earth, light and air. Of these, cool touch resides in water, hot touch in light and lukewarm in earth and air.

स्पर्शं लक्षयति । त्वगिति । स्पर्शत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । संयोगादावतिव्याप्तिवाराणाय मात्रपदम् ।

Dīpikā:

The definition of touch is given in Text: *tvagindriya.* To avoid overapplicability of the definition in the generic attribute of touch, the word *quality* is inserted in the definition. *Alone* is inserted in the definition to avoid overapplicability in conjunction.[49]

5. The Theory of Pāka:

रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यं च । अन्यत्र अपाकजं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यम् अनित्यगतमनित्यम् ॥ ५ ॥

rūpa-ādi catuṣṭayam, the four (qualities) beginning with colour; *pṛthivyām,* in earth; *pākajam,* (produced) through the application of heat; *anityam ca,* and non-eternal; *anyatra,* in other (substances); *apākajam,* not produced by heat, ie natural; *nityam anityam ca,* (and are) eternal and non-eternal; *nityagatam nityam,* eternal in eternal substances; *anityagatam anityam,* non-eternal in non-eternals.

5. The four qualities beginning with colour are produced in earth through the application of heat, and are non-eternal. In other substances (ie in water, light and air) they are not produced by the application of heat (ie natural) and are eternal and also non-eternal;

in eternals (ie in atoms) they are eternal; and in non-eternals (ie in products) they are non-eternal.

पाकजमिति । पाकस्तेजः संयोगः । तेन पूर्वरूपं नश्यति रूपान्तरमुत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः । तत्र परमाणुष्वेव पाको न द्व्यणुकादौ । आमनिक्षिप्ते घटे परमाणुषु रूपान्तरोत्पत्तौ श्यामघटनाशे पुनर्द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण रक्तघटोत्पत्तिः । तत्र परमाणवः समवायिकारणम् । तेजः संयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम् । अदृष्टादिकं निमित्तकारणम् । द्व्यणुकादिरूपे कारणरूपमसमवायिकारणमिति पीलुपाकवादिनो वैशेषिकाः । पूर्वघटस्य नाशं विनैव अवयविनि अवयवेषु च परमाणुपर्यन्तेषु युगपद्रूपान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति पिठरपाकवादिनो नैयायिकाः । अत एव पार्थिवपरमाणुरूपादिकमनित्यमित्यर्थः । अन्यत्र जलादावित्यर्थः । **नित्यगतमिति ।** परमाणुगतमित्यर्थः । **अनित्यगतमिति ।** द्व्यणुकादिगतमित्यर्थः । रूपादिचतुष्टयम् उद्भूतं प्रत्यक्षम् । अनुद्भूतमप्रत्यक्षम् । उद्भूतत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रयोजको धर्मः । तदभावोऽनुद्भूतत्वम् ।

Dīpikā:

Contact with light is *pāka*. The meaning is that by the contact of light with earth the colour (of the earthen product) existing prior to its contact with light gets destroyed and an altogether different colour is produced in its place. This process of baking takes place in atoms only and not in dyads etc.[50]

When an unbaked jar is baked *in mild heat,* the jar of black colour gets disintegrated (down to the stage of atoms along with the qualities in those atoms); and a different colour is produced (in those atoms). Again, by integration of (fresh) dyads and triads, etc a new jar of red colour comes into being. Here atoms form the inherent cause (of the new red colour) and the contact of *light* forms the non-inherent cause of (the new red colour of the atoms), and the unseen results of the actions of the individual soul (*adṛṣṭa*) for whom it is to be created, constitute the instrumental cause. The Vaiśeṣika theorists known as *Pīlupākavādins* hold the view that the effect of colour etc is produced in atoms only and not in dyads etc. But the Naiyāyikas known as *Piṭharapākavādins* hold the view that the contact of *light* destroys only the black colour of the jar down to the stage of atoms without

destroying the old black jar itself and while producing simultaneously an altogether different red colour in the component parts down to the stage of the atoms. This is why it is said that colour etc subsisting in the atoms of earth are non-eternal.

By *anyatra* in the text, other substances like water, light and air are meant. The word *nityagatam* indicates (the four qualities) subsisting in the atoms. By *anityagatam* it is implied that (the four qualities) subsisting in dyads etc are non-eternal. The four qualities beginning with colour possess manifested perceptibility. Those which do not possess manifest perceptibility are imperceptible. Manifest perceptibility is the attribute which helps in direct perception and the lack of this attribute is non-perceptibility.

6. Number-Saṅkhyā:

एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः संख्या । सा नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः एकत्वादिपरार्धपर्यन्ता । एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यम् । अनित्यगतमनित्यम् । द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्राऽनित्यमेव ॥ ६ ॥

Ekatva-ādi, (of words) one etc; *vyavahārahetuḥ,* the cause of common usage; *saṁkhyā,* (is) number; *sā navadravyavṛttiḥ,* it resides in the nine substances; *ekatva-ādi parārdhaparyantā,* beginning from one etc to *parārdha; ekatvam nityam anityam ca,* oneness is eternal and non-eternal; *nityagatam nityam,* eternal in eternal substances; *anityagatam anityam,* non-eternal in non-eternals; *dvitva-ādikam,* duality and the rest; *tu,* but; *sarvatra,* everywhere; *anityam eva,* (are) only non-eternals.

6. Number is the cause of common usage of (enumerative) expressions like one, two, etc. It is found in all the nine substances. It starts from one and ends with *parārdha.* Oneness is eternal and non-eternal (ie

eternal in atoms and non-eternal in products); eternal in eternal substances and non-eternal in non-eternals. Number two and higher numbers are only non-eternals everywhere.

संख्यां लक्षयति । एकेति ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines *number: Ekatvādi....*

(Parārdha is the highest number equivalent to a lakh of lakhs of crores, which constitutes half of the life-span of Brahmā, the creator.

7. Dimension (Parimāṇam):

मानव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं परिमाणम् । नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः । तच्चतुर्विधम् । अणु महत् दीर्घं ह्रस्वं चेति ॥ ७ ॥

Mānavyavahārāsādhāraṇakāraṇam, the special cause of common usage pertaining to measurement; *parimāṇam,* (is) dimension; *navadravya vṛttiḥ,* it resides in the nine substances; *tat caturvidham,* and that is fourfold; *aṇu,* atomic; *mahat,* large; *dīrgham,* long; *ḥrsvam,* short; *ca iti,* and thus.

7. Dimension is the special cause of the common usage of words pertaining to measurement. It is found in all the nine substances. And, it is of four varieties: atomic, large, long, and short.

परिमाणं लक्षयति । **मानेति** । परिमाणं विभजते । **तच्चेति** । भावप्रधानो निर्देशः । अणुत्वं, महत्त्वं, दीर्घत्वं, ह्रस्वत्वं चेत्यर्थः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines dimension: *Māna....* Dimension is divided: *taccha.... Aṇu,* etc in the Text indicate *aṇutva* etc that is to say, minuteness, largeness, length and shortness.[51]

8. Distinctness (Pṛthaktvam):

पृथग्व्यवहारासाधारणकारणं पृथक्त्वम् । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥ ८ ॥

Pṛthagvyavahāra, common expression of difference from one another; *asādhāraṇakāraṇam,* the special cause (of); *pṛthaktvam,* (is) distinctness; *sarvadravyavṛttiḥ,* it resides in all substances.

8. Distinctness is the special cause of conventional expressions such as *this is distinct from that.* It is found in all the nine substances.

पृथक्त्वं लक्षयति । **पृथगिति** । इदमस्मात्पृथक् इति व्यवहारकारणं पृथक्त्वमित्यर्थः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines *distinctness: pṛthak....* That which causes the expression of distinctness of one object from another is severalty.[52]

9. Conjunction (Saṁyoga):

संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः संयोगः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥ ९ ॥

Saṁyuktavyavahārahetuḥ, the cause of common expression of contact; *saṁyogaḥ,* (is) conjunction; *sarvadravyavṛttiḥ,* it resides in all the (nine) substances.

9. Conjunction is the special cause of conventional expressions of contact between two objects. It exists in all the substances.

संयोगं लक्षयति । **संयुक्तेति** । इमौ संयुक्तौ इति व्यवहारहेतुरित्यर्थः । संख्यादिलक्षणे सर्वत्र दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय असाधारणेति विशेषणीयम् । संयोगो द्विविधः कर्मजः संयोगजश्चेति । आद्यो हस्तक्रियया हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगात्कायपुस्तकसंयोगः । अव्याप्यवृत्तिः संयोगः । स्वात्यन्ताभावसमाना-धिकरणत्वमव्याप्यवृत्तित्वम् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines conjunction: *saṁyukta....* The expression which causes the idea: *these are in conjunction with each other,* is conjunction. Everywhere the term *special* ought to be given while denoting the characteristic mark of number etc in order to remove the defect of overapplicability in space, time, etc.

Conjunction is of two varieties: born of action and of contact. The former arises when a book comes in contact with hand, due to the activity of the hand in grasping a book. The second variety is the contact which arises between one's body taken as a whole and a book, when the book is in contact with one's hand. Conjunction is a non-pervasive (quality). Non-pervasiveness in a thing is the characteristic quality of being co-existent in the same substratum with its absolute negation.[53]

10. Disjunction (Vibhāga):

संयोगनाशको गुणो विभागः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥ १० ॥

Saṁyoganāśakaḥ guṇaḥ, the quality which destroys conjunction; *vibhāgaḥ,* (is) disjunction; *sarvadravyavṛttiḥ,* (it) resides in all substances.

10. Disjunction is the quality which destroys conjunction. It resides in all the nine substances.

विभागं लक्षयति । **संयोगेति** । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संयोगनाशक इति । विभागोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्चेति । आद्यो हस्तपुस्तकविभागः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकविभागात्कायपुस्तकविभागः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines disjunction: *saṁyoga....* The word *quality* is inserted in the definition to avoid over-applicability in time etc. To avoid overapplicability in colour etc the term *destroyer of contact* is used in the definition. Disjunction is also of two kinds: born of action and born of disjunction. The first variety is the disjunction of a book from the hand caused by the action of the hand (in throwing away the book). The second variety is the disjunction of the book from the body caused by the disjunction of the book from the hand.

11. Remoteness - Paratva and Proximity (aparatva):

परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे परत्वापरत्वे । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टय मनोवृत्तिनी । ते द्विविधे दिक्कृते कालकृते च । दूरस्थे दिक्कृतं परत्वं । समीपस्थे दिक्कृतमपरत्वम् । ज्येष्ठे कालकृतं परत्वम् । कनिष्ठे कालकृतमपरत्वम् ॥ ११ ॥

Para, remote; *apara,* near; *vyavahāra,* common usage; *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa,* the special cause of; *paratvāparatve,* remoteness and proximity; *pṛthivī-ādi,* earth etc; *catuṣṭayamano,* four (beginning with earth), and mind; *vṛttinī,* they reside in; *te dvividhe,* they are twofold; *dikkṛte,* caused by space; *kālakṛte ca,* and caused by time; *dūrasthe dikkṛtam,* the distance caused by space; *paratvam,* is remoteness; *samīpasthe dikkṛtam,* the nearness caused by space; *aparatvam,* is proximity; *jyeṣṭhe kālakṛtam,* elderliness caused by time; *paratvam,* is remoteness; *kaniṣṭhe kālakṛtam,* juniority caused by time; *aparatvam,* is proximity.

11. Remoteness and proximity are the special causes of common usage of words expressing remoteness and proximity. They reside in four substances beginning with earth, and also in mind. Each of them is of two varieties: spatial and temporal. In things existing at a distance, spatial remoteness is found; in things near, spatial proximity is found; in an elderly person, temporal remoteness is found; in a younger person, temporal proximity is found.

परत्वापरत्वयोर्लक्षणमाह । परापरेति । परव्यवहारासाधारणकारणं परत्वम् । अपरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणमपरत्वम् इत्यर्थः । ते विभजते । ते द्विविधे इति । दिक्कृतयोरुदाहरणमाह । दूरस्थइति । कालकृते उदाहरति । ज्येष्ठ इति ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines remoteness and proximity: *Para....* The

special cause of expression of posteriority is remoteness. The special cause of expression of priority is proximity. Remoteness and proximity are divided by the Text: *te dvividhe....* The example for remoteness and proximity caused by spatial distance and nearness is shown: *dūrasthe....* The example for remoteness and proximity caused by temporal distance and nearness is shown in the Text: *jyeṣṭhe....*

12. Heaviness (Gurutvam):

आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वम् । पृथिवीजलवृत्ति ॥ १२ ॥

Ādyapatana, (of) the first fall; *asamavāyikāraṇam,* the non-intimate cause; *gurutvam,* (is) heaviness; *pṛthivī,* earth; *jala,* water; *vṛitti,* (they) reside in.

12. Heaviness is the non-intimate cause of the first down-ward motion in a falling substance. It resides in earth and water.

गुरुत्वं लक्षयति । आद्येति । द्वितीयादिपतनस्य वेगासमवायिकारणत्वाद्वेगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय आद्येति ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines Heaviness: *ādya....* Velocity is the non-intimate cause of the second and subsequent acts of falling of a substance. Therefore,. to avoid overapplicability (of the definition) in velocity, the word *ādya* is used in the definition.

13. Fluidity - (dravatvam):

आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वं । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवृत्ति । तद्द्विविधं, सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकं च । सांसिद्धिकं जले । नैमित्तिकं पृथिवीतेजसोः । पृथिव्यां घृतादावग्नि संयोगजं द्रवत्वम् । तेजसि सुवर्णादौ ॥ १३ ॥

ādyasyandana, (of the first) flow; *asamavāyikāraṇam,* the non-intimate cause; *dravatvam,* (is) fluidity; *Pṛthivī,* earth; *ap,* water; *tejo,* light; *vṛtti,* (they) reside in; *tad dvividham,* it is twofold; *sāṁsiddhikam,* natural; *naimittikam ca,* and artificial; *sāṁsiddhikam jale,* the natural is in water; *naimittikam,* the artificial; *pṛthivītejasoḥ,* (reside) in earth and light; *pṛthivyām ghṛtādau,* in earth, in ghee etc; *agnisaṁyogajam,* born of contact with fire; *dravatvam,* fluidity (is); *tejasi,* in light; *suvarṇādau,* in gold etc.

13. Fluidity is the non-intimate cause of the first flow (of a liquid substance). It resides in earth, water and light. It is of two varieties: natural and artificial. In water, natural fluidity is found. In earth and light, artificial fluidity is found. In earth artificial fluidity is generated through the contact of fire with ghee. Artificial fluidity is found in gold etc belonging to light.

द्रवत्वं लक्षयति । **आद्येति** । स्यन्दनं प्रस्रवणम् । तेजःसंयोगजं नैमित्तिकम् । तद्भिन्नं सांसिद्धिकम् । पृथिव्यां नैमित्तिकमुदाहरति । **घृतादाविति** । तेजसि तदाह । **सुवर्णादाविति** ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines fluidity: *ādyasyandana....* Flow is the act of flowing of a liquid substance. The fluidity generated through the contact of light is artificial fluidity. The one other than this is the natural fluidity. An example of artificial fluidity in earth is given in ghee coming in contact with fire. In the same way, artificial fluidity in light is exemplified in gold. (The word *ādya* is inserted in the definition to exclude velocity which is the non-intimate cause of the second and all subsequent acts of flowing).

14. Viscidity (Snehaḥ):

चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुर्गुणः स्नेहः । जलमात्रवृत्तिः ॥ १४ ॥

cūrṇa-ādi, (of) powder etc; *piṇḍībhāvahetuḥ,* the cause of

agglutination; *guṇaḥ,* (is the) quality; *snehaḥ,* Viscidity; *jalamātravṛttiḥ,* it resides in water only.

14. Viscidity is the quality which causes the agglutination of powder etc. It exists in water only.

स्नेहं लक्षयति । चूर्णेति । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय पिण्डीभावेति ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines viscidity: *cūrṇa....* The word *quality* is inserted in the definition to exclude time etc (which are the common causes of all effects). To avoid the defect of over-applicability in colour etc the word *Piṇḍībhāwa* etc is used in the definition.[54]

15. Sound (Śabdaḥ):

श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः, आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः । स द्विविधः, ध्वन्यात्मकः वर्णात्मकश्च । तत्र ध्वन्यात्मकः भेर्यादौ । वर्णात्मकः संस्कृतभाषादिरूपः ॥ १५ ॥

Srotragrāhyaḥ guṇaḥ, the quality apprehended by the ear; *śabdaḥ,* (is) sound; *ākāśamātravṛttiḥ,* it resides in ether only; *sa dvividhaḥ,* it is twofold; *dhvanyātmakaḥ,* of the nature of inarticulate sound; *varṇātmakaśca,* and of the nature of letters; *tatra,* of these; *dhvanyātmakaḥ,* of the nature of inarticulate sound; *bheryādau,* (is found) in the sound produced by drums etc. *Varṇātmakaḥ,* of the nature of letters; *saṁskṛtabhāṣādirūpaḥ,* (is found) in the form of languages like Sanskrit etc.

15. Sound is the quality apprehended by the organ of hearing. It subsists in ether alone. It is twofold: of the nature of inarticulate sound and of the nature of the alphabetic sound. Inarticulate sound is found in the sound produced by drums etc. The alphabetic

sound is found in the form of languages like Sanskrit etc.

शब्दं लक्षयति । **श्रोत्रेति** । शब्दत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय श्रोत्रेति । शब्दास्त्रिविधः संयोगजः, विभागजः, शब्दजश्चेति । तत्र आद्यो भेरीदण्डसंयोगजन्यः । द्वितीयो वंशे पाटचमाने दळद्वयविभागजन्यश्चटचटाशब्दः । भेर्यादिदेशमारभ्य श्रोत्रदेशपर्यन्तं द्वितीयादिशब्दाः शब्दजाः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines sound: *śrotra*.... The word quality is inserted in the definition to avoid the defect of overapplicability in soundness.[55] To avoid the defect of overapplicability in colour etc the word *śrotra* is used in the definition. Sound is of three kinds: born of conjunction; born of disjunction; and born of sound. The first kind of sound is produced by the contact of a stick with a drum; the decrepitating sound that is produced when a bamboo is halved is the second kind of sound; all subsequent sounds reaching the ear from the place where the sound is produced first, is the third kind of sound.[56]

16. Cognition (Jñānam):

सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्गुणो बुद्धिर्ज्ञानम् । सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च ॥ १६ ॥

Sarvavyavahāraheturguṇaḥ, the quality which causes all kinds of communications; *buddhiḥ,* is cognition; *jñānam,* (and) it is knowledge; *sā dvividhā,* it is two-fold; *smṛtiḥ anubhavaḥ ca,* remembrance and apprehension.

16. Cognition is the quality which is the cause of all kinds of communications; and it is knowledge. It is two-fold: remembrance and apprehension.

बुद्धेर्लक्षणमाह । **सर्वव्यवहारेति** । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय सर्वव्यवहार इति । जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यं ज्ञानमेव लक्षणमिति भावः । बुद्धिं विभजते । **सेति** ।

Dīpikā:

The characteristic mark of cognition is given in the Text: *sarva....* The word *quality* is inserted in the definition to avoid overapplicability in time etc. To avoid overapplicability in colour etc the term *sarvavyavahāra...* is inserted in the definition. The characteristic mark of cognition is: the immediate knowledge which becomes the subject (*gamya*) of the *consciousness* (*anuvyavasāya*) having the form: *I know.*[57]

17. Cognition is twofold: (i) Remembrance (Smṛti) and (ii) Apprehension: (anubhava):

(i) Remembrance (Smṛti):

संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः ॥ १७ ॥

Saṁskāramātrajanyam, born of mental impressions alone; *jñānam,* the knowledge; *smṛtiḥ,* is remembrance.

17. Remembrance is the knowledge born of mental impressions alone.

स्मृतेर्लक्षणमाह । **संस्कारेति** । भावनाख्यः संस्कारः । संस्कारध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ज्ञानमिति । घटादिप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संस्कारजन्यमिति । प्रत्यभिज्ञायाम् अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रपदम् ।

Dīpikā:

Remembrance is defined by the Text: *saṁskāra.* Mental impression is reminiscent impression.[58] The word *jñānam* is inserted in the definition to avoid overapplicability in the destruction of mental impression (*saṁskāradhvaṁsa*).[59] The term born of *saṁskāra* is added (to the definition) to avoid overapplicability in perception of things like jar etc. To avoid overapplicability in reminiscence (*pratyabhijñā*), the term *alone* is used in the definition.[60]

18. Apprehension (anubhava):

तद्भिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभवः । स द्विविधः, यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्च ॥ १८ ॥

Tadbhinnam Jñānam, knowledge different from that; *anubhavaḥ,* (is) apprehension; *sa dvividhaḥ,* it is twofold; *yathārthaḥ,* true, conformable to the object; *ayathārthaśca,* and false, ie non-conformable to the object.

18. Knowledge other than recollection is apprehension. It is twofold: conformable to the object and not conformable to the object.

अनुभवं लक्षयति । **तद्भिन्नमिति** । स्मृतिभिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभव इत्यर्थः । अनुभवं विभजते । **स द्विविध इति** ।

Dīpikā:

Apprehension is defined by the Text: *Tadbhinnam.* The meaning is that knowledge other than recollection is apprehension. Apprehension is divided by the Text: *sa dvividhaḥ.*

19. Valid apprehension (Yathārtha anubhava):

तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः । यथा रजते इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । सैव प्रमेत्युच्यते ॥ १९ ॥

Tadvati, that in which an object is known to possess an attribute; *tatprakārakaḥ,* possessing that attribute; *anubhavaḥ* apprehension; *yathārthaḥ,* is true (apprehension); *yathā,* for example; *rajate,* in silver; *idam rajatam iti jñānam,* the knowledge *this is silver; saiva pramā ityucyate,* this indeed is known as valid knowledge.

19. A valid apprehension is that in which an object is known as possessing attributes which it really possesses eg the apprehension of silver arising in an object where there is silverness. This is also known as valid knowledge of a thing.

यथार्थानुभवस्य लक्षणमाह । **तद्वतीति** । ननु घटे घटत्वम् इति प्रमायामव्याप्तिः, घटत्वे घटाभावादिति चेत् न, यत्र यत्संबन्धोऽस्ति तत्र तत्संबन्धानुभवः इत्यर्थाद्घटत्वे घटसंबन्धोऽस्तीति नाव्याप्तिः । **सैवेति** । यथार्थानुभव एव शास्त्रे प्रमेत्युच्यत इत्यर्थः ।

Dīpikā:

The characteristic mark of valid apprehension is explained by the Text: *Tadvati....*

Objection: If the above definition is admitted, it results in partial applicability in true apprehension: *potness in a pot;* because, jar does not exist in its genus potness.[61]

Reply: It is not so; because where a certain relation exists, there also occurs the apprehension of that relation.[62] Therefore there is no defect of *avyāpti* in the above definition. This valid cognition is also known as *pramā* in the scriptures.

20. Erroneous apprehension (ayathārtha anubhava):

तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः । यथा
शुक्ताविदंरजतमिति ज्ञानम् । सैव अप्रमा इत्युच्यते ॥ २० ॥

Tadabhāvavati, not possessing that attribute; *tatprakārakaḥ,* (but appearing) as having that attribute; *anubhavaḥ,* (such an) apprenhension; *ayathārthaḥ,* is false apprehension; *yathā,* for example; *śuktau,* in a mother-of-pearl; *idam rajatamiti jñānam,* the knowledge, *this is a piece of silver; saiva,* that indeed; *apramā ityucyate,* is called the non-valid knowledge.

20. That is non-valid apprehension in which an object is known as having an attribute which it does not have in reality. For example, the apprehension of silver arising in a piece of mother-of-pearl. This indeed is called the false cognition.

अयथार्थानुभवं लक्षयति । तदभाववतीति । नन्विदं संयोगीति प्रमायामतिव्याप्तिरिति चेत् न । यदवच्छेदेन यत्संबन्धाभावस्तदवच्छेदेन तत्संबन्धज्ञानस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । संयोगाभावावच्छेदेन संयोगज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात्संयोगावच्छेदेन संयोगसंबन्धस्य सत्त्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines erroneous cognition: *tadabhāvavati....*[63]

Objection: The above definition brings in overapplicability in the apprehension: *this is in conjunction.*[64]

Reply: No; it is only in erroneous apprehension that the knowledge of contact is obtained from a part where there is the absence of contact and what is implied here by *apramā* is the knowledge of contact in a particular space where there is the absence of contact. But in the above apprehension (*kapisamyogīti jñāne*), contact is known to exist in the space where there is the contact of monkey. So there is no defect of overapplicability.

21. Valid apprehension is fourfold:

यथार्थानुभवः चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात् ॥ २१ ॥

Yathārthānubhavaḥ, the valid apprehension; *caturvidhaḥ,* is fourfold; *pratyakṣa,* perception; *anumiti,* inference; *upamiti,* analytical knowledge; *śābda,* verbal testimony; *bhedāt,* due to difference.

21. Valid apprehension is fourfold due to the division into perception, inference, analytical knowledge and verbal testimony.

यथार्थानुभवं विभजते । **यथार्थेति ।**

Dīpikā:

Valid apprehension is divided by the Text: *Yathārtha....*

22. The instruments of valid apprehension:

तत् करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्द भेदात् ॥ २२ ॥

Tat karaṇamapi, their instruments also; *caturvidham,* are fourfold; *pratyakṣa,* perception; *anumāna,* inference; *upamāna,* comparison; *śabda,* word; *bhedāt,* due to division into.

22. Their instruments too are fourfold due to division into the instrument of perception, instrument of inference, instrument of comparative knowledge; and the instrument of verbal testimony.

प्रसङ्गात्प्रमाकरणं विभजते । **तत्करणमपीति** । प्रमाकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ।

Dīpikā:

In this context, the means of valid apprehension is also being explained.[65] That which gives rise to right apprehension is proof; this definition is the general characteristic of proof.

23. Definition of Special cause:

असाधारणं कारणं करणम् ॥ २३ ॥

Asādhāraṇam kāraṇam, uncommon cause; *karaṇam,* is the special cause.

23. The uncommon cause (instrumental or efficient) is the special cause.

करणलक्षणमाह । **असाधारणेति** । दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय असाधारणेति ।

Dīpikā:

The text defines cause: *asādhāraṇa....* The term *uncommon* is inserted in the definition to avoid the defect of overapplicability in time, space etc.[66]

24. Definition of cause:

कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम् ॥ २४ ॥

Kārya, (to the) effect; *niyata,* invariably; *purvavṛtti,* antecedent; *kāraṇam,* the cause (is that which is).

24. That which invariably precedes its effect is its cause.

कारणलक्षणमाह । **कार्येति** । पूर्ववृत्ति कारणमित्युक्ते रासभादावतिव्याप्तिः स्यादतो नियतेति । तावन्मात्रे कृते कार्येऽतिव्याप्तिरतः पूर्ववृत्तीति । ननु तन्तुरूपमपि पटं प्रति कारणं स्यादिति चेत् न, अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सतीति विशेषणात् । अनन्यथासिद्धत्वमन्यथासिद्धिरहितत्वं । अन्यथासिद्धिः त्रिविधा - येन सहैव यस्य

यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तेन तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा तन्तुनां तन्तुरूपं तन्तुत्वं च पटं प्रति । अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा शब्दं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव पटं प्रत्याकाशस्य । अन्यत्र कृतनियतपूर्ववर्तिर्न एव कार्यसंभवे तत्सहभूतमन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा पाकजस्थले गन्धं प्रति रूपप्रागभावस्य । एवञ्च अनन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् ।

Dīpikā:

The text defines the cause; *kārya*... If cause is defined merely as antecedent, the defect of overapplicability occurs in animals like ass etc (in the production of a jar). This is avoided by the inclusion of the term invariably (as an ass need not be invariably antecedent in the production of a jar). Again, the mere definition *kāryaniyatam kāraṇam,* brings in the defect of overapplicability in the produced effect.[67] To avoid this, the term *pūrvavṛtti* is inserted in the definition (ie there can be no antecedent effect before the production of an effect).

Objection: The colour of the yarn also becomes the cause of cloth (as both *kāryaniyatatva* and *antecedence* are found in colour).

Reply: It is not so; because the definition of *kāraṇa* is qualified by the adjunct *ananyathāsiddhatve sati* which means *provided, the antecedent thing is not connected with dispensable things. Ananyathāsiddha* is that which does not depend for its invariable existence upon some other antecedent existing thing.[68] The absence of dispensable antecedents is *ananyathāisiddha.*

Anyathāsiddhatva (the dispensable antecedence in the production of a thing) is threefold: (a) Things that are connected to inherent relation (*samavāya sambandha*) with the cause and thus become the antecedents to effect through them; as for instance, the colour of yarn (*tanturūpa*) and the generic attribute of yarn (*tantutva*) which are intimately united with yarn, are antecedent to its effect, viz, a piece of cloth (*paṭa*). Here both *tanturūpa* and *tantutva* are the examples for the

first variety of *anyathāsiddha.* (b) Things that are antecedent to cause and therefore become antecedent to effect; as for instance, ether in the production of a jar. Ether is not directly perceived and its existence is proved only with reference to sound of which ether is the inherent cause. Thus, ether becomes antecedent to jar only after it becomes antecedent to its effect, sound. Therefore, ether is *anyathāsiddha* in the production of a jar. This is an example for the second type. (c) All other concomitants of cause that are not connected with it by inherence (*samavāya*). Since the production of an effect is determined by its invariable antecedence in some other place, other antecedents that accompany the product are considered *anyathāsiddha:* for instance, when heat is applied, the antecedent non-existence of colour (*rūpa prāgabhāva*) is *anyathāsiddha* in the production of smell. This is the third type. Thus a cause is defined as *the indispensable invariable antecedence* of an effect.[69]

25. Definition of effect:

कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ॥ २५ ॥

Kāryam, the effect (is); *prāgabhāva,* (of its own) antecedent non-existence; *pratiyogi,* counter correlative.

25. Effect is the counter-correlative of its own antecedent non-existence (in its inherent cause).

कार्यलक्षणमाह । कार्यमिति ।

Dīpikā:

The Text gives the characteristic mark of effect: *kāryam....*[70]

26. Cause (Kāraṇam):

कारणं त्रिविधम् - समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् ॥ २६ ॥

Kāraṇam, cause; *trividham,* is threefold; *samavāyi,* inherent; *asamavāyi,* non-inherent; *nimitta,* occasioning; *bhedāt,* due to division into.

26. Cause is of three kinds: inherent, non-inherent, and occasioning (instrumental or efficient).[71]

27. The inherent cause (samavāyi kāraṇam):

यत् समवेतं कार्यं उत्पद्यते तत् समवायिकारणम् ।
यथा तंतवः पटस्य, पटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः ॥ २७ ॥

Yat, that in which; *samavetam kāryam,* being in inseparable union with the effect; *utpadyate,* is produced; *tat,* that (is); *samavāyi kāraṇam,* the inherent cause; *yathā,* like; *tantavaḥ,* the yarns (are); *paṭasya,* of cloth; *paṭaḥ ca,* and the cloth; *svagatarūpādeḥ,* of the colour on it.

27. The inherent cause is that which is in inseparable union in (the thing in) which the effect is produced, as the yarns are of the (effect) cloth and the cloth is of the colour on it.

कारणं विभजते । **कारणमिति** । समवायिकारणस्य लक्षणमाह — **यत्समवेतमिति** । यस्मिन् समवेतमित्यर्थः । असमवायिकारणं लक्षयति — **कार्येणेति** । कार्येणेत्येतदुदाहरति — **तन्तुसंयोग इति** ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines inherent cause: *Yat samavetam....* The idea is that it is in inseparable union with the effect.[72]

28. The non-inherent cause (asamavāyi kāraṇam):

कार्येण कारणेन वा सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति यत्कारणं तदसमवायिकारणम् । यथा तंतुसंयोगः पटस्य, तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य ॥ २८ ॥

Kāryeṇa, with effect; *kāraṇena,* with the cause; *vā,* or; *saha,* with; *ekasmin arthe,* in the same object; *samavetatve sati,* being inseparably united; *yat kāraṇam,* which cause; *tad*

asamavāyikāraṇam, that is the non-intimate cause; *yathā,* like; *taṅtusaṁyogaḥ,* the conjunction of yarns; *paṭasya,* of the cloth; *taṅturūpam,* the colour of the yarn; *paṭarūpasya,* of the colour of the cloth.

28. The non-inherent cause is one which is inseparably united in the same object either with the effect, or with the cause, as the conjunction of yarns in relation to the (effect) cloth or the colour of the yarns in relation to (the effect) the colour of the cloth.

कार्येण पटेन सह एकस्मिंस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । कारणेनेत्येतदुदाहरति — **तन्तुरूपमिति** । कारणेन पटेन सह एकस्मिंस्तंन्तौ समवेतत्वात्

Dīpikā:

The Text gives two definitions of non-intimate cause: the first is: *kāryeṇa saha ekasminnarthe samavetatve sati yat kāraṇam tat asamavāyikāraṇam* - that is the non-inherent cause, which is inherent in the same substratum along with the effect. The Text provides the example of the relation of contact of yarn with cloth to explain this type of non-inherent cause.[73]

The second variety is: *kāraṇena saha ekasminnarthe samavetatve sati yat kāraṇam tat asamavāyikāraṇam* - that is the non-inherent cause which is inherent in the substratum along with cloth which is the inherent cause of the colour of cloth (*paṭarūpa*).[74]

29. Occasioning cause (nimitta kāraṇam):

तदुभयभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणम् ।
यथा तुरीवेमादिकं पटस्य ॥ २९ ॥

Tadubhayabhinnam, That which is different from the above two; *kāraṇam,* the cause; *nimittakāraṇam,* is the occasioning cause; *yathā,* like; *turī,* shuttle; *vema,* loom; *ādikam,* etc; *paṭasya,* (are of) cloth.

29. The cause which is different from both these

causes is the occasioning cause (instrumental or efficient), such as the shuttle, loom etc in the case of (production of) a piece of cloth.

तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । निमित्तकारणं लक्षयति — तदुभयेति । समवाय्यसमवायिभिन्नकारणं निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the occasioning cause: *tadubhaya....* The cause different from both the intimate and non-intimate causes is the occasioning cause (either instrumental or efficient).[75]

30. Special Cause (asādharaṇam kāraṇnam):

तदेतत्त्रिविधकारणमध्ये यदसाधारणं कारणं तदेव करणम् ॥ ३० ॥

Tadetat, that this; *trividhakāraṇamadhye,* among the three-fold causes; *asādhāraṇam kāraṇam,* that is the particular cause; *tadeva karaṇam,* that indeed is the special cause.

30. That alone which is the uncommon cause among the three varieties of causes mentioned above, is the special cause.

करणलक्षणमुपसंहरति — तदेतदिति ।

Dīpikā:

The Text concludes the definition of special cause: *Tadetat....*[76]

SECTION IV

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF EPISTEMOLOGY

31. Perception (Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa):

तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ३१ ॥

Tatra, among them; *pratyakṣajñānakaraṇam,* the special cause of percept; *pratyakṣam,* is perception.

31. Among them, perception is the special cause of percept.

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमाह — तत्रेति । प्रमाणचतुष्टयमध्ये इत्यर्थः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines percept: *tatra.... Tatra* means, among the four means of apprehension.

32. Perception defined and explained:

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्द्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं चेति । तत्र निष्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकं यथेदं किञ्चित् । सप्रकारकं ज्ञानं सविकल्पकं यथा डित्थोऽयं, ब्राह्मणोऽयं, श्यामोऽयं, पाचकोऽयमिति ॥ ३२ ॥

Indriya, organ; *artha,* object; *sannikarṣajanyam,* born of the contact of; *jñānam,* knowledge; *pratyakṣam,* is perception; *tad*

dvividham, it is twofold; *nirvikalpakam,* indeterminate; *savikalpakam ceti,* and determinate; *tatra,* of them; *niṣprakārakam jñānam,* the knowledge of a thing without any attribute; *nirvikalpakam,* - (is) indeterminate; *yathā,* like; *idam kiñcit,* this is something; *saprakārakam,* with attribute; *jñānam,* knowledge; *savikalpakam,* is determinate; *yathā,* like; *ḍitthaḥ ayam,* he is a Ḍittha; *brāhmaṇaḥ ayam,* he is a Brāhmaṇa; *śyāmaḥ ayam,* he is dark; *pācakaḥ ayam* he is a cook; *iti,* thus.

32. Perception is the apprehension born of the contact of the organ with an object. It is of two kinds: indeterminate and determinate. Of these, the knowledge of a thing without any attribute is known as the indeterminate apprehension; such as, *this is something.* Attributive knowledge is determinative apprehension. Apprehensions like, *he is a Ḍittha, he is a Brāhmaṇa, he is black, he is a cook,* are examples of determinate apprehension.

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य लक्षणमाह — **इन्द्रियेति** । इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिकम्, अर्थो घटादिः, तयोः संनिकर्षः संयोगादिः, तज्जन्यं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः । तद्विभजते । तद्द्विविधमिति । निर्विकल्पकस्य लक्षणमाह — **निष्प्रकारकमिति** । विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः । ननु निर्विकल्पके किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् न, गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञानं विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं, विशिष्टज्ञानत्वात्, दण्डीति ज्ञानवत् इत्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । विशेषणज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गान्निर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः । सविकल्पकं लक्षयति । **सप्रकारकमिति** । नामजात्यादिविशेष्यविशेषणसम्बन्धावगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः । सविकल्पकमुदाहरति । **यथेति** ।

Dīpikā:

The distinguishing characteristic mark of perception is given in the Text: *Indriya....* The organs are the eye etc. Objects are jar etc. Their connection is known as contact. That which is produced as a result of this contact (of organ with the object) is perception. It is again divided by the Text: *it is of two kinds.* The Text then gives the characteristic mark

of indeterminate apprehension. The knowledge in which there is the absence (*anavagāhi*) of a subject, attribute, and relation (between the attribute and the subject) is the indeterminate knowledge.

Question: What is the proof to determine the indeterminate knowledge?

Reply: The attributive knowledge: *this is a cow,* is born of the knowledge of the qualifying attribute *cowness;* because, it is an attributive knowledge (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) like the knowledge, *A man with a stick.* Inference is thus the proof (in establishing the indeterminate knowledge). If we say that the knowledge of the attribute also is determinate knowledge, it will then land us in the logical anomaly of *infinitum regressus.* Therefore, the knowledge of the attribute proved by inference, has to be accepted to determine the indeterminate knowledge. The knowledge which comprehends the relation of the qualified and the qualifier such as *name, class* etc is known as the *determinate knowledge.* Determinate knowledge is exemplified: *yathā....* The Text defines determinate knowledge: *saprakārakam....*[77]

33. The operative cause for perception is six-fold:

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः षड्विधः । संयोगः, संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायः, विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्चेति ॥ ३३ ॥

Pratyakṣajñānahetuḥ, the cause of perceptual knowledge; *indriya arthasannikarṣaḥ,* is the contact of organ and object; *ṣaḍvidhaḥ,* (it is) sixfold; *saṁyogaḥ,* conjunction; *saṁyuktasamavāyaḥ,* inherence with the conjoint; *saṁyukta samavetasamavāyaḥ,* inherent union with the inherent which is conjoint; *samavāyaḥ,* inherence; *samavetasamavāyaḥ,* inherence with the inherently united; *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ,* relation of the attribute with the subject; *ca iti* and thus.

33. The conjunction of organs with objects which causes perception is of six kinds: (a) conjunction; (b) inherent union with what has come into contact; (c) inherent union with what is intimately united with a thing which has come in contact; (d) inherent union; (e) inherent union with the intimately united; and (f) the connection of the attribute with the substantive.

इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षं विभजते । **प्रत्यक्षेति** ।

Dīpikā:

The Text divides conjunction of organ with object: *pratyakṣa....*

34. The first operative cause (Saṁyoga - sannikarṣaḥ):

चक्षुषा घटप्रत्यक्षजनने संयोगः सन्निकर्षः ॥ ३४ ॥

Cakṣuṣā, by the eye; *ghaṭapratyakṣajanane,* in causing the perception of the jar; *saṁyogaḥ sannikarṣaḥ,* conjunction is the contact.

34. Conjunction is the contact, producing perception of the jar by the eye.

संयोगसंनिकर्षमुदाहरति । **चक्षुषेति** । द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे सर्वत्र संयोगः संनिकर्षः । आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मन इन्द्रियेण, इन्द्रियमर्थेन, ततः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इत्यर्थः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text exemplifies conjunctive contact: *cakṣuṣā....* *Conjunctive contact* is the cause in producing perception of substances in all cases. The self (*ātman*) comes in contact with mind (*manas*), the mind with the organ (*indriya*), and organ with the object (*viṣaya*), and then perceptual knowledge takes place.[78]

35. Second operative cause (Saṁyukta samavāya):

घटरूपप्रत्यक्षजनने संयुक्त समवायः संनिकर्षः ।
चक्षुः संयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य समवायात् ॥ ३५ ॥

Ghaṭarūpapratyakṣajanane, in causing the perception of the colour of the jar; *saṁyuktasamavāyaḥ,* intimate union with the conjoint; *sannikarṣaḥ,* is the contact; *cakṣuḥ saṁyukte ghaṭe,* when the jar is in contact with the eye; (in it) *rūpasya samavāyāt,* the colour is intimately united with the jar.

35. The inherent union with the conjoint is the contact in producing the perception of the colour of a jar, as the colour is inherently united with the jar which is in contact with the eye.

संयुक्तसमवायमुदाहरति । **घटरूपेति** । तत्र युक्तिमाह । चक्षुःसंयुक्त इति ।

Dīpikā:

Inherent union with the conjoint is exemplified: *ghaṭarūpa....* The process is explained: *cakṣuḥ saṁyukte.*[79]

36. Third operative cause (Saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya):

रूपत्वसामान्यप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः सन्निकर्षः । चक्षुः संयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं, तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायात् ॥ ३६ ॥

Rūpatvasāmānyapratyakṣe, in perceiving the universal genus colourness; *saṁyukta samavetasamavāyaḥ,* inherent union with the inherently united; *sannikarṣaḥ,* is the contact; *cakṣuḥ saṁyukte ghaṭe,* in the jar which is in contact with the eye; *rūpam samavetam,* colour is inherent; *tatra rūpatvasya samavāyāt,* there, colourness is inherently united.

36. Inherent union with the intimately united is the contact in producing the perception of the universal genus colourness, as colour is inherently united with the jar that is conjoint with the ocular organ, and the genus colourness is inherently united therewith.

संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायमुदाहरति । **रूपत्वेति** ।

Dīpikā:

The Text gives an example of inherent union with the intimately united - *rūpatva....*[80]

37. Fourth operative cause (Samavāyaḥ sannikarṣaḥ):

श्रोत्रेण शब्दसाक्षात्कारे समवायः सन्निकर्षः कर्णविवरवर्त्याकाशस्य श्रोत्रत्वात् शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात् गुणगुणिनोश्च समवायात् ॥ ३७ ॥

Śrotreṇa, by the ear; *śabdasākṣātkāre,* in the apprehension of sound; *samavāyaḥ sannikarṣaḥ,* inherence is the contact; *karṇavivaravarti ākāśasya,* of the ether located in the cavity of the ear; *śrotratvāt,* (is) the organ of hearing; *śabdasya ākāśaguṇatvāt,* since sound is the quality of ether; *guṇaguṇinośca samavāyāt,* and due to the inherent union between the qualified and the attribute.

37. Inherent union is the contact in the perception of word by the organ of hearing, as the organ of hearing is the ether in the cavity of the ear inasmuch as sound is the quality of ether and the quality and the qualified are inherently united.

समवायमुदाहरति । **श्रोत्रेणेति** । तदुपपादयति । **कर्णेति** । ननु दूरस्थशब्दस्य कथं श्रोत्रसम्बन्ध इति चेत् न, वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा शब्दान्तरोत्पत्तिक्रमेण श्रोत्रदेशे जातस्य श्रोत्रेण संबन्धात्प्रत्यक्षसंभवः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text gives an example of inherent union: *śrotreṇa.* That is being elaborated *Karṇa....*

Question: How does a distant sound come in contact with the auditory sense?

Reply: Just like the principle of *vīcītaraṅga* or *kadaṁbamukula;* the first sound produces another sound which in turn propels another, and so on, till the last sound reaches the auditory sense, thus enabling one to perceive sound directly.[81]

38. Fifth operative cause - Samaveta-samavāya-sannikarṣaḥ:

शब्दत्वसाक्षात्कारे समवेतसमवायः सन्निकर्षः श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य समवायात् ॥ ३८ ॥

Śabdatvasākṣātkāre, in the cognition of the genus soundness, *samaveta - samavāyaḥ,* inherent union with the inherently united; *sannikarṣaḥ,* is the contact; *śrotrasamavete - śabde,* in sound which is inherently united with ear; *śabdatvasya,* of the genus soundness; *samavāyāt,* (of) intimate unity.

38. Inherent union with the inherently united is the contact in cognising soundness, as the genus soundness is inherently united with sound which is inherently united with the auditory sense.

समवेतसमवायमुदाहरति । शब्दत्वेति ।

Dīpikā:

The Text gives an example of inherent union with the intimately united: *śabdatva....*

39. Sixth operative cause (Viśeṣana - Viśeṣyabhāva Sannikarṣa):

अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभावः सन्निकर्षः, घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुः संयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात् ॥ ३९ ॥

Abhāvapratyakṣe, in the cognition of negation; *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya bhāvaḥ,* the relation of attribute and the subject; *sannikarṣaḥ,* is the contact; *ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalam ityatra,* in the cognition: 'This spot of earth is with the negation of a jar'; *cakṣuḥ saṁyukte bhūtale,* in the spot of earth, which is in contact with the eye; *ghaṭābhāvasya viśeṣaṇatvāt,* the negation of a jar is the attribute.

39. The connection of the qualifier and the qualified is the conjunction in the perception of negation, as in the cognition: *This spot of earth is with the negation of jar.* Here, the negation of a jar is an attribute of a place in contact with the eye.

विशेषणविशेष्यभावमुदाहरति । **अभावेति** । तदुपपादयति । **घटाभाववदिति** । भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यत्र अभावस्य विशेष्यत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । एतेन अनुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वं निरस्तम् । यद्यत्र घटोऽभविष्यत्तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यत, दर्शनाभावान्नास्तीति तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोध्यनुपलब्धिसहकृतेन्द्रियेणैव अभावज्ञानोत्पत्तौ अनुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वासंभवात् । अधिकरणज्ञानार्थमपेक्षणीयेन्द्रियस्यैव करणत्वोपपत्तावनुपलब्धेः करणत्वायोगात् । विशेषणविशेष्यभावो विशेषणविशेष्यस्वरूपमेव, नातिरिक्तः संबन्धः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमुपसंहरंस्तस्य करणमाह । **एवमिति** ।

Dīpikā:

The Text gives an example of the connection of the attribute and the subject: *abhāvaḥ*.... This is being explained: *Ghaṭābhāvavat*.... In the cognition *this spot of earth is with the negation of jar, the spot of earth is the qualified and the negation of jar* is the attribute.[82] In the cognition, *there is no jar on the spot of earth,* (where the eye is in contact with the spot of earth of which) the *negation of jar* is the qualified.[83] By this, the necessity for accepting non-perception as a distinct source of knowledge (*anupalabdheḥ pramāṇāntaratvam*) is refuted.

If there had been a jar, then the jar would have been apprehended as existing on that spot of earth. It is due to its absence, the apprehension, *jar is not here,* arises. Here, in this argument, is found the counter-entity of the negation of apprehension, thus proving that non-perception is only an accessory (*sahakārī*) of the eye which alone perceives the negation of jar on earth. Therefore (in this knowledge of the *negation of jar on earth*), the eye alone being the cause of the knowledge of substratum of negation it is impossible to state that *anupalabdhi* (non-perception) is an independent source to gain the knowledge of negation of jar.[84]

The relationship between the qualifier and the qualified is nothing but the nature of the attribute and the qualified. By this no other relationship is meant.

40. Conclusion:

एवं सन्निकर्षषट्कजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं, तत्करणमिन्द्रियम्, तस्मादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ॥ ४० ॥

Evam, thus; *sannikarṣaṣaṭkajanyam jñānam,* the knowledge caused by the sixfold contact; *pratyakṣam,* is perception; *tat karaṇam indriyam,* organ is its cause; *tasmāt,* therefore; *indriyam pratyakṣapramāṇam,* organ is the proof of perception; *iti siddham,* (is) thus established.

40. Perception is thus the cognition caused by the sixfold contact, and the organ is its cause (efficient or instrumental). Therefore, organ is the proof of *perception.*

असाधारणकारणत्वादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमुपसंहरति । तस्मादिति ।

Dīpikā:

Concluding the section dealing with perceptual knowledge, the Text mentions its special cause: *evam....* Since the organ is the special cause of perception, it is called the efficient or instrumental cause of perception. He concludes the section dealing with *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* by the words: *tasmāt....*

SECTION V

INFERENCE

1. Inference (anumānam):

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् ॥ १ ॥

anumiti karaṇam, the special cause of inferential knowledge; *anumānam,* (is) inference.

1. Inference is the special cause of inferential knowledge.

अनुमानं लक्षयति—**अनुमितिकरणमिति ।**

Dīpikā:

The Text defines inference: *anumitikaraṇam.*[85]

2. Inferential knowledge (anumiti):

परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः ॥ २ ॥

Parāmarśajanyam, born of subsumptive reflection; *jñānam,* knowledge; *anumitiḥ,* is inferential cognition.

2. Inferential knowledge is the knowledge born of subsumptive reflection.

अनुमितिं लक्षयति — **परामर्शेति ।** ननु संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिः स्थाणुपुरुषसंशयानन्तरं पुरुषत्वव्याप्यकरादिमानयम् इति परामर्शे सति पुरुष एव इति प्रत्यक्षजननात् । न च तत्रानुमितिरेवेति वाच्यम् । पुरुषं साक्षात्करोमि इत्यनुव्यवसायविरोधादिति

चेत् न, पक्षतासहकृतपरामर्शजन्यत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्ध्यभावः पक्षता । साध्यसिद्धिरनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका । सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽपि अनुमिनुयाम् इतीच्छायामनुमितिदर्शनात् सिषाधयिषोत्तेजिका । ततश्चोत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमण्यभावस्य दाहकारणत्ववत्सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्ध्यभावस्याप्यनुमितिकारणत्वम् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text gives the characteristic mark of inferential knowledge: *parāmarśa....*

Objection: There is overapplicability in perception in the form of a conclusion arrived at after first doubting, as in the example: *Is this a post or a man?* (On the perception of an object from a distance in insufficient light, the doubt, 'is this a post or a man?' arises). Then he reasons with the help of subsumptive reflection: *But this object has hands etc which are found invariably associated with mankind.* Then arises the perception: *this indeed is a man.* It should not be argued that the above cognition *this indeed is a man* is to be construed as inferential knowledge inasmuch as it has been derived consequent on *parāmarśa,* viz, this has hands etc which is *vyāpya* (less pervasive) with regard to mankind, and as it is contrary to *anuvyavasāya,* like: *I am perceiving a man.*[86]

Reply: Not so; because, the defect in the definition is avoided by prefixing *parāmarśa* with the adjunct: *in association with pakṣatā.* Then it ought to be interpreted as follows: *inferential cognition is the knowledge that arises from parāmarśa in association with pakṣatā. Pakṣatā* (ie the characteristic of an instance) consists *in having in it the negation of the ascertainment of the thing to be inferred, accompanied by a negation of any desire to infer an already proven thing*[87] *Indubious knowledge of the thing to be proved is the counter-acting factor in inferential knowledge (ie when the thing to be proved is ascertained in the pakṣa,* the need to infer its existence is superfluous). Even when the thing to be proved is perceived, sometimes it is observed that a desire: *I shall infer,* stimulates one to take to inference (to establish the proven). Here, the factor that stimulates one (to take to inference) is the

desire to establish a thing in the *pakṣa*. Just as the absence of a *pratibandhaka maṇi* (the gem capable of neutralising the burning power of fire) in association with the absence of a *uttejaka maṇi* (a gem that stimulates the power of burning in fire) is the cause of heat, even so, the absence of indubious knowledge of the thing to be proved in association with the absence of a desire to predicate a thing in the *pakṣa* is the cause of inferential knowledge.[88]

3. Subsumptive reflection (parāmarśa):

व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः । यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः । तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिः ॥ ३ ॥

Vyāptiviśiṣṭa, as distinguished by invariable concomitance; *pakṣadharmatājñānam,* the knowledge of reason in an instance; *parāmarśaḥ,* is subsumptive reflection; *yathā* for example; *vahnivyāpyadhūmavānayam parvataḥ,* this mountain has smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire; *iti jñānam parāmarśaḥ,* this knowledge is subsumptive reflection; *tajjanyam* resulting from that; *parvato vahnimān,* this mountain is fiery; *iti jñānam,* this knowledge; *anumitiḥ,* is inferential knowledge.

3. Subsumptive reflection is the knowledge of reason existing in the subject accompanied by invariable concomitance (of *sādhya*), eg the knowledge: *this mountain has smoke which is invariably pervaded by fire* is *parāmarśa;* and the cognition that results from it and takes the form: *the mountain is fiery* is the inferential knowledge.

परामर्शं लक्षयति — **व्याप्तीति** । व्याप्तिविषयकं यत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं स परामर्श इत्यर्थः । परामर्शमभिनीय दर्शयति — **यथेति** । अनुमितिमभिनीय दर्शयति — **तज्जन्यमिति** । परामर्शजन्यमित्यर्थः । व्याप्तिलक्षणमाह — **यत्रेति** ।

Dīpikā:

The Author defines *parāmarśa: vyāpti....* The meaning is that the knowledge of the existence of reason in an instance which has invariable concomitance as its object, is subsumptive reflection. The Author explains *parāmarśa* by declaration through the words: *Yathā....* Similarly, he explains inferential knowledge through the usage of words, *tajjanyam....* The meaning is: inferential knowledge is born of subsumptive reflection.

4. Invariable concomitance - vyāpti:

यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः ॥ ४ ॥

Yatra yatra dhūmaḥ, wherever there is smoke; *tatra tatra agniḥ,* there is fire; *iti sāhacaryaniyamaḥ,* this certainty of co-existence; *vyāptiḥ,* is invariable concomitance.

4. Invariable concomitance is the certainty of co-existence like, *wherever there is smoke there is fire.*

यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निः इति व्याप्तेरभिनयः । साहचर्यनियमः इति लक्षणम् । साहचर्यं सामानाधिकरण्यं, तस्य नियमः । हेतुसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः ।

Dīpikā:

The characteristic mark of *vyāpti* is given in the Text: *yatra....* The Text further illustrates *vyāpti* through the words: *where there is smoke there is also fire.* The distinguishing characteristic mark of invariable concomitance is the invariability of concomitance. Concomitance is co-existence (of smoke and fire) in one and the same substratum; its certainty is *niyama.* The fuller definition of *vyāpti* is: *the quality of being co-existent in the same substratum with the thing to be proved which does not become the counter-entity of its own absolute negation that co-exists with reason in the same substratum.*[89]

5. Pakṣadharmatā - The special feature of a subject:

व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता ॥ ५ ॥

Vyāpyasya, of the concomitance of a thing; *parvatādivṛttitvam,* the existence on an object, like a mountain; *pakṣadharmatā,* makes it the characteristic mark of a receptacle or subject.

5. The presence of an invariably concomitant thing in an object like a mountain makes it the characteristic of a receptacle or subject.[90]

पक्षधर्मतास्वरूपमाह — व्याप्यस्येति ।

6. Inference is twofold:

अनुमानं द्विविधं - स्वार्थं परार्थं च ॥ ६ ॥

Anumānam dvividham, inference is of two kinds; *svārtham,* for oneself; *parārtham ca,* and for another.

6. Inference is of two kinds: *for oneself* and *for another.*

(a) Inference for oneself:

तत्र स्वार्थं स्वानुमितिहेतुः, तथाहि, स्वयमेव भूयोदर्शनेन यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निरिति महानसादौ व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतः, तद्गते चाग्नौ सन्दिहानः पर्वते धूमं पश्यन् व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निः इति । तदनन्तरं वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्श इत्युच्यते । तस्मात् पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिः उत्पद्यते । तदेतत् स्वार्थानुमानम् ॥ ७ ॥

Tatra, of them; *svārtham sva-anumiti hetuḥ,* 'for oneself' is the cause of one's own inferential knowledge; *tathā hi* for instance; *svayameva,* by oneself; *bhūyodarśanena,* perceiving again and again; *yatra yatra dhūmaḥ,* wherever there is smoke;

tatra tatra agniḥ, there is fire; *iti,* thus; *mahānasādau,* in hearth etc; *vyāptim gṛhītvā,* having apprehended a regular concomitance; *parvata samīpam gataḥ,* goes near a mountain; *tadgate ca,* having approached that; *agnau saṅdihānaḥ,* suspecting fire; *parvate dhūmam paśyan,* seeing smoke on the mountain; *vyāptim smarati,* remembers the invariable concomitance; *yatra yatra dhūmaḥ,* wherever there is smoke; *tatra tatra agniḥ,* there is fire; *iti,* thus; *tadanantaram,* after this; *vahnivyāpya dhūmavān,* smoky, pervaded by fire; *ayaṁ parvataḥ,* this mountain is; *iti jñānam utpadyate,* this knowledge arises; *ayameva,* this, verily, is; *liṅgaparāmarśa,* subsumptive reflection arising from a mark; *iti ucyate,* is known; *tasmāt,* from this; *parvato vahnimān,* mountain is fiery; *iti jñānam anumitiḥ utpadyate,* inferential knowledge as this arises; *tad etat,* that this (knowledge); *svārthānumānam,* is one's own inference.

7. Of them, *inference for oneself* is the cause of one's own inferential knowledge. For instance, one, having repeatedly seen in the hearth etc the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, arrives at the universal generalisation: *wherever there is smoke there is fire,* and goes near a mountain. On suspecting fire on the mountain, and seeing smoke thereon, he remembers the universal concomitance: *wherever there is smoke there is fire.* After this, there dawns in him the knowledge *this mountain is smoky, pervaded by fire.* This is known as *subsumptive reflection arising from a mark.* From the above knowledge, the inferential knowledge, *mountain has fire in it* arises. This is one's own inference.

अनुमानं विभजते — **अनुमानमिति** । स्वार्थानुमानं दर्शयति **स्वयमेवेति** । ननु पार्थिवत्वलोहलेख्यत्वादौ शतशः सहचारदर्शनेऽपि वज्रमणौ व्यभिचारोपलब्धेर्भूयोदर्शनेन कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेत् न । व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहसहकृतसहचारज्ञानस्य व्याप्तिग्राहकत्वात् । व्यभिचारज्ञानं निश्चयः शङ्का च । तद्विरहः क्वचित्तर्कात्, क्वचित्स्वतः सिद्ध एव । धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तिग्रहे कार्यकारणभावभङ्गप्रसङ्गलक्षणस्तर्को व्यभिचारशङ्कानिवर्तकः । ननु

सकलवह्निधूमयोरसन्निकर्षात्कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेत् न। वह्नित्वधूमत्वरूप-सामान्यप्रत्यासत्त्यासकलवह्निधूमज्ञानसंभवात्। **तस्मादिति**। लिङ्गपरामर्शादित्यर्थः।

Dīpikā:

Tatra in the Text means between the two kinds of inference. *Bhuyodarśanena* in the Text means acceptance of the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire after repeated ascertainment of invariable co-existence of the thing to be proved and the reason.

Objection: One may observe a hundred times the co-existence of earth and the possibility of its being scratched by metals; still, in things like diamond, a deviation to the above rule is observed (ie though *vajra* is a particular modification of earth, no scratches can be caused by any metal except *vajra*). Then, how can it be said that invariable concomitance is ascertained by repeated observation?[91]

Reply: The objection is not tenable, because, *vyāpti* is to be interpreted as *the knowledge of co-existence in association with an absence of fallacious knowledge.* Fallacious knowledge is twofold; certainty of a contrary fact, and mere suspicion. The absence of *vyabhicārajñāna* is proved sometimes by reasoning; sometimes it is self-proved from lack of reason. *Vyabhicāra śaṅkā* in the statement of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire is removed by the argument of the *possibility of breaking the relation of effect and cause.*[92]

Objection: How can this invariable concomitance of smoke and fire be accepted when there is the absence of perception of all fires and all smokes existing everywhere?

Reply: One can have the knowledge of all types of fires and smokes existing in all the places by means of perception of the generic attributes of fire and smoke. *Tasmāt* in the text means *from liṅga parāmarśa,* ie from the subsumptive reflection arising from a mark.

(b) Inference for others:

यत्तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परंप्रतिबोधयितुं पञ्चावयव वाक्यं

प्रयुज्यते तत् परार्थानुमानम् । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्, धूमत्वात्, यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमान् यथा महानसः, तथा चायं, तस्मात्तथेति । अनेन प्रतिपादितात् लिङ्गात् परोऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ८ ॥

Yat tu, that which; *svayam dhūmāt agnim anumāya,* having inferred for oneself fire from smoke; *paramprati bodhayitum,* to make others understand (the same); *pañcāvayava vākyam,* five-membered syllogism; *prayujyate,* is employed; *tat parārthānumānam,* that is inference for others. *Yathā parvato vahnimān* like the mountain is fiery; *dhūmatvāt,* because of smoke; *yo yo dhūmavān,* whichever is smoky; *sa vahnimān,* that is fiery; *yathā mahānasaḥ,* like a hearth; *tathā ca ayam,* and so is this; *tasmāt tathā iti,* therefore it is so; *anena pratipāditāt liṅgāt,* from this expounded mark; *paraḥ api,* even others; *agnim pratipadyate,* apprehend fire.

8. But when, one, having inferred for oneself fire from smoke, employs the five-membered syllogism to make others understand the same, it is known as 'inference for others', eg *the mountain is fiery, because of smoke; whichever is smoky is fiery, as a hearth, and this is such, and therefore it is so.* From this five membered syllogism, others also apprehend fire (on the mountain by means of inference).

परार्थानुमानमाह — **यत्त्विति** । यच्छब्दस्य 'तत्परार्थानुमानम्' इति तच्छब्देनान्वयः । पञ्चावयववाक्यमुदाहरति — **यथेति** ।

Dīpikā:

The Text explains 'inference for another': *yat tu....* The word *yat* has to be taken in agreement with the word *tat* as by the word *yat* (that) *inference for another* is meant. The five - membered syllogism is exemplified: *yathā....*

9. The five-membered syllogism

प्रतिज्ञा - हेतु - उदाहरण - उपनय - निगमनानि पञ्चावयवाः ।

पर्वतो वह्निमानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्त्वात् इति हेतुः ।
यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमान् यथा महानस इत्युदाहरणम् ।
तथा च अयमिति उपनयः । तस्मात्तथेति निगमनम् ॥ ९ ॥

Pratijñā, proposition; *hetu,* reason; *udāharaṇa,* example; *upanaya,* subsumptive correlative; *nigamanāni,* (and) the conclusion (are); *pañcāvayavāḥ,* the five limbs; *parvataḥ,* the mountain; *vahnimān,* is fiery; *iti pratijñā,* is the proposition; *dhūmavatvāt,* due to smokiness; *iti hetuḥ,* is the reason; *yo yo dhūmavān,* whichever is smoky; *saḥ vahnimān,* that is fiery; *yathā mahānasaḥ,* like a hearth; *iti udāharaṇam,* this is the example; *tathā ca ayam,* and so is this; *iti upanayaḥ,* is the subsumptive correlative; *tasmāt tathā,* therefore it is such; *iti nigamanam,* is the conclusion.

9. The five members of the syllogism are: the proposition set down; the reason adduced therein; the example; the subsumptive correlative; and the conclusion. The proposition set down is, *the mountain is fiery,* the reason adduced in support of the above proposition is, *due to smokiness;* the example cited is, *whichever is smoky is fiery,* as a *hearth;* the subsumptive correlative is, *and so this mountain* (has smoke pervaded by fire); *therefore it is such* is the conclusion.

अवयवस्वरूपमाह — **प्रतिज्ञेति** ॥ उदाहृतवाक्ये प्रतिज्ञादिविभागमाह — **पर्वतो वह्निमानिति** ॥ साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा । पञ्चम्यन्तं लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं हेतुः । व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकं उदाहरणम् । व्याप्तिविशिष्टलिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वचनमुपनयः । हेतुसाध्यवत्तया पक्षप्रतिपादकं वचनं निगमनम् । अबाधितत्वादिकं निगमनप्रयोजनम् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text expalins the nature of the limbs: *pratijñā....* Through sentences of examples the Text explains the sections like *pratijña* etc: *parvato vahnimān....* The declaration of the subject (receptable - *pakṣa* in which the *sādhya* is to be ascertained) along with the thing to be proved is *proposition.*

The declaration indicating the mark that serves to demonstrate the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* and which (ie the declaration) ends in the ablative case, is the reason. The declaration which ascertains the invariable concomitance of reason and the thing to be proved, is the example. The declaration of mark accompanied by the invariable concomitance of the thing to be proved is the subsumptive correlative. The declaration of the subject along with the thing to be proved and reason, is the conclusion. The knowledge of the thing to be ascertained in a subject is the purpose of proposition. The utility of reason is the indication of the knowledge of the mark in a subject. The purpose of exemplification is to demonstrate the invariable concomitance (between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*). The purpose of subsumptive correlative is the demonstration of the knowledge of the existence of reason in the subject. The purpose of conclusion is to demonstrate the existence of the thing to be proved in the subject.

10. The special condition for anumiti - liṅga parāmarśa:

स्वार्थानुमितिपरार्थानुमित्योः लिङ्गपरामर्श एव करणम् । तस्मात् लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् ॥ १० ॥

Svārthānumiti, one's own inferential knowledge; *parārtha anumityoḥ,* (and) of inferential knowledge for another; *liṅgaparāmarśaḥ,* consideration of the mark; *eva,* alone; *karaṇam,* (is) the special cause; *tasmāt,* therefore; *liṅgaparāmarśaḥ,* consideration of the mark; *anumānam,* is inference.

10. Consideration of the mark alone is the special cause of inferential knowledge for oneself as well as for others. Therefore, consideration of the mark is inference.

अनुमितिकरणमाह — स्वार्थेति । ननु व्याप्तिस्मृतिपक्षधर्मताज्ञानाभ्यामेव अनुमितिसंभवे विशिष्टपरामर्शः किमर्थमङ्गीकर्तव्य इति चेत् न, 'वह्निव्याप्यवानयम्' इति शाब्दपरामर्शस्थले

परामर्शस्यावश्यकतया लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शस्यैव कारणत्वात् । लिङ्गं न करणम्, अतीतादौ व्यभिचारात् । 'व्यापारवत्कारणं करणम्' इति मते परामर्शद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानं करणम् । तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः । अनुमानमुपसंहरति - **तस्मादिति ।**

Dīpikā:

The Text describes the instrument of inferential knowledge through words: *svārtha*....

Objection: Since inferential knowledge can be had by the mere remembrance of invariable concomitance and by the knowledge of the existence of reason in mountain, why should one accept *consideration of the mark* with the adjunct of *the knowledge of invariable concomitance* (as the special cause of inferential knowledge)?[93]

Reply: In cases where the subsumptive reflection, *this mountain is smoky as pervaded by fire* is caused by mere words (on hearing it from others, without actually perceiving the existence of smoke in the mountain and also without possessing the knowledge of invariable concomitance), one has to take recourse to *viśiṣṭa parāmarśa* (to arrive at inferential knowledge). So, keeping in view, the principle of parsimony and brevity of expression, everywhere *tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa* is accepted as the special cause of inferential knowledge. Mere *mark* is not the special cause of *anumiti,* because of the deviation that would crop up (if we accept *mark* as the special cause) in the inferential knowledge arising from a reason which existed in the past or which is yet to come into existence. It is the *knowledge* of mark that is the special cause of inferential knowledge.[94]

The cause *that is operative* is the special cause. According to this definition, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance which has subsumptive reflection as its operation is the special cause of inferential knowledge. *Vyāpāra* (operation) is that which having been produced by any cause, becomes the cause of the product which is to be produced by the cause (of *vyāpāra*).[95] The Author concludes the section on *anumāna* with the words: *Tasmāt.*

11. Liṅga is threefold:

लिङ्गं त्रिविधम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकि, केवलान्वयि, केवलव्यतिरेकि चेति । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि । यथा वह्नौ साध्ये धूमवत्त्वम् । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः । यत्र वह्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाह्रद इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः ॥ ११ ॥

Liṅgam trividham, mark is three-fold; *anvayavyatireki,* positive and negative; *kevalānwayi,* purely positive; *kevalavyatireki,* purely negative; *ca iti,* and thus; *anwayena vyatirekeṇa ca,* positively and negatively; *vyāptimat,* pervading; *anwayavyatireki,* is positive-negative. *Yathā,* like; *vahnau sādhye,* when fire is to be proved; *dhūmavattvam,* smokiness; *yatra dhūmaḥ,* where there is smoke; *tatra agniḥ,* there is fire; *yathā mahānasaḥ,* like the hearth; *iti anvayavyāptiḥ,* is the positive concomitance; *yatra vahniḥ nāsti,* where there is no fire; *tatra dhūmaḥ api nāsti,* there smoke also does not exist; *yathā mahāhrada,* as is a lake; *iti vyatirekavyāptiḥ,* is the negative concomitance.

11. Mark is threefold: that which is (a) positive and negative; (b) purely positive; (c) purely negative. That which pervades both positively and negatively is the positive-negative; eg *smokiness when fire is the thing to be proved.* The proposition, *where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a hearth* is the positive concomitance. The proposition *where there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke, as in a lake,* is the negative concomitance.

लिङ्गं विभजते — **लिङ्गमिति** ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरेकिणं लक्षयति — **अन्वयेनेति** ॥ हेतुसाध्ययोर्व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः, तदभावयोर्व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः ।

Dīpikā:

Mark is divided by the Text: *trividham.* The Text defines

the positive-negative concomitance: *anvayena....* The positive concomitance is the invariable co-existence of the reason with the thing to be proved. The negative concomitance is the invariable absence of the reason wherever the thing to be proved is absent.[96]

12. Kevalānvayi liṅga:

अन्वयमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयि । यथा घटः अभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् पटवत् । अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वयोः व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिर्नास्ति, सर्वस्यापि प्रमेयत्वात् अभिधेयत्वाच्च ॥ १२ ॥

Anvayamātravyāptikam, that which is concomitant only positively; *kevalānwayi,* is the purely positive; *yathā,* like; *ghaṭaḥ abhidheyaḥ,* jar is nameable; *prameyatvāt,* because of knowability; *paṭavat,* like a piece of cloth; *atra,* here; *prameyatva abhidheyatvayoḥ,* between knowability and nameability; *vyatireka vyāptiḥ nāsti,* there is no negative concomitance; *sarvasyāpi,* of all things; *prameyatvāt,* due to knowability; *abhidheyatwāt ca,* and due to nameability.

12. *Purely positive liṅga* is that which has only positive concomitance, eg *jar is nameable because it is knowable, like a cloth.* Here, there is no negative concomitance of knowability or nameability, as all things are both knowable and nameable.

केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह — **अन्वयेति** ॥ केवलान्वयिसाध्यकं लिङ्गं केवलान्वयि । (वृत्तिमत्) अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् । ईश्वरप्रमाविषयत्वं सर्वपदाभिधेयत्वं च सर्वत्रास्तीति व्यतिरेकाभावः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the purely positive reason: *anvaya....* The *mark* that has only positive concomitance is the purely positive reason. *Kevalānvayitva* is *never being the counter-correlative of absolute non-existence.* This is shown through the example: *jar is nameable because it is knowable.*

Since everything is knowable to the Lord and also is nameable, as everything is included in the word *all* which is the collective term for everything that is nameable, negative concomitance does not exist anywhere.

13. Kevalavyatireki liṅga:

व्यतिरेकमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि, यथा पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धवत्त्वात् । यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत् यथा जलम् । न चेयं तथा । तस्मान्न तथेति । अत्र यद्गन्धवत् तदितरभिन्नम् इत्यन्वयदृष्टान्तो नास्ति, पृथिवीमात्रस्य पक्षत्वात् ॥ १३ ॥

Vyatirekamātravyāptikam, that which has only a negative concomitance; *kevalavyatireki,* is the purely negative; *yathā,* like; *pṛthivī,* earth; *itarebhyo,* from the rest; *bhidyate,* differs; *gandhavattvāt,* because of existence of smell; *yad itarebhyo na bhidyate,* whichever does not differ from the rest; *na tad gandhavat,* it has no smell; *yathā jalam,* like water; *na ca iyam tathā,* but this is not so; *tasmāt na tathā iti,* therefore, it is not so; *atra yad gandhavat,* here, that which has smell; *tad itarabhinnam,* that is different from the rest; *iti anvayadṛṣṭāntaḥ nāsti,* there is no such example of positive concomitance; *pṛthivīmātrasya pakṣatwāt,* because of the whole earth being the subject here.

13. The purely negative reason is that which has a negative concomitance only, eg *earth differs from the rest because it has smell.* Whichever does not differ from the rest has no smell in it, eg water. But this earth is not so (because there is no absence of smell). Therefore, it is not so. Here, there is no positive example like *whichever has smell is different from others,* because the whole earth constitutes the subject here (as all varieties of products and transformations of earth constitute the subject here).

केवलव्यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह — **व्यतिरेकेति** ॥ तदुदाहरति-**यथेति** । नन्वितरभेदः प्रसिद्धो वा न वा । आद्ये यत्र प्रसिद्धस्तत्र हेतुसत्त्वे अन्वयित्वम्, असत्त्वे असाधारण्यम् । द्वितीये साध्यज्ञानाभावात्कथं तद्विशिष्टानुमितिः । विशेषणज्ञानाभावे विशिष्टज्ञानानुदयात्प्रतियोगिज्ञानाभावाद्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानमपि न स्यादिति चेत् न । जलादित्रयोदशान्योन्याभावानां त्रयोदशसु प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्धानां मेलनं पृथिव्यां साध्यते । तत्र त्रयोदशत्वावच्छिन्नभेदात्मक - साध्यस्यैकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वाभावान्नान्वयित्वासाधारण्ये । प्रत्येकाधिकरणप्रसिद्धया साध्यविशिष्टानुमितिः व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिनिरूपणं चेति ।

Dīpikā:

The characteristic mark of purely negative reason is given in the Text: *vyatireka*.... It is further illustrated, *pṛthivī*....

Objection: *Is difference from the rest* previously known, or not known? If the former, (ie *if the difference from the rest* is known to exist somewhere other than earth), then, the reason either co-exists with it or not; if the reason co-exists, then there is a positive concomitance. (Therefore, the *hetu* cannot be called a purely negative one); if the reason does not co-exist, then there occurs the defect of *asādhāraṇya*. In the latter event, (ie if *itarabheda* is not known), then the knowledge of the thing to be proved being unknown, how can there be inferential knowledge, characterised by itself, because of the maxim: *a qualified thing cannot be known without the previous knowledge of the qualifier?*[97] Also, since the knowledge of negation depends on the knowledge of its counter-entity, the negation of *difference from the rest* also is unknown; hence there can be no knowledge of negative concomitance.

Reply: It is known that the thirteen mutual negations of water etc reside severally in each of the thirteen things like water etc at a time.[98] And the aggregate (ie all the thirteen mutual negations) is shown to exist at one and the same time in earth. Therefore, due to the absence of the simultaneous existence of the thirteen mutual negations on any one thing we cannot know whether the *hetu* exists there or not. And, having thus no knowledge of the *hetu*, positive or negative, we can neither call it *anvayī* or *asādhāraṇya*. (This refutes

the first objection. The following argument refutes the second objection). Difference from the rest which is the thing to be proved is already known to exist severally in (the thirteen as shown above); hence, it is possible to have inferential knowledge as characterized by the *sādhya* as pervaded by the negation of *sādhana* is determined.

14. Subject (pakṣa):

सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान् पक्षः । यथा धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ पर्वतः ॥ १४ ॥

Sandigdhasādhyavān, that on which is suspected the thing to be inferred; *pakṣaḥ,* is the subject; *dhūmavattve hetau,* when smokiness or smoke is the reason; *parvataḥ,* a mountain.

14. Subject is that on which the thing to be proved is suspected, eg a mountain when smokiness or smoke is the reason.

पक्षलक्षणमाह — **सन्दिग्धेति** ॥ ननु श्रवणानन्तरभाविमननस्थले अव्याप्तिः । तत्र वेदवाक्यैरात्मनो निश्चितत्वेन सन्देहाभावात् । किञ्च प्रत्यक्षेऽपि वह्नौ यत्रेच्छयानुमितिस्तत्राव्याप्तिरिति चेत् न, उक्तपक्षताश्रयत्वस्य पक्षलक्षणत्वात् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the subject: *sandigdha....*

Objection: Here, the defect of *avyāpti* occurs in reflection (like, *the soul is different from the body etc*) because, the knowledge (of the soul as different from the body etc) is ascertained by hearing it (from the preceptor. Hence here is the absence of doubt in the *pakṣa.* So, here is *avyāpti* of *pakṣalakṣaṇa* in *manana*). Also, the defect of *avyāpti* occurs in instances when one wishes to infer fire even after having directly perceived it. (That is, the existence of fire is determined by perception; so, here there is no doubt with regard to its existence in the *pakṣa.* So *avyāpti* occurs).

Reply: This objection is untenable; because *pakṣatā* is to be interpreted in the manner explained earlier (to avoid *ativyāpti* in *saṁśayottara pratyakṣa*). *Pakṣatā* is the absence of the

indubious knowledge of the thing to be proved accompanied by an absence of desire to establish an already ascertained *sādhya*.

15. Similar instance (sapakṣa):

निश्चितसाध्यवान् सपक्षः, यथा तत्रैव महानसम् ॥ १५ ॥

Niścitasādhyavān, that in which the thing to be proved is determined; *sapakṣaḥ,* is the similar instance; *yathā,* like; *tatraiva,* in the same instance; *mahānasam,* hearth.

15. The subject in which the existence of the thing to be proved is known for certain is the similar instance; eg a hearth in the same case.

सपक्षलक्षणमाह — **निश्चितेति ॥**

Dīpikā:

The Text defines similar instance *niścita*....[99]

16. Contrary instance (Vipakṣa):

निश्चितसाध्याऽभाववान् विपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महाह्रदः ॥ १६ ॥

Niścitasādhya abhāvavān, that in which the absence of the thing to be proved is determined; *vipakṣaḥ,* is the contrary instance; *yathā,* like; *tatraiva mahāhradaḥ,* in that very inference, a lake.

16. The subject in which the non-existence of the thing to be proved is determined is the contrary instance; eg a lake in the same inference.

विपक्षलक्षणमाह — **निश्चितेति ॥**

Dīpikā:

The Text gives the characteristic mark of a contrary instance: *niścita*....[100]

17. Defective reason (hetvābhāsa):

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षासिद्धबाधिताः पञ्च हेत्वा-
भासाः ॥ १७ ॥

Savyabhicāra, straying; *viruddha,* adverse; *satpratipakṣa,* antithetical; *asiddha,* unestablished; *bādhitāḥ,* (and) stultified (are the); *pañca hetvābhāsāḥ,* five defective reasons.

17. The defective reasons are five (a) straying; (b) adverse; (c) antithetical; (d) unestablished; and (e) stultified.

एवं सद्धेतून्निरूप्य असद्धेतून्निरूपयितुं विभजते — **सव्यभिचारेति** ॥ अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वं हेत्वाभासत्वम् ।

Dīpikā:

Having first explained the characteristic marks of faultless reasons, now, the Text deals with defective reasons by dividing them into *straying reason etc.* (with a view to indicate that these reasons should not be employed in an inference). Defective reasoning consists in being the subject of valid apprehension which prevents inferential knowledge.

18. Savyabhicāra hetu is threefold:

सव्यभिचारः अनैकान्तिकः । स त्रिविधः
साधारणासाधारणानुपसंहारिभेदात् ॥ १८ ॥

Savyabhicāraḥ, the straying reason; *anaikāntikaḥ,* is (also known as) the deviating; *sa trividhaḥ,* it is threefold; *sādhāraṇa,* common; *asādhāraṇa,* uncommon; *anupasaṁhārin,* (and) non-exclusive; *bhedāt,* due to division into.

18. The straying reason is one that is known also as the deviating. It is of three kinds due to its division into common, uncommon, and non-exclusive.

सव्यभिचारं विभजते — **स त्रिविध** इति ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text divides the straying reason: *sa trividhaḥ....*

19. Sādhāraṇa savyabhicāra hetu:

तत्र साध्याभाववद्वृत्तिः साधारणः अनैकान्तिकः, यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रमेयत्वात् इति । प्रमेयत्वस्य वह्न्यभाववति ह्रदे विद्यमानत्वात् ॥ १९ ॥

Tatra, of these; *sādhyābhāvavadvṛttiḥ,* existence in a place where there is the absence of the thing to be proved; *sādhāraṇaḥ anaikāntikaḥ,* is the common strayer; *yathā,* like; *parvato vahnimān,* mountain is fiery; *prameyatvāt iti,* because of knowability; *prameyatvasya,* of knowability; *vahnyabhāvavati hrade,* in a lake where there is the absence of fire; *vidyamānatvāt,* due to its existence.

19. Of these, the reason which is present in a place where there is the absence of the thing to be proved, is the common strayer reason; eg the argument *mountain is fiery, because, it is knowable;* here, knowability exists in a lake also where there is the absence of fire.

साधारणं लक्षयति — **तत्रेति** ॥ उदाहरति — **यथेति** ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the common strayer reason; *tatra....* It gives an example: *yathā....*[101]

20. Asādhārana savyabhicāra hetu:

सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तः पक्षमात्रवृत्तिः असाधारणः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वात् इति । शब्दत्वं हि सर्वेभ्यो नित्येभ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तं शब्दमात्रवृत्तिः ॥ २० ॥

Sarvasapakṣa, all similar instances; *vipakṣa,* (and) contrary instances; *vyāvṛttaḥ,* not present; *pakṣamātravṛttiḥ,* (but) is present only in the subject; *asādhāraṇaḥ,* is the uncommon (strayer reason); *yathā,* like; *śabdo nityaḥ,* sound is eternal; *śabdatvāt iti,* because of soundness; *śabdatvam,* soundness; *sarvebhyo nityebhyo anityebhyaśca vyāvṛttam,* is absent in all things eternal and non-eternal; *śabdamātravṛtti,* exists in sound only.

20. The uncommon strayer reason is that which is found only in the subject while not being present in any similar and contrary instances; eg *sound is eternal because of soundness.* Soundness exists only in sound and is absent in all eternal and non-eternal things.

असाधारणं लक्षयति — सर्वेति ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the uncommon strayer: *sarva...*[102]

21. Anupasaṁhāri savyabhicāra hetu:

अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहितोऽनुपसंहारी । यथा सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र सर्वस्यापि पक्षत्वात् दृष्टान्तो नास्ति ॥ २१ ॥

Anvaya vyatireka-dṛṣṭānta-rahitaḥ, having neither positive example nor negative example; *anupasaṁhārī,* is the non-exclusive strayer reason; *yathā,* like; *sarvamanityam,* everything is non-eternal; *prameyatvāditi,* because it is knowable. *Atra,* here; *sarvasyāpi,* of everything; *pakṣatvāt,* being the subject; *dṛṣṭānto nāsti,* (there is) no instance.

21. The non-exclusive strayer reason is that which has neither positive instance nor negative instance, as in the argument, *everything is non-eternal because it is knowable.* Here, since everything is treated as the subject no example is available to support the inference.

अनुपसंहारिणो लक्षणमाह — **अन्वयेति ॥**

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the non-exclusive strayer; *anvaya....*[103]

22. Viruddha hetu:

साध्याभावव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वादिति । कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभावेनाऽनित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम् ॥ २२ ॥

Sādhyābhāvavyāpto hetuḥ, the reason pervaded by the negation of the thing to be proved; *viruddhaḥ,* is the self-contradicting reason. *Yathā,* like; *śabdo nityaḥ,* sound is eternal; *kṛtakatvāditi,* because it is produced; *kṛtakatvam hi,* producibility; *nityatva abhāvena anityatvena,* by non-eternality, which is of the nature of the negation of eternality; *vyāptam,* is pervasive.

22. The self-contradicting reason is that which is pervaded by the negation of the thing to be proved eg the argument, ***sound is eternal because it is produced.*** Here, *producibility* is pervasive of non-eternality which is of the nature of the ***negation of eternality.***

विरुद्धं लक्षयति — **साध्येति ॥**

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the self-contradicting reason: *sādhya....*[104]

23. Satpratipakṣa hetu:

यस्य साध्याभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स सत्प्रतिपक्षः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववत् । शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वात् घटवत् ॥ २३ ॥

Yasya, of whom; *sādhyābhāvasādhakam,* capable of proving the negation of the thing to be proved; *hetvantaram vidyate,* another reason exists; *sa satpratipakṣaḥ,* that is the antithetical reason; *yathā,* like; *śabdo nityaḥ,* sound is eternal; *śrāvaṇatvāt,*

because it is audible; *śabdatvavat,* like soundness; *śabdo anityaḥ,* sound is non-eternal; *kāryatvāt,* because it is a product; *ghaṭavat,* like a jar.

23. The antithetical reason is that of which there exists another reason capable of proving the negation of the thing to be proved, as in the argument: *sound is eternal, because it is audible, like soundness; and sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a jar.*

सत्प्रतिपक्षं लक्षयति — **यस्येति** ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the antithetical reason: *yasya....*[105]

24. Asiddha hetu is threefold:

असिद्धस्त्रिविधः — आश्रयासिद्धः, स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति ॥ २४ ॥

Asiddhastrividhaḥ, the reason unestablished to itself is threefold; *āśrayāsiddhaḥ,* unestablished in respect of its substratum; *svarūpā siddhaḥ,* unestablished in respect of itself; *vyāpyatvāsiddhaśceti,* and unestablished in respect of its concomitance.

24. The unestablished reason is of three kinds: (a) unestablished in respect of its substratum; (b) unestablished in respect of itself; and (c) unestablished in respect of its concomitance.

असिद्धं विभजते — **असिद्ध** इति ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the antithetical reason: *asiddha.*

25. Āśrayāsiddha:

आश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभि अरविन्दत्वात् सरोजारविन्दवत् । अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः स च नास्त्येव ॥ २५ ॥

Āśrayāsiddho, (the reason) with non-existent substratum; *Yathā,* like; *gaganāraviṅdam,* sky-lotus; *surabhi,* is fragrant; *araviṅdatvāt,* because it is a lotus; *sarojāraviṅdavat,* like a lotus in a lake; *atra,* here; *gaganāraviṅdam āśrayaḥ,* sky-lotus is the substratum; *sa ca nāstyeva,* and that does not exist.

25. The reason with non-existent substratum is found in the argument: *sky-lotus is fragrant because it is a lotus like a lotus in a lake.* In this argument, *sky-lotus* is the subject but it *never exists.*

आश्रयासिद्धमुदाहरति — **गगनेति** ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text gives an example for reason with non-existent substratum: *gaganeti.*

26. Svarūpāsiddha:

स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दो गुणश्चाक्षुषत्वात् । अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दं नास्ति शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

Svarūpāsiddho, the reason unestablished in respect of itself; *yathā,* like; *śabdo guṇaḥ,* sound is a quality; *cākṣuṣatvāt,* because it is visible; *atra,* here; *cākṣuṣatvam,* visibility; *śabde,* in sound; *nāsti,* does not exist; *śabdasya,* of sound; *śrāvaṇatvāt,* of audibility only.

26. The reason that is unestablished in respect of itself is found in the argument: *sound is a quality because it is visible;* here, *visibility* does not exist in *sound,* as in sound only audibility exists.

स्वरूपासिद्धमुदाहरति — **यथेति** ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text gives an example for reason unestablished in respect of itself: *Yatheti.*

27. Vyāpyatvāsiddha:

सोपाधिको हेतुः व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः । साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वं उपाधिः । साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । पर्वतो धूमवान्वह्निमत्वादित्यत्र आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः । तथाहि । यत्र धूमस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता । यत्र वह्निस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगो नास्ति अयोगोलके आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगाभावादिति साधनाव्यापकता । एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वादार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः । सोपाधिकत्वात् वह्निमत्त्वं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धम् ॥ २७ ॥

Sopādhiko hetuḥ, the reason associated with an adventitious condition; *vyāpyatvāsiddhaḥ,* is unestablished in respect of its own pervasion; *sādhyavyāpakatve sati,* while being pervasive of the thing to be proved; *sādhana avyāpakatvam,* being non-pervasive of the reason; *upādhiḥ,* is adventitious condition; *sādhyasamānādhikaraṇa ātyantābhāva apratiyogitvam,* not being the counter correlative of its absolute negation while co-existing with the thing to be proved; *sādhyavyāpakatvam,* is being pervasive of the thing to be proved; *sādhanavanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvam,* being the counter correlative of absolute negation co-existing with reason; *sādhana avyāpakatvam,* is being non-pervasive of the reason; *parvato dhūmavān,* mountain is smoky; *vahnimatvāt,* because it has fire; *ityatra,* in this case; *ārdreṅdhanasaṁyogaḥ,* contact with wet fuel; *upādhiḥ,* is the adventitious condition; *tathāhi,* it being so; *yatra dhūmaḥ,* where there is smoke; *tatra ārdreṅdhanasaṁyogaḥ,* there is contact with wet fuel; *iti,* thus; *sādhyavyāpakatā,* is pervasion of the thing to be proved; *yatra vahniḥ,* where there is fire; *tatra ārdreṅdhanasaṁyogaḥ,* there the contact with wet fuel;

nāsti, does not exist; *ayogolake,* in red-hot iron-ball; *ārdreṅdhanasaṁyoga abhāvād,* due to the absence of contact with wet fuel; *iti,* thus; *sādhana avyāpakatā,* non-pervasion of reason; *evam,* thus; *sādhyavyāpakatve sati,* while being pervasive of the thing to be proved; *sādhana avyāpakatvād,* being non-pervasive of the reason; *ārdreṅdhanasaṁyogaḥ,* the contact with wet fuel; *upādhiḥ,* is adventitious condition; *sopādhikatvāt,* being associated with adventitious condition; *vahnimatvam,* possession of fire; *vyāpyatvāsiddham,* is unestablished to its own pervasiveness.

27. The reason associated with an adventitious condition is known as unestablished in respect of its own pervasion; adventitious condition is that which pervades the thing to be proved but is not pervasive of the reason. (That which invariably co-exists with *sādhya* is *sādhyavyāpaka;* that which does not co-exist in some place with *sādhana* is *sādhana avyāpaka*). Not having counter-correlative of its absolute negation while co-existing with the thing to be proved is being pervasive of the thing to be proved. Having the counter-entity of absolute negation co-existing with reason is being non-pervasive of reason. In the argument: *Mountain is smoky, because it has fire,* contact with wet fuel is the *upādhi.* It is pervasive of the thing to be proved. (ie smoke) because of the concomitance, *wherever there is smoke there is contact with wet fuel.* But there is no contact with wet fuel wherever there is fire; for example, in a red hot iron-ball there is fire, though contact with wet fuel is not there. Thus the adventitious condition is non-pervasive of the reason. In like manner, contact with wet fuel is the adventitious condition in the present instance because it is pervasive of the thing to be proved while not being pervasive of the reason. Therefore, fire which is the reason in the argument

under reference, is unestablished in relation to its own pervasiveness owing to its association with adventitious condition.

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्य लक्षणमाह — **सोपाधिक इति** ॥ उपाधेर्लक्षणमाह — **साध्येति** ॥ उपाधिश्चतुर्विधः केवलसाध्यव्यापकः, पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः, साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः, उदासीनधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकश्चेति । आद्यः आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः । द्वितीयो यथा वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात् इत्यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम् । तृतीयो यथा — प्रागभावो विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् । चतुर्थो यथा — प्रागभावो विनाशी प्रमेयत्वात् इत्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the reason unestablished in respect of itself: *sopādhiko.... Upādhi* (adventitious condition) is of four types: (1) Pervasive of *sādhya* and non-pervasive of reason; (2) that which is pervasive of *sādhya* delimited by the property of residing in *pakṣa* and is non-pervasive of reason; (3) that which is pervasive of *sādhya* delimited by the property of residing in the reason and is non-pervasive of reason, and (4) that which is pervasive of *sādhya* delimited by a property which has no concern either of *pakṣa* or reason and is non-pervasive of reason. The example for the first kind of *upādhi* is *contact with wet fuel.* Let us now take the second kind, and illustrate it with the following example: *Air is perceptible because of its being the substratum of touch caused by perception.* Here *touch,* ie the state of being the substratum of touch, is *sopādhika* (with the defect of *upādhi*). Manifested colour is the *upādhi* in this instance; because it is pervasive of the *sādhya,* viz, perceptibility. Indeed it is so; wherever there is perceptibility delimited by substanceness (the property of residing in the *pakṣa*) there is manifested colour. Here manifested colour is pervasive of *sādhya,* viz perceptibility. It should not be argued that since manifested colour is not found to exist in *air* in spite of its being possessed of perceptibility and substanceness in it, manifested colour cannot be held

as *upādhi;* because it is not possible to include here air in the category of *substances possessing perceptibility* inasmuch as *air* is the pakṣa here, in which *perceptibility has yet to be ascertained. Thus, there is touch* in earth, water and *tejas.* Accordingly, there will also be manifested colour in the above three substances. Since by *substanceness* only the property residing in substances other than *Ātma* is meant, the inclusion of *Ātma* in the category of substance becomes excluded. So, the possible argument, *there is perceptibility in Ātma but there is no manifested colour* is being averted. Thus, a part of the definition of *upādhi,* viz *that which is pervasive of sādhya delimited by the property of residing in pakṣa* is established in *manifested colour.* The other part of the definition viz *non-pervasive of reason,* is found to be in the *manifested colour* thus: wherever there is touch there need not be manifested colour (eg there is touch in the *Air,* but there is no manifold colour) in it. (It should be noted here that the absence of manifested colour is not under dispute in the *pakṣa,* viz air). That which becomes *vyāpaka* even to that which is *vyāpaka* to reason becomes *vyāpya* to the reason is the *upādhi* and a reason with this defect of *upādhi* becomes defective.

The third kind of *upādhi* is found in the argument: *Antecedent negation is destructible because of being produced.* Here, *bhāvatvam* (Being-ness) is the *upādhi.* Where there is *sādhya,* viz non-eternality, delimited by the property (ie the state of being created) residing in the reason viz, effect (production), there is *bhāvatvam.* There is non-eternality delimited by the property, viz, the state of being created, as in a pot and the like. But, where there is the reason *janyatvam* in *dhvaṁsa* where there is *bhāvatvam.* Thus, the reason in the above argument is *sopādhika,* and is defective.

The fourth kind of *upādhi* is found in the argument: *Antecedent negation is destructible because of its being knowable.* Here too *bhāvatvam* is *upādhi.* Where there is *sādhya* delimited by the property *janyatvam* (the property that belongs neither to *pakṣa* nor to reason) there is *bhāvatvam.* But where there

is the reason *knowability,* eg in negation, there is not *bhāvatvam.* Thus, the reason being *sopādhika,* it is defective.

28. Bādhita hetu:

यस्य साध्याभावः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स बाधितः । यथा वह्निरनुष्णो द्रव्यत्वात् जलवत् । अत्रानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्वं स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षेण गुह्यत इति बाधितत्वम् ॥ २८ ॥

Yasya sādhyābhāvaḥ, whose negation of the thing to be proved; *pramāṇāntareṇa niścitaḥ,* is established by another proof; *sa bādhitaḥ,* that is the contradicted reason; *yathā,* like; *vahniḥ anuṣṇaḥ,* fire is non-hot; *dravyatvāt,* it being a substance; *jalavat,* like water; *atra,* here; *anuṣṇatvam,* non-hotness; *sādhyam,* is the thing to be proved; *tadabhāva uṣṇatvam,* notness which is the negation of that; *sparśana-pratyakṣeṇa,* by means of tactile perception; *gṛhyate,* is apprehended; *iti bādhitatvam,* thus is contradicted.

28. The contradicted reason is one where the negation of the thing to be proved is established by another proof, eg *fire is not-hot, because it is a substance, like water.* Here, *non-hotness* is the thing to be proved. But *hotness,* the negation of non-hotness, is cognised through tactile perception. Therefore, the above reason is known as the contradicted reason.

बाधितस्य लक्षणमाह — **यस्येति** ॥ अत्र बाधस्य ग्राह्याभावनिश्चयत्वेन, सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य विरोधिज्ञानसामग्रीत्वेन साक्षादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । इतरेषां तु परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । तत्रापि साधारणस्याव्यभिचाराभावरूपतया, विरुद्धस्य सामानाधिकरण्याभावतया व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्य विशिष्टव्याप्त्यभावतया, असाधारणानुपसंहारिणोः व्याप्तिसंशयाधायकत्वेन व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम्, आश्रयासिद्धिस्वरूपासिद्धयोः पक्षधर्मताज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । उपाधिस्तु व्यभिचारज्ञानद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकः । सिद्धसाधनं तु पक्षताविघटकतया आश्रयासिद्धावन्तर्भवतीति प्राञ्चः । निग्रहस्थानान्तरमिति नवीनाः ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text defines the contradicted reason: *yasya*.... The stultified and the antithetical reasons directly obstruct inferential knowledge: the first, through the determination of the non-existence of the thing to be proved; the second, through the entire causal apparatus bringing about the adverse cognition (by determining the negation of the thing to be proved). In other cases, inference is obstructed owing to the obstruction to subsumptive reflection. Even among them, inferential knowledge is prevented owing to the prevention of the knowledge of invariable concomitance due to the obstruction caused by such counter agents as (a) *sādhāraṇa* in which there is the absence of the absence of inconsistency; (b) *viruddha* in which there is the absence of predicative correlation of the thing to be proved and the reason; (c) *vyāpyatvāsiddha,* in which there is the absence of determinate concomitance; and (d) *asādhāraṇa* and *anupasaṁhārin* in which there is the presence of doubtful invariable concomitance; in *āśrayāsiddha* and *svarūpāsiddha,* there exists obstruction to the knowledge of the presence of reason in the subject. But *upādhi* prevents inferential knowledge by counteracting the knowledge of invariable concomitance through the knowledge of inconsistency. Naiyāyikas belonging to the traditional school are of the opinion that the re-establishment of an already proved *sādhya* like: *jar is non-eternal, because it is a product,* gets included in *āśrayāsiddha* itself on account of the destruction of *pakṣatā;* but the modern Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that it is included in vulnerable points (*nigrahasthāna*), which cause defeat in a debate.

SECTION VI

UPAMĀNA - ASSIMILATIVE ANALOGY

उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धज्ञानमुपमितिः । तत्करणं सादृश्यज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तर व्यापारः । तथा हि कश्चिद्गवयशब्दार्थमजानन् कुतश्चित् आरण्यकपुरुषाद्गोसदृशो गवय इति श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन् गोसदृशं पिण्डं पश्यति । तदनन्तरमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य इत्युपमितिरुत्पद्यते ॥ १ ॥

Upamitikaraṇam, the special cause of assimilative knowledge; *upamānam,* is analogy; *saṁjñā-saṁjñisaṁbandhajñānam,* the knowledge of the relation of a name with the object denoted by it; *upamitiḥ,* is assimilative knowledge; *tatkaraṇam,* its special cause; *sādṛśyajñānam,* is the knowledge of similarity; *atideśavākyārthasmaraṇam,* remembrance of the meaning of the sentence heard at an earlier occasion; *avāntaravyāpāraḥ,* is the intermediary operative cause; *tathā hi,* for example; *kaścid,* some one; *gavaya śabdārtham,* the object of the word gavaya; *ajānan,* not knowing; *kutaścit,* from a certain; *āraṇyakapuruṣāt,* man of the forest; *gosadṛśo gavaya,* gavaya is similar to a cow; *iti śrutvā,* hearing thus; *vanam gataḥ,* goes to a forest; *vākyārtham smaran,* remembers the meaning of the sentence; *gosadṛśam piṇḍam paśyati,* sees an animal similar to a cow; *tadanantaram,* after that; *asau,* this is; *gavayaśabdavācyaḥ,* the object denoted by the word gavaya; *iti,* thus; *upamiti,* assimilative knowledge; *utpadyate,* dawns.

1. Analogy is the instrument of assimilative knowledge. It is the knowledge of the relation existing between a name and the object denoted by it. The knowledge of similarity is its immediate special cause; the remembrance of the meaning of a former direction conveying similarity between two objects, is the intermediary operation; this may be exemplified thus: a person who is ignorant of the object denoted by the word *gavaya* learns from a certain forester that the *gavaya* is similar to a cow. Subsequently, going to the forest, he sees the strange animal similar to a cow, and remembers the declaration. Then arises in him the knowledge: This is the animal denoted by the word *gavaya.*

उपमानं लक्षयति — उपमितिकरणमिति ॥

Dīpikā:

The Text defines analogy: *upamiti*.... Annambhaṭṭa next takes up for discussion *upamāna* which is the third of the four pramāṇas accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. *Upamiti is the knowledge of relation between a term and the object it stands for.* The special condition under which *upamiti* arises is the *knowledge of similarity,* which rises due to a statement such as: *gavaya is like a cow.* When this knowledge is similar to the knowledge arising from memory of what he had heard before, (which is the intermediary *vyāpara*) one has *upamiti.* In other words, *upamiti* is just the perceptual knowledge of similarity.

SECTION VII

SABDA - VALID VERBAL TESTIMONY

आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । आप्तस्तु, यथार्थवक्ता । वाक्यं पदसमूहः । यथा गामानयेति । शक्तं पदम् । अस्मात्पदात् अयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसंकेतः शक्तिः ॥ १ ॥

Āptavākyam, sentence by a trustworthy person; *śabdaḥ,* is valid verbal testimony; *āptastu,* and a trustworthy person; *yathārthavaktā,* is one who speaks of things as they exist in reality; *vākyam,* sentence; *padasamūhaḥ,* is a group of words; *yathā,* like; *gāmānaya,* bring a cow; *iti,* thus; *śaktam,* that which has significative potency; *padam,* is a word; *asmāt padāt,* from this word; *ayamarthaḥ,* this meaning; *boddhavyaḥ,* is to be understood; *iti,* thus; *īśvarasaṅketaḥ,* the desire of Īśvara; *śaktiḥ,* is the significative potency.

1. Valid verbal testimony is a sentence spoken by a trustworthy person. A trustworthy person is one who speaks of things as they exist in reality. *Sentence* is a group of words, like: *Bring a cow. Word* is that which has *significative potency.* Significative potency is the desire of God (and also of *jīva*) that a certain concept be understood from a certain word.

शब्दं लक्षयति — **आप्तेति** ॥ आप्तं लक्षयति — **आप्तस्त्विति** ॥ वाक्यलक्षणमाह — वाक्यमिति ॥ पदलक्षणमाह — **शक्तमिति** ॥ अर्थस्मृत्यनुकूलपदपदार्थसंबन्धः शक्तिः । सा च पदार्थान्तरमिति मीमांसकाः । तन्निरासार्थमाह — अस्मादिति ॥

डित्थादीनामिव घटादीनामपि संकेत एव शक्तिः न तु पदार्थान्तरमित्यर्थः । ननु गवादिपदानां जातावेवं शक्तिः, विशेषणतया जातेः प्रथममुपस्थितत्वात् । व्यक्तिलाभस्तु आक्षेपादिति केचित् । तत् न, गामानयेत्यादौ वृद्धव्यवहारेण सर्वत्रानयनादेर्व्यक्तावेव संभवेन, जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तावेव शक्तिकल्पनात् । शक्तिग्रहश्च वृद्धव्यवहारेण । व्युत्पित्सुर्बालो 'गामानय' इत्युत्तमवृद्धवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं मध्यमवृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य गवानयनं च दृष्ट्वा मध्यमवृद्धप्रवृत्तिजनकज्ञानस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वाक्यजन्यत्वं निश्चित्य 'अश्वमानय गां बधान'इति वाक्यान्तरे आवापोद्वापाभ्यां गोपदस्य गोत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिः, अश्वपदस्य अश्वत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरिति व्युत्पद्यते । ननु सर्वत्र कार्यपरत्वाद्व्यवहारस्य कार्यपरवाक्य एव व्युत्पत्तिर्न सिद्धपर इति चेत् न । 'काश्यां त्रिभुवनतिलको भूपतिरास्ते' इत्यादौ सिद्धेऽपि व्यवहारात्, 'विकसितपद्मे मधुकरस्तिष्ठति' इत्यादौ प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्याहारात्सिद्धेऽपि मधुकरादिव्युत्पत्तिदर्शनाच्च । लक्षणापि शब्दवृत्तिः । शक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा । गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र गङ्गापदवाच्यप्रवाहसंबन्धादेव तीरोपस्थितौ तीरेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्प्यते । सैन्धवादौ लवणाश्वयोः परस्परसंबन्धाभावान्नानाशक्तिकल्पनम् । लक्षणा त्रिविधा — जहल्लक्षणा, अजहल्लक्षणा, जहदजहल्लक्षणा चेति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयाभावः तत्र जहल्लक्षणा । यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्याप्यन्वयः, तत्र अजहदिति । यथा छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यैकदेशत्यागेन एकदेशान्वयः, तत्र जहदजहदिति । यथा तत्त्वमसीति । गौण्यपि लक्षणैव लक्ष्यमाणगुणसंबन्धस्वरूपा यथा अग्निर्माणवक इति । व्यञ्जनापि शक्तिलक्षणान्तर्भूता, शब्दशक्तिमूला अर्थशक्तिमूला च । अनुमानादिना अन्यथासिद्धा । तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजम् । तत्प्रतीतीच्छ्योच्चरितत्वं तात्पर्यम् । तात्पर्यज्ञानञ्च वाक्यार्थज्ञाने हेतुः नानार्थानुरोधात् । प्रकरणादिकं तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । द्वारमित्यादौ पिधेहीति शब्दाध्याहारः । ननु अर्थज्ञानार्थत्वाच्छब्दस्यार्थमविज्ञाय शब्दाध्याहारासंभवादर्थाध्याहार एव युक्त इति चेत् न । पदविशेषजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेः शाब्दज्ञाने हेतुत्वात् । अन्यथा 'घटः कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिः' इत्यत्रापि शाब्दज्ञानप्रसङ्गात् । पङ्कजादिपदेषु योगरूढिः । अवयवशक्तिर्योगः । समुदायशक्ती रूढिः । नियतपद्मत्वादिज्ञानार्थं समुदायशक्तिः । अन्यथा कुमुदेऽपि प्रयोगप्रसङ्गात् । 'इतरान्विते शक्तिः' इति प्राभाकराः । अन्वयस्य वाक्यार्थतया भानसम्भवादन्वयांशेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्पनीया इति गौतमीयाः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text beginning with *Āpta*... defines valid verbal testimony. The Text *Śaktam*... defines the characteristic of *Word*. Significative potency is the relation of a word and the object meant by that word which is always favourable

in reviving the memory of that object. The Mīmāṁsakas are of the opinion that significative potency is an independent *padārtha*. To refute this argument of the Mīmāṁsakas, the Text says, *Asmāt*... etc.

The implication here is that *śakti* is not a distinct *padārtha*, since *śakti* is considered as *desire* (which comes under the category of quality). The *śakti* of things like pots etc is in *saṅketa* only, like the words *Dittha* etc (where the *śakti* is in the persons indicated by these names).

Objection: The *Śakti* in words like *cow* etc is apprehended only in the generic attribute, because of the immediate apprehension of the notion of generic attribute inasmuch as it is the attribute of the qualified object *cow*. The individual (as qualified by the *Jāti*) is apprehended by necessary implication (ie by means of *Arthāpatti pramāṇa*).[106]

Reply: It is not so; because, when one says, *bring a cow*, the activity of bringing would be possible only when the significative potency is applied to the individual (since it is impossible to fetch only the generic attribute to the exclusion of the individual; nor any hearer ever proceeds to fetch the generic attribute of the *vyakti* when he is called upon to bring a *cow*). This is observed by the usage of elders.

Therefore, the argument that the significative potency of a word connotes an object as determined by its generic attribute (and not merely the generic attribute) has to be accepted. And, this is apprehended by observing the usage of elders. The *madhyama vṛddha* (ie the second elder who moves to carry out the mandate) proceeds to the activity of fetching a cow on hearing from the first elder person the sentence, *bring a cow*, and following the instruction, he fetches the cow. The boy (seated nearby, but is ignorant of the exact denotations of the words in the sentence, but is desirous of achieving proficiency in the science of etymology, observes all this and arrives at the conclusion of the *producibility of knowledge by a proposition* (*jñānasya vākyajanyatvam*), by applying the method of affirmation and negation. Again, with

the help of *āvāpa* and *udvāpa* in sentences like *bring the horse, bind the cow,* there arises in the inquisitive boy the apprehension that the significative potency of the word *cow* is apprehended in *cow* as determined by the adjunct *cowness* and the significative potency of the word *horse* is apprehended in the object *horse* as determined by the adjunct *horseness.*[107]

Objection: Inasmuch as everywhere the purpose of the usage of a sentence is to motivate one into activity, it cannot be said that a sentence unaccompanied by any copula generates the knowledge of significative potency in an object.

Reply: This is not so; because in statements like: *In Kāñci Tribhuvana Tilaka* etc the meaning is understood through popular usage. Also in statements like: *a bee in a bloomed lotus* etc the meaning of the word *madhukara* is apprehended on account of its contiguity to a well-known word (ie bloomed lotus) even though the above statement does not motivate one into activity.[108]

Implication is the relation between a word and the meaning of that word. (By the term *vṛtti,* both *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā,* are meant, as *lakṣaṇā* too, like *śakti,* is a *vṛtti* in *śabda*). Implication is the relation with the direct meaning of a *word.* In statements like: *A cowherd's hamlet on* the *Ganges* etc we get the implied meaning of *on the bank of the Ganges* on account of the relation of the *bank* with the *stream,* signified by the word, *Gaṅgā.* Therefore, in the above instance, the significative potency cannot be said to indicate the bank also. In words like, *saiṅdhava,* etc several *śaktis* are to be presumed on account of the absence of any relation between *salt* and *horse.*[109]

Implication is threefold: *jahallakṣaṇā, ajahallakṣaṇā* and *jahadajahallakṣaṇā. Jahallakṣaṇā* is that where the primary meaning is wholly abandoned and a new one is substituted; eg the statement: *Cots cry out. Ajahallakṣaṇā* is that where the word conveys something more, while retaining the sense of the primary meaning, as is found in the statement: *Umbrella-holders are going. Jahadajahallakṣaṇā* is that where

only a part of the statement is abandoned, as is found in the Vedic dictum: *Thou art That.*[110]

Gauṇī also is a form of *lakṣaṇā* on account of its relation with the qualities in the thing which is apprehended through implication as in the statement, *agnirmāṇavakaḥ - the student is fire. Vyañjanā* or the suggestive mode of expression also is included in *śakti* (expression) and *lakṣaṇā* (implication); because it springs from *śabdaśakti,* ie *vyañjanā* depends on the *force* or *potency* of a word having multiple meanings, and from *arthaśakti,* ie from the force of the meaning of the word, and it is obtained through inference etc.[111]

The non-apprehension of the intended sense is the cause of implication. *Tātparya* or intention is an utterance with a desire to convey the intended sense. And the apprehension of the intention is the cause of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence because of its lending itself to many meanings. The context helps in apprehending the intended sense. In statements like *door,* the word *close* should be supplied (to get at the intended sense of the speaker when an incomplete sentence is uttered).

Objection: The purpose of *word* is to have the knowledge of the meaning. Without knowing the meaning it is not possible to supply the *particular word* conveying *that meaning.* Therefore, it is but proper to supply the *meaning* itself (and not the *word*).

Reply: It is not so; because, only such meaning as is produced by the corresponding word is the cause of understanding the meaning of the sentence. Otherwise, in statements like *pot is karmatvam,* and *bringing is kṛti* also there will be the possibility of *śābdajñāna.*[112]

In words like *paṅkaja* etc the mode used is *yogarūḍhi,* the mode in which both the etymological and customary significances are partly retained. *Yoga* or *etymological significance* is the power of several roots or component parts of a word. *Rūḍhi* or *customary significance* is the power or force of the composite whole. In order to get at the customary meaning

of *paṅkaja* as *lotus,* the power of composite whole is used; otherwise, the word *paṅkaja* may also mean lily etc.[113] The followers of Prabhākara opine that the significative potency is in the meaning which has coherent connection with other meanings (*itarānvita*). The followers of Gautama are of the opinion that inasmuch as the construction of the meaning of the words is understood as the meaning of the sentence through the sentence in which the words are used in a coherent order, the significative potency should not be imagined in the construction also.[114]

2. Verbal expectancy, compatibility, and juxtaposition:

आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता संनिधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानहेतुः पदस्य पदान्तर-व्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वम् आकाङ्क्षा । अर्थाबाधो योग्यता । पदानामविलम्बेनोच्चारणं संनिधिः ॥ २ ॥

Ākāṅkṣā, verbal expectancy; *yogyatā,* compatibility; *sannidhiḥ,* juxtaposition; *ca,* and; *vākyārtha,* (of the) meaning of the sentence; *jñānahetuḥ,* (are the) causes of knowledge; *padasya,* of a word; *Padāṅtaravyatireka,* (due to) the absence of some other word; *prayuktānvayānanubhāvakatvam,* inability to convey the syntactic meaning; *ākāṅkṣā,* is verbal expectancy; *arthābādhaḥ,* non-contradiction of the meaning; *yogyatā,* is compatibility; *padānām,* of words; *avilaṁbena uccāraṇam,* utterance in quick succession; *sannidhiḥ,* is juxtaposition.

2. Verbal expectancy, compatibility, and juxtaposition are the causes of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Verbal expectancy consists in the inability of a word to convey the meaning of a sentence due to the absence of some other word. Compatibility is non-contradiction of the sense. Juxtaposition is the utterance of words in quick succession.

आकाङ्क्षेति ॥ आकाङ्क्षादिज्ञानमित्यर्थः । अन्यथा आकाङ्क्षादिभ्रमाच्छाब्दभ्रमो न स्यात् ।

आकाङ्क्षां लक्षयति — **पदस्येति** ॥ योग्यतालक्षणमाह — **अर्थेति** ॥ संनिधिलक्षणमाह — **पदानामिति** ॥ अविलम्बेन पदार्थोपस्थितिः संनिधिः । उच्चारणं तु तदुपयोगितयोक्तम् ।

Dīpikā:

The word *verbal expectancy* in the Text has to be interpreted to mean, *the knowledge of verbal expectancy* etc. Otherwise, (if it is merely said that verbal expectancy is the cause of apprehension of verbal testimony) there can occur no such knowledge inasmuch as an erroneous apprehension of verbal testimony can arise in a place where one has an erroneous notion of verbal expectancy. (So, it is the knowledge of verbal expectancy that is the cause of the apprehension of verbal testimony. Similarly, the knowledge of compatibility etc is the cause of the apprehension of verbal testimony). The Text defines compatibility; *artha*.... Juxtaposition is defined by the Text: *padānām*.... Juxtaposition is the continuous apprehension of the meaning of words. *Utterance* is inserted in the Text to indicate its utility in grasping the meaning of the objects indicated by the word.[115]

3. Verbal Expectancy:

आकाङ्क्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणम् । यथा गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीति न प्रमाणमाकाङ्क्षाविरहात् । अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न प्रमाणं योग्यताविरहात् । प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोच्चारितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं सांनिध्याभावात् ॥ ३ ॥

Ākāṅkṣādirahitam vākyam, a sentence devoid of verbal expectancy etc; *apramāṇam,* is unauthoritative; *yathā,* for example; *gauḥ,* (the words like) a cow; *aśvaḥ,* a horse; *puruṣaḥ,* a man; *hasti,* an elephant; *iti,* thus; *na,* not; *pramāṇam,* authoritative; *ākāṅkṣāvirahāt,* owing to the absence of verbal expectancy; *agninā siñcet,* sprinkle with fire; *iti na pramāṇam,* this is not authoritative; *yogyatāvirahāt,* owing to the absence of compatibility. *prahare prahare,* at long intervals; *asahoccāritāni,* pronounced without compactnesss; *gāmānaya,*

bring a cow; *ityādipadāni,* words like this; *na pramāṇam,* (are not) authoritative; *sānnidhyābhāvāt,* owing to the want of juxtaposition.

3. A sentence devoid of verbal expectancy etc is unauthoritative; eg the words: *a cow, a horse, a man, an elephant,* etc are not authoritative as they are devoid of verbal expectancy. The sentence *sprinkle with fire* is not authoritative owing to the absence of compatibility. Words like *bring.....a.....cow* etc pronounced at long intervals are not authoritative owing to want of juxtaposition.

गौरश्व इति ॥ घटकर्मत्वमित्यप्यनाकाङ्क्षोदाहरणं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

Dīpikā:

Simple statements like a cow, a horse etc and (such sentences) as jar being an accusative (ghaṭaḥ karmatvam) etc are examples of sentences that lack verbal expectancy in them.[116]

4. Sentence:

वाक्यं द्विविधम् । वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वात्सर्वमेव प्रमाणम् । लौकिकं त्वाप्तोक्तं प्रमाणम् । अन्यदप्रमाणम् ॥ ४ ॥

Vākyam, A sentence; *dvividham,* is twofold; *vaidikam,* sacred; *laukikam ca,* and secular; *vaidikam,* the sacred; *īśvaroktatvāt,* being pronounced by God; *sarvameva pramāṇam,* all are authoritative; *laukikam tu,* but the secular; *āptoktam,* pronounced by a trustworthy person; *pramāṇam,* is authoritative; *anyad,* other pronouncements; *apramāṇam,* are unauthoritative.

4. Sentence is of two kinds: sacred and secular. The sacred being the pronouncements of God, are all authoritative. But the secular pronouncements made by

trustworthy persons only are authoritative; all pronouncements made by others are unauthoritative.

वाक्यं विभजते — **वाक्यमिति** ॥ वैदिकस्य विशेषमाह — **वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वादिति** ॥ ननु वेदस्यानादित्वात्कथमीश्वरोक्तत्वमिति चेत् न । 'वेदः पौरुषेयः वाक्यसमूहत्वात् भारतादिवत्' इत्यनुमानेन पौरुषेयत्वसिद्धेः । न च स्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वमुपाधिः, गौतमादिभिः शिष्यपरम्परया वेदेऽपि सकर्तृकत्वस्मरणेन साधनव्यापकत्वात् । 'तस्मात्तपोनात्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त' इति श्रुतेश्च । ननु वर्णा नित्याः, स एवायं गकार इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात् । तथा च कथं वेदस्यानित्यत्वमिति चेत् न, 'उत्पन्नो गकारो विनष्टो गकार' इत्यादिप्रतीत्या वर्णानामनित्यत्वात्, 'सोऽयं गकार' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः 'सेयं दीपज्वाला' इतिवत्साजात्यावलम्बनत्वात्, वर्णानां नित्यत्वेऽप्यानुपूर्वीविशिष्टवाक्यस्यानित्यत्वाच्च । तस्मादीश्वरोक्ता वेदाः । मन्वादिस्मृतीनामाचाराणां च वेदमूलकतया प्रामाण्यम् । स्मृतिमूलवाक्यानामिदानीमनध्ययनात्तन्मूलभूता काचिच्छाखोत्सन्नेति कल्प्यते । ननु पठ्यमानवेदवाक्योत्सादनस्य कल्पयितुमशक्यतया विप्रकीर्णवादस्यायुक्तत्वान्नित्यानुमेयो वेदो मूलमिति चेत् न, तथा सति कदापि वर्णानामानुपूर्वीज्ञानासंभवेन बोधकत्वासंभवात् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text divides a sentence; *vākyam....* The distinguishing quality of *sacred pronouncements* is explained: *vaidikam....*

Objection: The Vedas are beginningless. How can it then be said that they are pronounced by Īśvara?

Reply: It is not so; the Vedas are *pauruṣeya* because they are a collection of sentences, even like the *Mahābhārata* etc. This inference establishes that the Vedas are *pauruṣeya*. Nor can it be argued that this inference is vitiated with the defect of adventitious condition (*upādhi*) consisting in the *remembrance of the authorship of the work;* because, here, the reason is pervasive of the remembrance of the authorship, since the authorship of the Vedas was known, as it was remembered by sages like Gautama through the tradition of unbroken tutelage from teacher to disciple. *Śrutis* too declare: *The three Vedas are born of Īśvara through His austerity.* (*Tasmāt tapānāt trayāḥ vedāḥ ajāyanta*)

Objection: Letters (*varṇāḥ*) are eternal owing to the

reminiscence (*pratyabhijñā*): *"this letter ga is verily that."* This being so, how can the Vedas be non-eternal? (ie the Vedas being spoken by God, have a beginning and are thus impermanent. But the letters being eternal, how can the Vedas be non-eternal, since the Vedas are only collection of sentences?)

Reply: It is not so; the non-eternality of letters is proved by the cognition: *this letter ga is produced: this letter ga is destroyed.* The reminiscence *this letter ga is verily that letter ga* arises depending on the common quality in them.[117]

The canons of Manu and others, and other canons prescribing code of conduct etc are authoritative because they derive their authority from the Vedas, they being their sources. Whenever certain Vedic sources are untraceable, it should be presumed that those branches of the Vedas which form the sources for the *smṛti* texts, but which are not traceable now, have been lost owing to the discontinuance of the study of those sections in the modern times.

Objection: But it is impossible to presume the diappearance of the Vedic sections which are being recited generation after generation. Also, it is inappropriate to presume that the Vedic passages are scattered everywhere and consequently they are untraceable. Therefore, it must be admitted that the untraceable Vedic sources which form the authority for the *smṛti* texts by Manu and others, were also inferred by them as they are being inferred so by us now.

Reply: It is not so; further, even if your argument is admitted, it cannot be sustained inasmuch as it is very difficult to recognise the particular order of arrangement of letters used in the Vedas, and the Vedas, in which the recognition of this order of letters and words is lacking, cannot produce any valid verbal cognition. (Therefore, Manu and others did not infer the Vedic Sources but were conversant with them which are lost to the present generation).[118]

5. Meaning of a sentence:

वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानम् । तत्करणं शब्दः ॥ ५ ॥

Vākyārthajñānam, the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence; *śābdajñānam,* is the apprehension arising from valid testimony; *tatkaraṇam,* its special cause; *śabdaḥ,* is the word.

5. The apprehension arising from valid testimony is the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Its special cause is the word.

ननु एतानि पदानि स्मारितार्थसंसर्गवन्ति आकाङ्क्षादिमत्पदकदम्बकत्वात् मद्वाक्यवत् इत्यनुमानादेव संसर्गज्ञानसंभवाच्छब्दो न प्रमाणान्तरमिति चेन्न । अनुमित्यपेक्षया विलक्षणस्य शाब्दज्ञानस्य 'शब्दात्प्रत्येमि' इत्यनुव्यवसायसाक्षिकस्य सर्वसंमतत्वात् । नन्वर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणान्तरमस्ति 'पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते' इति दृष्टे श्रुते वा पीनत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या रात्रिभोजनमर्थापत्त्या कल्प्यत इति चेन्न । 'देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते दिवाऽभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वात्' इत्यनुमानेनैव रात्रिभोजनस्य सिद्धत्वात् । शते पञ्चाशदिति सम्भवोऽप्यनुमानमेव । 'इह वटे यक्षस्तिष्ठति' इत्यैतिह्यमपि अज्ञातमूलवक्तृकशब्द एव । चेष्टापि शब्दानुमानद्वारा व्यवहारहेतुरिति न प्रमाणान्तरम् । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाश्चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि ॥

Dīpikā:

Objection: Verbal testimony is not an independent means of valid knowledge because of the possibility of having the knowledge of the syntactic meaning of the whole sentence through inference: *these words connect the meaning remembered by them; because they possess the group of words having necessary accessories like verbal expectancy; even like my own sentence.* (Therefore, *śabda* is not a distinct *prāmāṇa*)

Reply: It is not so; because, the apperception (*anuvyavasāyajñāna: "I know this by verbal testimony"* differs from the apperception: *"that is imparted by an inference,"* like, *"I know this by inference."* This dissimilarity between the two apperceptions is a universally recognised fact. (Therefore, we have to admit *Śabda* as a distinct *pramāṇa*).[119]

Some (ie the Mīmāṁsakas) admit of still another proof known as presumption (*arthāpatti*); eg when the knowledge, *fat Devadatta does not eat by daytime* is obtained either by

actual sight (*dṛṣṭe*) or by heresay from another person (*śrute*), the presumption that *Devadatta eats by night* arises, as otherwise, his remaining fat without eating cannot be explained. But this conclusion (arrived at by presumption) about Devadatta's eating by night can be had through inference itself, like, *Devadatta eats by night; for, he is fat though he does not eat by day.* (As such, there is no need for admitting a distinct *pramāṇa* like *Arthāpatti*).

Similarly *saṁbhava* (inclusion, which is a distinct proof accepted by the Paurāṇikas) through which the knowledge of *fifty* arises when one has the knowledge of *hundred,* is also a form of inference. (The knowledge of the *part* when one has the knowledge of the *whole,* can be had by inference). *Aitihya* (*Tradition,* which is accepted as a distinct proof by the Paurāṇikas) through which the knowledge, *A spirit dwells in this tree* is gained from the proposition of some unknown person, is included in *Śabda pramāṇa* since here also *vākya* is the source of such a belief. *Ceṣṭā* (gesture, yet another proof admitted by the Tāṅtrikas) also is not an independent proof; because, it becomes the cause of communication with another only by means of *śabda* arising from the inference (that is arrived at by observing the gestures).

Thus proofs are only four, viz, Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word.

SECTION VIII

NAIYĀYIKA THEORY ON EPISTEMOLOGY[120]

ज्ञानानां तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वं स्वतोग्राह्यं परतो वेति विचार्यते । तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिः — ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं तदप्रामाण्याग्राहकयावज्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यं न वा इति । अत्र विधिकोटिः स्वतस्त्वम् । निषेधकोटिः परतस्त्वम् । अनुमानादिग्राह्यत्वेन सिद्धसाधनवारणाय यावदिति । 'इदं ज्ञानमप्रमा' इति ज्ञानेन प्रामाण्याग्रहाद्बाधवारणाय — अप्रामाण्याग्राहकेति ॥ इदं ज्ञानमप्रमा इत्यनुव्यवसायनिष्ठप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्यापि अप्रामाण्याग्राहकत्वाभावात्स्वतस्त्वं न स्यादतस्तदिति । तस्मिन्ग्राह्यप्रामाण्याश्रयेऽप्रामाण्याग्राहिकेत्यर्थः । उदाहृतस्थले व्यवसायाप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्यनुव्यवसाये तद्ग्राहकत्वात्स्वतस्त्वसिद्धिः । ननु स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्यते, 'घटमहं जानामि' इत्यनुव्यवसायेन घटघटत्वयोरिव तत्सम्बन्धस्यापि विषयीकरणात् व्यवसायरूप प्रत्यासत्तेस्तुल्यत्वात् । पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकारसम्बन्धस्यैव प्रमात्वपदार्थत्वादिति चेत् न । स्वतःप्रामाण्यग्रहे 'जलज्ञानं प्रमा न वा' इत्यनभ्यासदशायां प्रमात्वसंशयो न स्यात् । अनुव्यवसायेन प्रामाण्यस्य निश्चितत्वात् । तस्मात्स्वतोग्राह्यत्वाभावात्परतो ग्राह्यत्वमेव । तथाहि । प्रथमं जलज्ञानानन्तरं प्रवृत्तौ सत्यां जललाभे सति पूर्वोत्पन्नं जलज्ञानं प्रमा सफलप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा अप्रमा इति व्यतिरेकिणा प्रमात्वं निश्चीयते । द्वितीयादिज्ञानेषु पूर्वज्ञानदृष्टान्तेन तत्सजातीयत्वलिङ्गेनान्वयव्यतिरेकिणापि गृह्यते । प्रमाया गुणजन्यत्वमुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् । प्रमासाधारणकारणं गुणः, अप्रमासाधारणकारणं दोषः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षे विशेषणवद्विशेष्यसंनिकर्षो गुणः । अनुमितौ व्यापकवति व्याप्यज्ञानम् । उपमितौ यथार्थसादृश्यज्ञानम् । शाब्दज्ञाने यथार्थयोग्यताज्ञानम् । इत्याद्यूहनीयम् । पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकाराभावस्यानुव्यवसायेनानुपस्थितत्वादप्रमात्वं परत एव गृह्यते । पित्तादिदोषजन्यत्वमुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् । ननु सर्वेषां ज्ञानानां यथार्थत्वादयथार्थज्ञानमेव नास्तीति । न च 'शुक्ताविदं रजतम्' इति ज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् । रजतस्मृतिपुरोवर्तिज्ञानाभ्यामेव

प्रवृत्तिसंभवात् । स्वतन्त्रोपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यैव सर्वत्र प्रवर्तकत्वेन 'नेदं रजतम्' इत्यादौ अतिप्रसङ्गाभावादिति चेत् न । सत्यरजतस्थले पुरोवर्तिविशेष्यकरजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानस्य लाघवेन प्रवृत्तिजनकतया शुक्तावपि रजतार्थि प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानस्यैव कल्पनात् ।

Dīpikā:

Here, a doubt arises whether the validity and non-validity of valid and non-valid cognitions are self-proved (*swataḥ*) or proved by some other means (*parataḥ*). Mīmāṁsakas accept that validity is self-proved. They accept that validity becomes self-proved when it becomes the object of the knowledge brought about by all causal materials (by all the respective materials in respect of all types of knowledge) which do not produce non-validity in the knowledge which is the substratum of validity (*tadaprāmānyā-grāhaka-yāvajjñānagrāhaka-samagrīgrāhyam*).

If *yāvat* (all) is removed, then the body of *sādhya* will be as follows: *Being the object of the knowledge brought about by causal materials which do not produce non-validity in the knowledge which is the substratum of validity.* Accordingly, in the inference: *This knowledge is valid; because of its being capable of making the action fruitful, validity* becomes the object of the knowledge that is brought about by the materials (*sāmagrīs*) which produce knowledge which is the substratum of validity. As such it becomes, as it were, that the Mīmāṁsakas have proved only what is already known and is established by the Naiyāyikas in respect of the above inference and have failed to prove that apperception (*anuvyavasāya* which they hold as capable of apprehending validity) and all other inference etc., apprehend validity, thus proving that validity is self-proved (*svatogrāhya*). When *yāvat* is included, the *siddha sādhana* (ie proving what is already known) defect is averted and apperception and all inference also become included in the *sādhya.*

In the knowledge, *This knowledge is non-valid - idam jñānam apramā,* the non-validity (*aprāmāṇya*) of the cognition is apprehended. Here is the *absence* of apprehension of validity. So, here occurs the defect of *bādha* (self-contradiction). To

avert this defect, it is said, *that which does not apprehend non-validity (aprāmāṇya agrāhaka).*

The validity found in the apperception (*anuvyavasāyajñāna*): *This knowledge is non-valid* is not *agrāhaka* to *aprāmāṇya.* To avert this defect, *tat* (ie *tasmin* - in the knowledge which is the substratum of validity) is brought together with *aprāmāṇyāgrāhaka* etc. The meaning is: validity consists in the knowledge that does not apprehend the non-validity of the knowledge that apprehends validity. In the above examples, though there is the apprehension of non-validity in *vyavasāya,* there is the non-apprehension of non-validity in apperception. Thus, it is proved that the validity of knowledge is apprehended by the same body of causal apparatus that apprehends knowledge. Mīmāṁsakas argue further thus: The Naiyāyikas favour the view that *this* and *jarness* are apprehended as *viśeṣya* and *prakāra* respectively in the apperception that apprehends: *this is a jar.* In other words, due to close contiguity of knowledge, those two are apprehended as such. On the strength of the same close contiguity of knowledge, why not they accept that the relation of the attribute too is apprehended in the object in view?

In this connection, the following doubt arises: First, one has the knowledge: *This is water.* Next arises the apperception *I know this water.* In this apperception, *water,* its genus *jalatva,* and the *relation* between water and its genus — all these three are objects, and all these are valid apprehensions. Here, their validity is proved by the same *sāmagrī* that produces knowledge (ie *svatogrāhyam*). Then, where is the occasion for entertaining a doubt whether the validity is proved by the same *sāmagrī* that brings about the knowledge or by some other means (like inference etc.)? In a place where the validity of a knowledge stands self-proved, there can be no room for any doubt whether the *knowledge of water* is valid or not. But a doubt has been raised. So, it has to be admitted that validity is not apprehended by apperception.

Therefore, it is not self-proved but proved by other means (*paratogrāhyam*). For example, first one has the *knowledge of water,* then he goes to take *that water* and finds the *water.* Here, the *knowledge of water* is *valid* because, this knowledge of water produces an action which in turn produces the fruit (of getting the water to drink etc). A negative example (*vyatireka drṣṭānta*) for the same is also given: *That which is not like this, is not like this,* ie *where there is no motivation for an action that produces a fruit, there is also no validity.* In this way, the validity of the first knowledge is determined. The second and third knowledges are also determined to be valid on the strength of the example of the first knowledge. Thus, it is proved that the validity of knowledge is proved by inference (ie *parataḥ prāmāṇya*).

Now a doubt arises as to what causes the production of validity in knowledge and what causes the apprehension of validity in knowledge. Here, the discussion is as to whether validity also is caused by the causal apparatus that produces knowledge (*jñāna utpādaka sāmagrī*) or by the causal apparatus other than the causal apparatus that produces knowledge? Here Naiyāyikas conclude that the validity of perception is born of *guṇa.* In this case, the contact of the eye with the object capable of producing valid perception is the *guṇa.* If it is non-validity it is born of defect (*doṣajanya*). In inferential cognition the knowledge of the *vyāpaka* (which is greater in extent) as existing in a place where there is *vyāpya* (which is less in extent) is the *guṇa.* In analytical knowledge (*upamiti*) the knowledge of resemblance is the *guṇa.* In verbal knowledge (*sābdajñāna*) the knowledge of proper compatibility etc is the *guṇa.* Thus, the causal apparatus of the validity of a knowledge being different from the causal apparatus bringing about a knowledge (*jñānasāmagrī*), it ought to be admitted that the production of the validity of knowledge (*jñānaprāmāṇya utpatti*) and the apprehension of validity (*jñapti*) are both caused by other sources (*parataḥ*). A white conch appears as yellow owing to the defect of jaundice attacking the eye. Here,

this erroneous cognition is due to the defect caused by jaundice (*pittadoṣa*).

The followers of Prabhākara say that all knowledges are valid (*pramā*) and that there is nothing like erroneous knowledge (*bhrama*). The cognition, *this is silver* is not one knowledge; in fact, here we have two knowledges: the knowledge of *this* is born of direct perception (*pratyakṣa-janya*) and the knowledge of *silver* is born of remembrance (*smaraṇa-janya*). One proceeds to pick up silver only if there is the absence of the knowledge, *the thing before me is not silver.* Therefore, there is no need to have an attributive knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) to motivate one to an activity of picking up the silver piece. So, there is nothing like erroneous knowledge. But the Naiyāyikas refute this contention saying that the man who is prompted to pick up the silver proceeds to the place thinking, *this is silver.* Here, the knowledge, *this is silver* must be an attributive knowledge. If he has the knowledge of a thing as silver which in reality is not silver, such a knowledge is erroneous knowledge. Thus the contention that there is no erroneous knoweldge is not correct.

SECTION IX
ERRONEOUS APPREHENSION

6. Erroneous apprehension: three-fold:

अयथार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः संशयविपर्ययतर्कभेदात् ॥ ६ ॥

Ayathārtha anubhavaḥ, erroneous apprehension; *trividhaḥ,* is threefold; *saṁśayaḥ,* doubt; *viparyaya,* misapprehension; *tarka,* (and) false assumption; *bhedāt,* due to division into.

6. Erroneous apprehension is of three types: doubt, misapprehension, and false assumption.

अयथार्थानुभवं विभजते — **अयथार्थ** इति ॥ स्वप्नस्य मानसविपर्ययरूपत्वान्न त्रैविध्यविरोधः

Dīpikā:

The Text divides erroneous knowledge: *Ayathārtha....* The experience that one has in a dream is of the nature of mental misapprehension of facts; thus, there can be no objection to the classification of erroneous experience into three varieties.[121]

7. Doubt:

एकस्मिन्धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः । यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ॥ ७ ॥

Ekasmin dharmiṇi, in the same thing; *viruddha-nānādharma-vaiśiṣṭya,* several mutually contradictory attributes;

avagāhi jñānam, the cognition that apprehends; *saṁśayaḥ,* is doubt; *yathā,* like; *sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā iti,* is it a post or is it a man?

7. The cognition that apprehends several mutually contradictory attributes in the same attributive thing is doubt, like: *Is it a post or a man?*

संशयलक्षणमाह — **एकेति** ॥ घटपटाविति समूहालम्बनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय एकेति । 'घटो द्रव्यम्' इत्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय विरुद्धेति । घटत्वविरुद्धपटत्ववान् इत्यत्र अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय नानेति ।

Dīpikā:

The characteristic of doubt is being explained: *Ekasmin....* The term, *Ekasmin dharmiṇi* is added to the above definition of doubt to avert the defect of overapplicability in the knowledge apprehending a group of things like: *Jar and cloth* etc. The word *viruddha* is added to avert overapplicability in statements like: *A jar is an object* etc. The term *nānā* (different) is added to avert overapplicability in the knowledge: *This possesses jarness which is contradictory to the attribute cloth-ness* (*paṭatvaviriuddhaghaṭatvavān*). By the use of the word *Viruddha* (contradictory) *viruddhatvam* (contradiction) is apprehended. In other words, jarness with *viruddhatvam* becomes apprehended. As such *ekasmin dharmiṇi viruddha dharmavatvam* (ie apprehending contradictory attributes in the same substratum) applies to the knowledge: *Paṭatvaviruddha ghaṭatvavān,* where *paṭatva viruddhatvam* is apprehended in the jar as *prakāra.* By adding *nānā* the defect of overapplicability is avoided; because, both *viruddhatvam* and *jarness* are not different to each other inasmuch as they reside in the same substratum and do not reside in different substrata.

8. Viparyaya:

मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययः । यथा शुक्तौ इदं रजतमिति ॥ ८ ॥

Mithyājñānam, erroneous knowledge; *viparyayaḥ,* is misapprehension; *yathā,* like; *śuktau idaṁ rajatamiti,* (the knowledge) *This is silver* in a piece of *oyster shell.*

8. Misapprehension is erroneous knowledge, like the knowledge: *That is silver* in a piece of *oyster shell.*

विपर्ययलक्षणमाह — **मिथ्येति** ॥ तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकनिर्णय इत्यर्थः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines misapprehension: *mithyā....* Misapprehension is the cognition of an attribute in a thing in which such an attribute does not exist in reality. When one has the knowledge of silver in an oyster shell, it is called an erroneous knowledge because the attribute of silverness does not exist in the piece of oyster shell.

9. Tarka:

व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः, यथा यदि वह्निर्न स्यात्तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति ॥ ९ ॥

Vyāpyāropeṇa, by the hypothetical admission of a less extensive thing; *vyāpakāropaḥ,* the deduction of more extensive thing; *tarka,* (is) false assumption; *yathā,* like; *yadi,* if; *vahniḥ na syāt,* there were no fire; *tarhi dhūmaḥ api na syād iti,* then, there would be no smoke also.

9. False assumption is the deduction of a more extensive thing by the hypothetical assumption of a less extensive one, as in the example: If there were no fire, then there would be no smoke.

तर्कं लक्षयति — **व्याप्येति** ॥ यद्यपि तर्को विपर्ययेऽन्तर्भवति, तथापि प्रमाणानुग्राहकत्वाद्भेदेन संकीर्तनम् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines false assumption; *vyāpya....* Though false assumption gets included in misapprehension, yet, it is mentioned separately, since it helps proofs in obtaining right knowledge.

10. Smṛti:

स्मृतिरपि द्विविधा । यथार्थायथार्था च । प्रमाजन्या यथार्था । अप्रमाजन्याऽयथार्था ॥ १० ॥

Smṛtiḥ api dvividhā recollection also is two-fold; *yathārthā,* true; *ayathārthā ca,* and false; *pramājanyā,* born of valid knowledge; *yathārthā,* is the true one; *apramājanyā,* born of false cognition; *ayathārthā,* is the erroneous one.

10. Recollection also is of two kinds: true and erroneous. The one arising from valid cognition is the true one; that arising from false cognition is the erroneous one.

स्मृतिं विभजते — **स्मृतिरिति ।**

Dīpikā:

The Text defines recollection: *smṛti...* etc.

11. Sukha:

सर्वेषामनुकूलतया वेदनीयं सुखम् ॥ ११ ॥

Sarveṣām, by all; *anukūlatayā,* with agreeable feelings; *vedanīyam,* that which is experienced; *sukham,* is pleasure.

11. That which is experienced by all with agreeable feelings is pleasure.

सुखं लक्षयति — **सर्वेषामिति** ॥ 'सुख्यहम्' इत्याद्यनुव्यवसायगम्यं सुखत्वादिकमेव लक्षणम् । यथाश्रुतं तु स्वरूपकथनमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines pleasure: *sarveṣām....* The individual experience of happiness arising from the awareness: *I am happy* is the characteristic of pleasure.[122] It is to be noted that the statement as it stands in the description of its nature (*svarūpa kathanam*)

12. Pain:

सर्वेषां प्रतिकूलतया वेदनीयं दुःखम् ॥ १२ ॥

Sarveṣām, by all; *pratikūlatayā,* with disagreeable feelings; *vedanīyam* that which is experienced; *duḥkham* is pain.

12. That which is experienced by all with disagreable feelings is pain.

13. Desire etc:

इच्छा कामः । क्रोधो द्वेषः । कृतिः प्रयत्नः । विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मः । निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्त्वधर्मः ॥ १३ ॥

Icchā, wish; *kāmaḥ,* is desire; *krodho dveṣaḥ,* anger is ill-feeling; *kṛtiḥ prayatnaḥ,* the will-to-do is volitional effort; *vihitakarma janyaḥ,* that which is born of enjoined actions; *dharmaḥ,* is merit; *niṣiddhakarma janyaḥ tu,* but that which is born of prohibited action; *adharmaḥ,* is demerit.

13. Wish is desire; ill-feeling is anger; volitional effort is the will-to-do; merit is that which is born of enjoined actions; but demerit is that which is born of prohibited actions.

14. Eight qualities beginning with Buddhi:

बुध्द्यादयोऽष्टावात्ममात्रविशेषगुणाः । बुद्धीच्छा प्रयत्ना द्विविधाः । नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्या ईश्वरस्य अनित्या जीवस्य ॥ १४ ॥

Buddhyādayaḥ aṣṭau, the eight (qualities) beginning with buddhi; *ātma-mātra-viśeṣa-guṇāḥ,* are the special qualities of the soul only; *buddhi,* cognition; *icchā,* desire; *prayatna,* effort; *dvividhāḥ,* are of two kinds; *nityā,* eternal; *anityāḥ ca,* and non-eternal; *nityā īśvarasya,* eternals belong to Īśvara; *anityā jīvasya,* non-eternals belong to human soul.

14. The eight qualities beginning with *buddhi* are the specific qualities of the soul only. Cognition, desire, and effort are of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. Eternals belong to Īśvara; non-eternals belong to the human soul.

15. Saṁskāra:

संस्कारस्त्रिविधः । वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्चेति । वेगः पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिः । अनुभवजन्या स्मृतिहेतुर्भावना । आत्ममात्रवृत्तिः । अन्यथाकृतस्य पुनस्तदवस्थापकः स्थितिस्थापकः कटादिपृथिवीवृत्तिः ॥ १५ ॥

Saṁskāraḥ trividhaḥ, impression is of three kinds; *vegaḥ,* velocity; *bhāvanā,* reminiscent impression; *sthitisthāpakaḥ ca iti,* and elasticity; *vegaḥ,* velocity; *pṛthivyādi catuṣṭaya mano vṛtti,* resides in four substances beginning with earth, and in mind; *anubhavajanyā,* born of experience; *smṛtihetuḥ,* (and) the cause of recollection; *bhāvanā,* is reminiscent impression; *ātma-mātra-vṛttiḥ,* it resides in the soul only; *anyathā-kṛtasya,* of a thing which is distorted; *punaḥ tadavasthāpakaḥ,* (the force) that brings it back to its normal shape; *sthitisthāpakaḥ,* is elasticity; *kaṭādi-pṛthivī-vṛttiḥ,* it resides in mat etc made of earth.

15. Impression is of three kinds: velocity, reminiscent impression and elasticity. Velocity resides in four substances beginning with earth, and in mind. That which is born of experience and which causes recollection, is reminiscent impression. It resides in the soul only. Elasticity is the force that brings a thing back to its normal shape whenever it is distorted. It resides in mat etc which are the transformations of earth.

संस्कारं विभजते — **संस्कार** इति ॥ संस्कारत्वजातिमान्संस्कारः । वेगस्याश्रयमाह — **वेग** इति ॥ वेगत्वजातिमान्वेगः । भावनां लक्षयति — **अनुभवेति** ॥ अनुभवध्वंसेऽति व्याप्तिवारणाय स्मृतीति । आत्मादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय अनुभवेति । स्मृतेरपि संस्कारजनकत्वं नवीनैरुक्तम् । स्थितिस्थापकं लक्षयति — **अन्यथेति** ॥ संख्यादयोऽष्टौ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्ववेगस्थितिस्थापकाः सामान्यगुणाः । अन्ये रूपादयो विशेषगुणाः । द्रव्यविभाजकोपाधिद्वयसमानाधिकरणावृत्तिजातिमद्गुणत्वं विशेषगुणत्वम् ।

Dīpikā:

The Text divides impression: *saṁskāra....* Impression is that which possesses its generic attribute *impressionness.* The Text indicates the substratum of velocity: *vega....* Velocity is that which possesses the generic attribute *velocityness* (*vegatva*). The Text defines reminiscent impression: *anubhava....* To avoid the defect of overapplicability in soul etc reminiscent impression is defined as *born of experience.* To avoid overapplicability in *destruction of experience,* the definition is qualified with the adjunct, *born of memory.* Moderners are of the opinion that memory is born of impression. The Text defines elasticity: *anyathā....* The eight qualities beginning with number, occasional fluidity, velocity, and elasticity are the *general qualities.* Other qualities like colour etc are *special qualities.* The property of being a special quality consists in *possessing the genus which does not exist in one which exists in a substratum in which two upādhis that divide dravya also exist.*

16. Karma:

चलनात्मकं कर्म । ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगहेतुरुत्क्षेपणम् । अधोदेश-संयोगहेतुरपक्षेपणम् । शरीरसंनिकृष्टसंयोगहेतुराकुञ्चनम् । विप्र-कृष्टसंयोगहेतुः प्रसारणम् । अन्यत् सर्वं गमनम् । पृथिव्या-दिचतुष्टयमनोमात्रवृत्ति ॥ १६ ॥

Calanātmakam karma, action is of the nature of motion; *ūrdhvadeśa saṁyogahetuḥ,* that which causes connection with the region upwards; *utkṣepaṇam,* is tossing; *adhodeśasaṁyoga-hetuḥ,* that which causes connection with regions downwards; *apakṣepaṇam,* is dropping; *śarīra sannikṛṣṭasaṁyogahetuḥ,* that which causes connection nearer the body; *ākuñcanam,* is contraction; *viprakṛṣṭasaṁyogahetuḥ,* that which causes connection with a distant region; *prasāraṇam,* is expansion; *anyat sarvam,* all other varieties (of motion); *gamanam,* is motion; *pṛthivyādi catuṣṭaya,* the four substances beginning with

earth; *mano,* (and) mind; *mātra vṛtti,* they reside only in (them).

16. Action is of the nature of motion. That which causes connection with regions upward is tossing; that which causes connection with regions downwards is dropping; that which causes connection nearer the body is contraction; that which causes connection with distant regions is expansion. All other varieties of motion is Motion. It resides in the four substances beginning with earth, and in mind.

कर्मणो लक्षणमाह — **चलनेति** ॥ उत्क्षेपणादीनां कार्यभेदमाह — **ऊर्ध्वेति** ॥ शरीरिति ॥ वक्रतासंपादकं आकुञ्चनम् । ऋजुतासंपादकं प्रसारणमित्यर्थः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines action: *calana....* Contraction is the action that causes the body to bend. Similarly, expansion is the action that causes the straightening of the body etc.

17.

नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यं द्रव्यगुणकर्मवृत्ति । तद्द्विविधं पराऽपरभेदात् । परं सत्ता । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादिः ॥ १७ ॥

Nityam, eternal; *ekam,* one; *anekānugatam,* (and which) resides in many things; *sāmānyam,* is the universal; *dravya,* substance; *guṇa,* quality; *karma,* action; *vṛtti,* (it) resides in; *tad dvividham,* it is twofold; *para,* more extensive; *apara,* less extensive; *bhedāt,* due to division into; *param,* more extensive; *sattā,* is existence; *aparam,* less extensive; *dravyatvādiḥ,* substanceness etc.

17. That which is eternal, one, and which resides in many things is the universal. It resides in substance, quality and action. It is twofold due to its division into the more extensive and the less extensive. Existence

is the more extensive, and substanceness etc are the less extensive variety.

सामान्यं लक्षयति — **नित्यमिति ॥** संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय नित्यमिति । जलपरमाणुगतरूपेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय एकेति । परमाणुपरिमाणादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय अनेकेति । अनुगतत्वं समवेतत्वम् । तेन नाभावादावतिव्याप्तिः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines Universal: *nitya....* To avoid overapplicability in *saṁyoga,* the term *Nitya* is added. To avoid overapplicability in the form in the atom of water, the term *eka* is added. To avoid overapplicability in the dimension of an atom, the term *aneka* is added. *Anugatatva* is the quality of residing in many by inherent relation. By this, overapplicability in *negation* etc is avoided.[123]

18. Viśeṣa

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो व्यावर्तका विशेषाः ॥ १८ ॥

Nityadravyavṛttayaḥ, residing in eternal substances; *vyāvartakā,* the differentiating features; *viśeṣāḥ,* (are) particulars.

18. Particulars are the differentiating features residing in eternal substances.

विशेषं लक्षयति — **नित्येति ॥**

Dīpikā:

The Text explains particulars: *nitya....* The characteristic of *viśeṣa* is given. They reside in eternal substances only and help in distinguishing one from another. They are infinite in number.[124]

19. Samavāyaḥ

नित्यसम्बन्धः समवायः । अयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्ये एकमविनश्यदपराऽश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ यथा

अवयवाऽवयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति ॥ १९ ॥

Nityasaṁbaṅdhaḥ, eternal relation; *samavāyaḥ,* is inherence; *ayutasiddhavṛttiḥ,* it exists in an inseparable pair; *yayoḥ dvayoḥ madhye,* between any two things; *ekam-avinaśyad,* one thing remaining undestroyed; *aparāśritameva-avatiṣṭhate,* exists in the other thing only; *tau-ayutasiddhau,* they are inseparable pairs; *yathā,* like; *avayava-avayavinau,* component part and the composite whole; *guṇa-guṇinau,* quality and the qualified; *kriyā-kriyāvaṅtau,* motion and the moving object; *jāti-vyaktī,* genus and the individual; *viśeṣa-nityadravye ca iti,* and in particular and eternal substance.

19. Inherence is the eternal relation; it exists in an inseparable pair: when, between two things, one thing, as long as it is not destroyed, exists in the other thing only, they are known as *inseparable pairs;* for example, part and the whole; quality and the qualified; motion and the moving object; genus and the individual; and particular and the eternal substance.

समवायं लक्षयति — **नित्येति** ॥ संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय नित्येति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संबन्धेति । अयुतसिद्धलक्षणमाह — **ययोरिति** ॥ 'नीलो घटः' इति विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविषया, विशिष्टबुद्धित्वात्, दण्डीतिविशिष्ट-बुद्धिवत् इति समवायसिद्धिः । अवयवावयविनाविति ॥ द्रव्यसमवायिकारणमवयवः जन्यद्रव्यमवयवि ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines inherence: *nitya....* To avoid overapplicability in conjunction, *nitya* is added to the definition (because in *conjunction* also there is connection of two halves, as in a jar; but it can be destroyed at any moment by separation; so it is not *nitya*). To avoid overapplicability in ether etc *relation* is added to the definition; ether is an eternal substance, but it is not a *saṁbaṅdha. Inseparable pair* is explained in the Text: *yayoḥ....* The knowledge which

apprehends the objects with adjuncts like *blue jar* apprehends the relation between the attribute and the thing possessing that attribute; because, it is a knowledge of the *qualified* and the *attribute* like the attributive knowledge: *a man with a stick.* Thus inherence is proved. The part is the inherent cause of the whole. The substance produced of those parts is the composite whole.[125]

20. Antecedent Negation:

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य ॥ २० ॥

Anādiḥ, without a beginning; *sāntaḥ,* having an end; *prāgabhāvaḥ,* is antecedent negation; *utpatteḥ pūrvam kāryasya,* (it exists) prior to the production of an effect.

20. Antecedent negation is without a beginning but with an end; it exists prior to the production of an effect.

प्रागभावं लक्षयति — **अनादिरिति** ॥ आकाशादावतिव्याप्ति वारणाय **सान्त** इति । घटादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय अनादिरिति । प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिः प्रतियोगिजनको भविष्यतीति व्यवहारहेतुः प्रागभावः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text explains antecedent negation: *anādi....* To avoid overapplicability in ether etc the term *with an end* is added to the definition; (because though ether is *anādi* it has no destruction). To exclude *jar* etc from the definition, the term *without a beginning* is added to the definition; (because, jar etc have a beginning and also an end). The cause of its counter correlative (ie *abhāva*) resides in the intimate cause of its counter correlative (ie the negation of jar resides in its material cause, the atoms of clay). Antecedent non-existence is the cause of such usage of words like: *Will come into existence.*

21. Destruction:

सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः । उत्पत्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य ॥ २१ ॥

Sādiḥ, with a beginning; *anantaḥ,* (but) without an end; *pradhvaṁsaḥ,* is destruction; *utpatyanantaram kāryasya,* (it occurs) after the production of an effect.

21. Destruction has a beginning but is without an end; it occurs after the production of an effect.

ध्वंसं लक्षयति — **सादिरिति** ॥ घटादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय अनन्तेति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय सादिरिति । प्रतियोगिजन्यः प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिर्ध्वस्त इति व्यवहारहेतुः ध्वंसः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines destruction: *Sādi....* To exclude *jar* etc *ananta* is added to the definition. To avert overapplicaibility in space etc *sādiḥ* is added. It is produced by its counter correlative and resides in the intimate cause of its own counter correlative. *Pradhvaṁsa* is the cause of usage of words like *it is destroyed.*

22. Absolute Negation:

त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति ॥ २२ ॥

Traikālika, existing in the three times; *saṁsargāvacchinna,* limited by relation or connection; *pratiyogitākaḥ,* that which ascertains or reflects counter correlative; *atyantābhāvaḥ,* is absolute negation; *yathā,* like; *bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti iti,* there is no jar on this spot of ground.

22. Absolute negation exists in all the three times, having that which ascertains or reflects counter correlative delimited by relation or connection, as in the statement: *There is no jar on this ground.*

अत्यन्ताभावं लक्षयति — **त्रैकालिकेति** ॥ अन्योन्याभावेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संसर्गेति । ध्वंसप्रागभावयोरतिव्याप्तिवारणाय त्रैकालिकेति ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines absolute negation: *Traikālika*.... To avoid overapplicability in reciprocal negation, the term *saṁsargā-vacchinna* is added to the definition. (ie *pratiyogitā is delimited by saṁsarga* which is the relation other than the relation of identity). To avert overapplicability in antecedent and destructive negations, the term *traikālika* is added to the definition.[126]

23. Reciprocal Negation:

तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽन्योन्याभावः । यथा घटः पटो नेति ॥ २३ ॥

Tādātmya-saṁbaṅdha-avacchinna, delimited by the relation of identity; *pratiyogitākaḥ,* having that which ascertains or reflects counter correlative; *anyonyābhāvaḥ,* is reciprocal negation; *yathā,* like; *ghaṭaḥ paṭo na iti,* jar is not a cloth.

23. That which ascertains or reflects counter correlative as delimited by the relation of identity is reciprocal negation, eg the statement: *jar is not cloth.*

अन्योन्याभावं लक्षयति — **तादात्म्येति ॥** प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकारोप्यसंसर्गभेदादेकप्रतियोगिकयोरत्यन्तान्योन्याभावयोर्भिन्नत्वम् । केवलदेवदत्ताभावादण्डयभावप्रतीत्या विशिष्टाभावः, 'एकसत्त्वेऽपि द्वौ न स्तः' इति प्रतीत्या द्वित्वावच्छिन्नाभावः, संयोगेन घटवति समवायेन घटाभावः, तत्तद्घटाभावाद्घटत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकसामान्याभावश्चातिरिक्तः । एवमन्योन्याभावोऽपि । घटत्वेन पटो नास्तीति प्रतीत्या व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभावो नाङ्गीक्रियते । पटे घटत्वं नास्तीति तदर्थः । अतिरिक्तत्वे स केवलान्वयी । सामयिकाभावोऽप्यत्यन्ताभाव एव समयविशेषे प्रतीयमानः । घटाभाववति घटानयने अत्यन्ताभावस्य अन्यत्र गमनाभावेऽपि अप्रतीतेः, घटापसरणे सति प्रतीतेः, भूतलघटसंयोगप्रागभावध्वंसयो- र्घटात्यन्ताभावप्रतीतिनियामकत्वं कल्प्यते । घटवति तत्संयोगप्रागभावध्वंसयोरसत्त्वादेवात्यन्ताभावस्याप्रतीतिः । घटापसरणे तु संयोगध्वंसस्य सत्त्वात्प्रतीतिरिति । केवलाधिकरणेनैव नास्तीति व्यवहारोपपत्तौ अभावो न पदार्थान्तरमिति

गुरुः । तत् न । अभावानङ्गीकारे कैवल्यस्य निर्वक्तुमाशक्यत्वात् । अभावाभावो भाव एव । नातिरिक्तः, अनवस्था-प्रसङ्गात् । ध्वंसप्रागभावः प्रागभावध्वंसश्च प्रतियोग्येवेति प्राञ्चः । अभावाभावोऽतिरिक्त एव तृतीयाभावस्य प्रथमाभावरूपत्वान्नानवस्थेति नवीनाः ।

Dīpikā:

The Text defines reciprocal negation: *Tādātmya*.... Absolute negation and reciprocal negation, though having one counter correlative, are manifold on account of the variety of the properties and connections that limit *pratiyogitā* in the counter correlatives in each case. (That is, the number of reciprocal negation depends on the varieties of *āropya,* ie the properties that delimit *pratiyogitā* in the counter correlatives and the varieties of absolute negation depend on the varieties of relation that delimit the *pratiyogitā* in the counter correlative).

Even when *Devadatta possessing a stick* is found to exist, the *non-existence of Devadatta associated with stick* is accepted in the sense that there does not exist Devadatta without possessing a stick. To the question, 'Does Devadatta without possessing a stick exist?', we will have to reply in the negative even though there does exist Devadatta possessing a stick. Non-existence of mere Devadatta without possessing a stick is different from *non-existence of Devadatta holding a stick* even though *pratiyogī Devadatta* remains to be the same. Difference is due to attributes given to *pratiyogitā.*

Even when one of the two things exists it is possible to say that *two do not exist,* because of the non-existence of the other one. The cognition that *two do not exist* consequent on supplying the attribute *two-ness* as adjunct to *pratiyogitā residing in two* is different from the knowledge *two do not exist* consequent on supplying the attribute *one-ness* as adjunct to *pratiyogitā* residing in *two.* Though in the above two places *pratiyogī* happens to be the same, the negation having the same *pratiyogī* becomes manifold in accordance with various attributes to *pratiyogitā.* The absence of the either of two or the absence of both becomes responsible for the knowledge that *two do not exist.*

In a place where there is a jar in the relation of conjunction, the absence of jar in the relation of inherent union is found. The negation of jar when *pratiyogitā* is limited by mere *jarness* is different from the *negation of* jar, when the *pratiyogitā* is limited by its special attributes. Similar is the case with regard to reciprocal negation too. The negation of counter correlative limited by *vyadhikaraṇa dharma* (two attributes not existing in the same substratum) which arises when one says, *cloth does not exist as having jarness in its inherent relation* is not accepted by Annaṁbhaṭṭa. The meaning is that *jar-ness* does not exist in cloth. If it is separate, then, it should not be counter correlative to absolute negation. *Periodical negation* also is the same as *absolute negation* because of *negation* being apprehended every now and then. If one brings a pot to a place where there is the negation of a jar, the *atyantābhāva* does not leave the place. We have accordingly to admit a rule that antecedent negation of the contact of pot in the spot or destruction of the pot in the spot is responsible for the perception of the absolute negation existing there.

The followers of Prabhākara say that *abhāva* is not a separate category; because, the negation of a thing must be explained with reference to the substratum. This is not so. Without accepting negation, the *mere-ness* of substratum cannot be explained. The absence of negation is existence; and this is not separate from existence, as it involves the defect of *regressus ad infinitum.* The ancients are of the opinion that the antecedent negation of destruction and the destruction of antecedent negation have the same counter correlative (ie a jar).

The absence of non-existence is different from existence. The modern Naiyāyikas say that the defect of *regressus ad infinitum* is avoided by accepting the *tṛtīyābhāva* as similar to *prathamābhāva.*

SECTION X

CONCLUSION

सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात् सप्तैव पदार्था इति सिद्धम् ॥ २४ ॥

Sarveṣām padārthānām, of all categories; *yathāyatham ukteṣu antarbhāvāt,* being included severally in those enumerated; *saptaiva padārthā iti siddham,* it is proved that categories are only seven.

24. Since all categories are included severally in those enumerated above, it is proved that categories are only seven.

ननु "प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्प वितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः" इति न्यायसूत्रे षोडशपदार्थानामुक्तत्वात्कथं सप्तैवेत्यत आह — सर्वेषामिति ॥ सर्वेषां सप्तस्वेवान्तर्भाव इत्यर्थः । 'आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनः प्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम्' इति द्वादशविधं प्रमेयम् । प्रवृत्तिर्धर्माधर्मौ । रागद्वेषमोहा दोषाः । राग इच्छा । द्वेषो मन्युः । मोहः शरीरादौ आत्मभ्रमः । प्रेत्यभावो मरणम् । फलं भोगः । अपवर्गो मोक्षः । स च स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमानकालीनदुःखध्वंसः । प्रयोजनं सुखप्राप्तिः दुःखहानिश्च । दृष्टान्तो महानसादिः । प्रामाणिकत्वेन अभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सिद्धान्तः । निर्णयो निश्चयः । स च प्रमाणफलम् । तत्त्वबुभुत्सोः कथा वादः । उभयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स्वपक्षस्थापनाहीना अपरपक्षविदळनमात्रावसाना वितण्डा । कथा नाम नानावत्कपूर्वोत्तरपक्षप्रतिपादकवाक्यसंदर्भः । अभिप्रायान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्यार्थान्तरं परिकल्प्य दूषणं छलम् । असदुत्तरं जातिः । साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्यप्राप्तिप्रसंगप्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणाहेत्वर्थापत्त्य विशीनोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनु-

पलब्धिनित्या नित्यकार्याकार्यसमा जातयः । वादिनोऽपजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम् । तच्च प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, प्रतिज्ञान्तरं, प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः, प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः, हेत्वन्तरं, अर्थान्तरं, निरर्थकं, अविज्ञातार्थकं, अपार्थकं, अप्राप्तकालं, न्यूनं, अधिकं, पुनरुक्तं, अननुभाषणं, अज्ञानं, अप्रतिभा, विक्षेपः, मतानुज्ञा, पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं, निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः, अपसिद्धान्तः, हेत्वाभासाश्च । शेषं सुगमम् ।

Dīpikā:

Now, the objection as to how the categories can be enumerated as only seven when the Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama enumerate them as sixteen (as is evidenced by the first aphorism), viz "Supreme felicity is attained by the knowledge about the true nature of proof, object of knowledge, doubt, motive, example, conclusion, premise, hypothetical reasoning, ascertainment, disquisition, controversy, cavil, fallacy, quibbling, self-contradiction, and refutation?" is replied by the Text: *Sarveṣām*.... The meaning is that all these categories are included severally in the seven categories (enumerated at the beginning of this Text).[127]

Objects of right knowledge are twelve (as is evidenced in the Nyāyasūtras). They are: soul, body, sense, objects of senses, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, result, pain and release.[128] By *pravṛtti* (Activity) is meant *Dharma* and *adharma* (righteousness and unrighteousness). *Faults (doṣa)* are *attraction, repulsion,* and *delusion. Attraction* is desire; *repulsion* is hatred; *delusion* is the erroneous identification of the soul with the body etc; *death* is the state of transmigration; *fruit* is the enjoyment; *release* is liberation and it is the absolute negation of pain in *Jīva* when there exists in the same *Jīva* no antecedent negation of pain. *Motive* is pleasure and the destruction of pain. *Examples* are hearth etc. *Conclusion* is the meaning arrived at from an authoritative source; ascertainment is arriving at a determination and that is the fruit of *proof. Disquisition* is the argumentation by a student with a desire to know truth; *controversy* is the dialogue between two parties with due logical method with a desire to score victory over each other; *cavil* consists in not endeavouring to establish his own side of the arguments (but ends only

in demolishing the opponents' view-points); *arguments* consist in making various statements by many people by way of exposition of sentences made by the proponents and opponents. *Quibbling* is finding fault by ascribing quite a different meaning to a proposition put forward with a totally different intent; *self-contradiction* is a reply which is untimely and inopportune; it is of 24 kinds of identicals in respect of resemblance, difference, addition, subtraction, questionable, unquestionable, alternative, thing to be established, presence, absence, regression, counter-example, non-production, doubt, topic, non-reason, presumption, non-difference, demonstration, perception, non-perception, eternal, non-eternal, and effect.[129]

ननु करतलानलसंयोगे सत्यपि प्रतिबन्धके सति दाहानुत्पत्तेः शक्तिः पदार्थान्तरमिति चेत् न । प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य कार्यमात्रे कारणत्वेन शक्तेरनुपयोगात् । कारणत्वस्यैव शक्तिपदार्थत्वात् । ननु भस्मादिना कांस्यादौ शुद्धिदर्शनादाधेयशक्तिरङ्गीकार्येति चेत् न । भस्मादिसंयोगसमानकालीनास्पृश्यस्पर्शप्रतियोगिकयावदभावसहितभस्मादि-संयोगध्वंसस्य शुद्धिपदार्थत्वात् । स्वत्वमपि न पदार्थान्तरम् यथेष्टविनियोगयोग्यत्वस्य स्वत्वरूपत्वात् । तदवच्छेदकं च प्रतिग्रहादिलब्धत्वमेवेति ।

Dīpikā:

Refutation (nigrahasthāna) is that which causes defeat to the argumentator. (It is of 22 kinds): Hurting the proposition, shifting the proposition, opposing the proposition, renouncing the proposition, shifting the reason, shifting the topic, the meaningless, the unintelligible, the incoherent, the untimely, saying too little, saying too much, repetition, silence, ignorance, non-ingenuity, evasion, admission of an opinion, over-looking the censurable, censuring the non-censurable, deviating from a tenet, and the semblance of a reason are the various kinds of refutation.[130] Rest is easily understood.

Objection: A distinct category known as *Śakti* has to be admitted; because, it is observed that in the presence of an obstructing agency the power of burning in fire is not produced even when the fire is in contact with one's palm of the hand.

Reply: It is not so; everywhere the absence of the obstructing agency is indispensable only in the production of the effect (here, burning) and not in producing the causal efficacy (ie the presence of an obstructing agency only neutralises the burning and not the heat, which causes burning). *Karaṇatvam* is the meaning of the word *Śakti.*

Objection: It is observed that ingredients like ash cleanse metals like lead; so we have to admit the presence of a *dependent power* in ash.

Reply: It is not so; because, the power of ash to cleanse the metal is the same as washing of the ash off the metal. Cleanliness consists in destroying the impurity by the contact of ash with a thing that is impure and which is free from any cause which will make it impure again. Therefore, purity is not a separate category. Thus the meaning of *Purity* is such destruction of ashes.

Ownership also is not an independent category; because, the true nature of ownership consists in the capability of a thing to be disposed of just as one pleases, ie a thing can be purchased and sold to another as one pleases.

अथ विधिर्निरूप्यते — प्रयत्नजनकचिकीर्षाजनकज्ञानविषयो विधिः । तत्प्रतिपादको लिङादिर्वा । कृत्यसाध्ये प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात् कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम् । न च विषभक्षणादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, इष्टसाधनतालिङ्गककृतिसाध्यताज्ञानस्य काम्यस्थले विहितकालशुचि-जीवित्वनिमित्तज्ञानजन्यस्य नित्यनैमित्तिकस्थले प्रवर्तकत्वात् । न चाननुगमः स्वविशेषणवत्ताप्रतिसंधानजन्यत्वस्यानुगतत्वादिति गुरवः । तत् न । लाघवेन कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्यैव चिकीर्षाद्वारा प्रयत्नजनकत्वात् । न च नित्यनैमित्तिकस्थले इष्टसाधनत्वाभावादप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, तत्रापि प्रत्यवायपरिहारस्य पापक्षयस्य च फलत्वकल्पनात् । तस्मात्कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमेव लिङाद्यर्थः । ननु 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यत्र लिङा स्वर्गसाधनमपूर्वं कार्यं प्रतीयते । यागस्याशुतरविनाशिनः कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गसाधनत्वायोगात् तद्योग्यं स्थायिकार्यमपूर्वमेव लिङाद्यर्थः । कार्यं कृतिसाध्यम् । कृतेः सविषयत्वाद्विषयाकाङ्क्षायां यागो विषयत्वेनान्वेति । 'कस्य कार्यम्' इति नियोज्याकाङ्क्षायां स्वर्गकामपदं नियोज्यपरतयान्वेति । कार्यबोद्धा नियोज्यः । तेन 'ज्योतिष्टोमनामकयागविषयकं स्वर्गकामस्य कार्यम्' इति वाक्यार्थः संपद्यते । वैदिकलिङत्वात् 'यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्' इति नित्यवाक्येऽप्यपूर्वमेव वाच्यं कल्प्यते ।

'आरोग्यकामो भेषजपानं कुर्यात्' इत्यादिलौकिकलिङः क्रियाकार्ये लक्षणा इति चेत् न । यागस्याप्ययोग्यतानिश्चयाभावेन इष्टसाधनतया प्रतीत्यनन्तरं तन्निर्वाहार्थम् — अवान्तरव्यापारतयाऽपूर्वकल्पनात् । कीर्तनादिना नाशश्रुतेर्न यागध्वंसो व्यापारः । लोकव्युत्पत्तिबलात्क्रियायामेव कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वं लिङा बोध्यत इति लिङ्त्वेन विध्यर्थकत्वम्, आख्यातत्वेन यत्नार्थकत्वम् । पचति पाकं करोतीति विवरणदर्शनात्, किं करोतीति प्रश्ने पचतीत्युत्तराच्चाख्यातस्य प्रयत्नार्थकत्वात् । रथो गच्छतीत्यादौ अनुकूलव्यापारे लक्षणा । देवदत्तः पचति, देवदत्तेन पच्यते तण्डुलः, इत्यादौ कर्तृकर्मणोर्नाख्यातार्थत्वम् । किं तु तद्गतैकत्वादीनामेव । तयोराक्षेपादेव लाभः । प्रजयतीत्यादौ धातोरेव प्रकर्षे शक्तिः । उपसर्गाणां द्योतकत्वमेव न तत्र शक्तिः ।

Now, the meaning of injunction (*vidhi*) is being elucidated. An injunction is a sentence which conveys knowledge that prompts a desire for action which in its turn produces an effort. To prompt man to an action three conditions are necessary; (a) *kṛtisādhyatājñāna,* the knowledge of the capability to perform a task; (b) *iṣṭasādhanatājñāna,* the knowledge of getting the desired fruit of the action, (c) *balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitvajñāna,* the knowledge that the performance of an action is harmless. Wherever there is the knowledge of incapability to accomplish a deed, there is also the absence of motivation for that action. So, there must be the knowledge of the possibility of accomplishing the deed. Secondly, one does not undertake a deed even if one is capable of doing that, if the result is harmful, eg the injunction to drink poison. So there must be the knowledge of getting the desired fruit of action to prompt one to activity.

In place of performance of rites with a desire for fruits (*kāmyakarma*) one needs the knowledge that it is possible to perform the rites accompanied by a knowledge of getting the desired fruit of the rite. In places of regular and occasional rites, the knowledge of (a) prescribed time, (b) one's own existence; and (c) of the state of purity are the factors that produce the knowledge that one ought to perform the regular and occational rites.

Objection: Here, various reasons have been adduced for the knowledge to make it capable of motivating a *man* to

activity. Why not give a general reason for the knowledge that will motivate a man to activity in places of regular, occasional and selfish rites? A man who is prompted to perform a rite has also the knowledge of conditions pertaining to those relevant rites. The knowledge of conditions pertaining to each rite is the general motivation to prompt a man to activity. This is the opinion of the followers of Prabhākara.

Reply: Now, this explanation is very elaborate. To be brief we say, the motivation to perform a rite is generated from a desire to perform that rite owing to the knowledge of one's capacity to perform that rite accompanied by a knowledge of getting the desired fruit of that rite.

Objection: But in places of regular and occasional rites, no fruit accrues to the performer (as those rites are duty-bound). So, where is the motivation in place of performance of regular and occasional rites?

Reply: Here also there is the achievement of fruit of action in the form of avoiding *pratyavāya* (sin occurring due to the non-performance of regular and occasional rites as enjoined in the scriptures) and also destroying sin. Therefore, injunction is the knowledge of the capability to accomplish a rite signified by words suffixed with personal endings of *liṅg, loṭ* etc.

The followers of Prabhākara are of the opinion that the meaning of personal ending *liṅg,* is in *apūrva* (the *śakti* or force born of a rite). In the Vedic injunction: *one desiring heaven ought to perform the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice,* which is suffixed with personal ending *liṅg,* the meaning of the injunction is in the rites related to *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, the performance of which produces a power called *apūrva.* The rite called *jyotiṣṭoma* perishes immediately after its completion and does not last till one gets the fruit (which is unseen) of that rite consisting in going to heaven. We have to admit that the meaning of an injunction is in the *power* that is produced by the performance of the sacrifice and which lasts till one gets the fruit. This is also known as *niyoga* as this *apūrva* engages one, who is desirous of going to heaven, to perform

the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice. Thus, the meaning of the injunction: *One desirous of attaining heaven shall perform jyotiṣṭtoma sacrifice* is: if one entertains a desire to go to heaven, he ought to strive to posses *apūrva* produced by the performance of the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice. Similarly, in Vedic injunction: *One ought to perfom agnihotra so long as one lives,* the meaning is indicated in the necessity to have *apūrva* by the performance of *agnihotra.* But in secular injunctions like: *One who desires health must drink medicine,* the implied meaning is in the action of drinking itself.

Naiyāyikas: It is not so. In the absence of the knowledge that the performance of *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice is not capable of conferring heaven as the fruit, one possesses the knowledge that the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice is the means to get heaven. One who knows this also knows that, though the fruit of getting heaven is not achieved immediately by performing the sacrifice, it is attained by the intermediary cause (*vyāpāra*) called *apūrva,* which is produced by the performance of the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice.[131] Thus, *apūrva* is only a form of *vyāpāra* and not the meaning of personal ending *liṅg.*

पदार्थतत्त्वज्ञानस्य परमप्रयोजनं मोक्षः । तथाहि 'आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' इति श्रुत्या श्रवणादीनां आत्मसाक्षात्कारहेतुत्वबोधनात् श्रुत्या देहादिविलक्षणात्मज्ञाने सत्यप्यसंभावनानिवृत्तेर्वाक्यार्थानुसंधानरूपमननसाध्यत्वात् । मननोपयोगिपदार्थनिरूपणद्वारा शास्त्रस्यापि मोक्षोपयोगित्वम् । तदनन्तरं श्रुत्युपदिष्टयोगविधिना निदिध्यासने कृते तदनन्तरं देहादिविलक्षणात्म साक्षात्कारे सति देहादावहमित्यभिमानरूपमिथ्याज्ञाननाशे दोषाभावात् प्रवृत्त्यभावे धर्माधर्मयोरभावे जन्माभावे पूर्वधर्माधर्मयोरनुभवेन नाशे चरमदुःखध्वंसलक्षणमोक्षो जायते । ज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनम् । मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तेर्ज्ञानमात्रसाध्यत्वात् । 'तमेवं विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय' इति श्रुत्या साधनान्तरनिषेधाच्च । ननु 'तत्प्राप्तिहेतुर्विज्ञानं कर्म चोक्तं महामुने' इति कर्मणो मोक्षसाधनत्वस्मरणाज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चय इति चेत् न । "नित्यनैमित्तिकैरेव कुर्वाणो दुरितक्षयम् । ज्ञानं च विमलीकुर्वन्नभ्यासेन च पाचयेत् । अभ्यासाच्च क्वचिज्ज्ञानात्कैवल्यं लभते नरः ।" इत्यादिना कर्मणो ज्ञानसाधनत्वप्रतिपादनाज्ज्ञानद्वारैव कर्मणो मोक्षसाधनत्वं न साक्षात् ।

तस्मात्पदार्थतत्त्वज्ञानस्य मोक्षः परमप्रयोजनमिति सर्वं रमणीयम् ॥
इति श्रीमदन्नम्भट्टोपाध्यायविरचिता तर्कसंग्रहदीपिका समाप्ता ॥

Dīpikā:

Some are of the opinion that it is only the destruction of sacrifice (*yāgadhvaṁsa*) that confers the fruit of heaven. Therefore, the destruction of sacrifice is the intermediary cause (*vyāpāra*) here. Naiyāyikas do not accept this argument because of the saying, *virtue is destroyed if one eulogises it (kīrtanādinā dharmanāśaḥ).* If you say that *yāgadhvaṁsa* (destruction of sacrifice) is the virtue that will take one to heaven, we say, it cannot be so; because, there can be no destruction (*dhvaṁsa*) of destruction. So, we have to admit that *apūrva* is only a *vyāpāra.*

Thus, by observing conventional behaviour, we have to admit the force of the meaning of the personal ending *liṅg* in the knowledge of the possibility of performing a rite along with the knowledge of getting the desired fruit of that rite.

In the personal ending *liṅg,* there is its attribute *liṅgatva* and also *ākhyātatva.* (All the ten *la-kāras* are known as *ākhyāta*). The meaning of *ākhyāta* is in the effort (*prayatna*) involved in the performance of an action, eg the action of cooking. When one asks, What is he doing? one replies: *he is cooking,* where the *effort* of *cooking* is involved. Thus by *ākhyāta,* the meaning of *effect* is determined. But in places where one says: *The chariot is moving,* we cannot say of an effort on the part of the chariot which is not favourable to produce the *activity of moving* inasmuch as effort is an attribute of a sentient being. Therefore, we have to admit here that *ākhyāta* has its implied meaning in *vyāpāra.*

The grammarians say that the meaning of *ākhyāta* is found either in the agent (*kartā*) or in the action (*karma*). This also is incorrect. In the examples: *Devadatta cooks rice and rice is cooked by Devadatta,* the meaning of both the *agent* and *karma* is got by *ākṣepa* ie expectation of the

significance in them). Therefore, we have to admit the meaning of *ākhyāta* as applying to *numbers* involved in the *agent* and the *action*, and we get this meaning by means of *ākṣepa*.

In places of usage of words like, *prayajati - he performs sacrifice excellently*, the attribute of *excellence* does not indicate the particle *pra* but only qualifies the verbal root *yaj;* because, the power of a particle is only in indication and not in qualifying statements.

Conclusion:

The highest aim of the knowledge of categories is liberation. It is said in the *Śruti:* "O Maitreyi, This Ātman ought to be realized, heard, reflected on and meditated upon"[132] This passage proclaims the method of hearing etc as the means for having an immediate and direct knowledge of Ātman. Though one hears the Vedic passages proclaiming that the Soul is quite distinct from the body etc one does not get rid of disbelief (*asaṁbhāvanā*) etc. This disbelief etc are removed by constant reflection on the Vedic teachings with the help of reasoning. Reasoning is impossible in the absence of a knowledge of the categories. Therefore, a knowledge of the categories is the means (though not the direct means) that produces the knowledge of the Soul. After this, one ought to constantly reflect and meditate on the true nature of the Soul following the instructions of the *Śruti*. Then one gets the direct knowledge of the Soul as quite distinct from body etc. From this occurs the destruction of false knowledge that causes erroneous identification of the soul with body etc by producing the notion: *I am this body*. With the elimination of erroneous knowledge, its attendant evils are also eliminated. With the elimination of evil, there occurs the absence of effort (as no desire is left in the mind with the destruction of ignorance). In the absence of effort, there is the absence of both merit and demerit. With its elimination, the cycle of transmigration in the form of birth etc also gets eliminated. With the destruction of rebirth, the stored results of past deeds, virtuous and non-virtuous, get exhausted by experiencing

them; with the exhaustion of all the results of past action, one attains liberation characterised by the absolute destruction of pain. Therefore, knowledge alone is the means of attaining liberation since it is caused by knowledge alone on the destruction of erroneous knowledge. The Śruti passage: "One attains the state of immortality by knowing Him alone; here there is no other way," prohibits means other than knowledge of the Soul to attain liberation.[133]

Objection: There is a doubt here; it is said: "O great Muni, it is said that *karma* and *jñāna* are the causes of attaining liberation.[134] Here, action also is prescribed as a means to attaining liberation. So, let it be said, that both action and knowledge conjointly produce liberation.

Reply: It is not so; by passages like: "It is only the performance of *nitya* and *naimittika* rites that leads to the destruction of effects of evil actions; knowledge purifies the mind and attains maturity by constant practice; from constant practice man attains liberation characterised by ripe knowledge",[135] it is taught that *karma* only leads to knowledge. Thus *karma* becomes the means for liberation only through knowledge, and not directly. Thus, the highest aim of the knowledge of the categories is liberation. So, this Text is worthy of respectful study by all who aim at liberation.

कणादन्यायमतयोर्बालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये । अन्नंभट्टेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसंग्रहः ॥ इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्याय अन्नंभट्टविरचिततर्कसंग्रहः समाप्तः ॥

The wise Annaṁbhaṭṭa composed this *Tarkasaṁgraha* with a view to making the systems of Gautama and Kaṇāda easily comprehensible to beginners.

Here ends the *Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annaṁbhaṭṭa along with his *Dīpikā*.

FOOTNOTES

1. Following the usual orthodox practice, the author begins his work with a *maṅgalācaraṇa* (or an invocatory verse), consisting of a prayer to his Chosen Deity, and a salutation to the preceptor. The second line of the verse incidentally also deals with the four incentives as is the practice before a literary treatise is commenced. *Maṅgalācaraṇa* at the commencement of a work is an auspicious act, consisting of invocatory verses to the deity adored by the Author. The prayer is a supplication to the deity to help in the unhindered completion of the work. The four incentives (*anubandha catuṣṭaya*) are: (a) *adhikārin,* a competent student; (b) *viṣaya,* the subject matter; (c) *saṁbandha,* relation; and (d) *prayojana,* aim or purpose. A study of any subject will appeal only to one who has an intense desire (ārthitva) for knowing the subject matter. He should also have the capacity to understand (*śaktatva*) to fully profit from the study. Here, the student competent to enter upon the study is a 'beginner' according to the Author. *Bāla* means a beginner who has both *ārthitva* and *śaktatva* and who is free from *aparyudasṭatva,* ie free from disabilities and possesses the opportunity. (Comp: *Srī Śaṅkara's com. on Tait.up. II-1*) The *subject matter* is the elements of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.* The *relation* is of the *treated and the treatise,* ie of the subject matter and the explainer treatise. The purpose is *easy comprehension of the subject matter,* a knowledge of which will eventually lead one to the highest goal of human life. *Prayojana* is the last link in the chain of incentives. Unless a promise is held out no one will seek knowledge. It is said:
'*prayojanamanuddiśya na maṅdo'pi pravartate*— without desiring profit not even a dullard takes any initiative.'

2. *Śiṣṭācāra-anumita:* Śiṣṭaḥ is one who performs an act enjoined in the Veda in conformity with his knowledge of the Tattvas based on the Veda- *Vedokta tattvajñānena veda vihita Karmakārī* - Nīlakaṇṭha.

3. The efficacy of Maṅgala in the completion of a work is questioned here by citing the deviation in the law of *anvaya* and *Vyatireka* ie in the presence and absence of its causes. Two entities are said to be related to each other when they are attended with *anvaya* and *Vyatireka. Anvaya* is the method of agreement or the positive factor and the Vyatireka is the method of disagreement or the negative factor. The presence of cause but the absence of the effect is the *anvaya Vyabhicāra.* In the above instance, *Maṅgalācaraṇa* is the cause; *samāpti* or completion of the work is the effect. The example cited to highlight the *anvaya Vyabhicāra* is the book Kādaṁbarī, the celebrated story of the heroine Kādaṁbarī by Bāṇa. The book was commenced with a *maṅgalācaraṇa,* but was not completed during the author's

life-time. So, here, there is deviation in the law of correlation as the effect does not exist though the cause exists. Similarly, in Kiraṇāvalī, though *maṅgalācaraṇa* was not performed, completion was achieved by the author. Here there is the absence of the cause while the effect is present, thus violating the law of negative factor. This deviation in the law of both the positive and negative factors renders the argument that a propitiatory verse before commencing any treatise possesses the efficacy to accomplish its unhindered completion, inaffective. Therefore, it is objected that the *maṅgalācaraṇa* at the commencement of a work has nothing to do with its completion.

4. The purpose of maṅgala śloka is to remove obstacles. Completion of the work will result if the obstacles are removed.

5. ie the non-existence of an object can be experienced only when that object - which is the *pratiyogin* or the counter-reality of non-existence is recollected. If recollected, it cannot be repudiated. If not, the negation of the eighth category too cannot be proved.

6. Annaṁbhaṭṭa here provides a positive interpretation to the preclusive term *seven*. He interprets the term to mean that the mention of the categories as *seven* only indicates the fact of a *category* being pervasive - *vyāpya* - in the sense of its being one among the seven categories. That is to say, when it is said, X is the *vyāpya* of Y, it means where there is X, there is also Y. So, wherever there is the fact of being a *padārtha,* there is also the fact of its being one among the seven categories. To put it simply, to be a *padārtha* is to be any of the seven categories beginning with *dravya,* ie it may be *dravya* or *guṇa* or *karma* etc. When thus interpreted in a positive way, the defects that would arise in a negative interpretation as pointed out by the opponents, would not occur.

7. The idea is this: Each one of the seven categories is different from every category other than itself. Thus the quality of being different from each one of the seven categories is known to exist in all the other six categories. But the aggregate of the negations of all the seven categories is not known to exist in any particular category. Will it not be known to exist in the eighth if there existed one such? Thus, the usage of the word *sapta* serves to exclude the existence of the eighth category. Again, if the aggregate of the negations of all the seven categories is not known anywhere, it will lead to the admittance that the seven categories do not exist at all, because without the knowledge of *sapta, bheda* cannot be negated as without the knowledge of counter-entity, a thing cannot be negated; for instance, a pot cannot be negated without the knowledge of the counter-entity of negation, viz, pot. If *saptabheda* were to be admitted as not existing anywhere in a particular place, then its counter-entity *sapta* too will have to be admitted as having no existence; if the negation

of pot is not admitted, the pot also should not be admitted as having existence. The reply to this objection is as follows: As each of the seven *bhedas* is known to exist severally in all other six categories it can be argued that each of the seven categories and its negation are well-known. As such, by the very argument that the aggregate of negations of the seven does not exist in one particular place, we are forced to admit that *saptabheda* has its existence everywhere, viz, in all the seven categories.

8. The above objection is raised by the Mīmāṁsakas who consider *Tamas* - *darkness* - to be a distinct substance and prove its existence by the argument that *Tamas* possesses *rūpa* - *colour* - and *motion.* None can deny that darkness is bluish or black. Also, it is seen to move in the sky, thus possessing motion; moreover, it cannot be said to belong to any of the group mentioned above by the Vaiśeṣikas. Thus, Mīmāṁsakas say that darkness must be accepted as the tenth substance.

Annaṁbhaṭṭa upholds the Vaiśeṣika position by asserting that *Tamas* or darkness is not any positive entity at all; it is nothing but the *absence of light.* If *darkness* had colour, as the Mīmāṁsakas say, it then ought to be seen in light; the uniform condition to apprehend colour or form is the presence of light. Whereas, darkness melts away or disappears in the presence of light. Sometimes, an object is not revealed in insufficient light; it is because of the insufficiency of the power of light to reveal an object and not because of the presence of darkness, for, darkness and light never co-exist. Then how to explain the fact of darkness being experienced by all? Annaṁbhaṭṭa explains such experiences as illusory. Nīlakaṇṭha, however, says that keeping in view the law of parsimony, it would be simpler to consider darkness as the absence of bright light rather than consider it as the tenth substance. See also Siddhāṅta Muktāvalī of Viśvanātha.

9. This definition is too narrow a definition as there are also cows of other colours.

10. Because, the definition of the cow as an animal having a horn includes buffaloes also since they too have horns, but are not cows.

11. Because the hoof of a cow is never uncloven.

12. *Asādhāraṇatva* is *lakṣyatā-avacchedaka-samaniyatatwam.* That which is intended to be defined is *lakṣya* or the *definitum.* When we want to define a cow, cow becomes the *lakṣya.* Thus, anything can become a *lakṣya.* Every *lakṣya* has in it *lakṣyatā,* ie the quality of being a *lakṣya.* Thus, when a cow is a *lakṣya,* it has in it the *lakṣyatā* also. Though *lakṣyatā* exists in all *lakṣyas, lakṣyatā* and *cowness* together exist only in a cow; similarly, lakṣyatā and horseness together exist only in a horse. Thus, it is the generic attribute cowness

that restricts the *lakṣyatā* from extending itself to a horse or to any other *lakṣya*. Similarly, *horseness* restricts *lakṣyatā* from extending itself to any other *lakṣya*. Thus, *cowness* or *horseness* are *avacchedakas* or adjuncts to *lakṣyatā*, which set limit to the extensive pervasion of *lakṣyatā*. Therefore, *lakṣyatā-avacchedaka* means an adjunct to *lakṣyatā*.

Sama-niyatatvam: When two things are invariably co-existent to each other, they are *sama-niyata*; eg where there is *dewlap* there will be *cowness* and where there is *cowness* there will be *dewlap*. Here, *dewlap* is *samaniyata* to *cowness* and vice versa. It is admitted that *lakṣaṇa* as such will be *vyāvartaka*, ie that which renders the *lakṣya* distinguished from all the rest. As such, the *lakṣaṇa* of *lakṣaṇa*, viz *lakṣyatā-avacchedaka-samaniyatatvam* would apply to all *lakṣaṇas* that are *vyāvartakas* - in this instance dewlap which is *vyāvartaka*, since it distinguishes the cow from the rest. As such, *lakṣyatā-avacchedaka-samaniyatatvam* rightly applies to dewlap thus: Where there is *lakṣyatā-avacchhedaka* (cowness) there is dewlap and where there is dewlap there is also cowness. But this *lakṣaṇa* of *lakṣyatā-avacchedaka-samaniyatatvam* extends to *vyāvṛtti* (*itarabheda*) which is other than *lakṣya*. *Vyāvṛtti* ie the quality of being different from everything other than itself, is *itarabheda*, while *vyāvartaka* is that which occasions the inference of the birth of *itarabheda*. But the *lakṣaṇa* of *lakṣaṇa* (ie *asādhāraṇatvam*) happens to extend to *gavetarabheda* (ie the quality of being distinct from all other than the cow) inasmuch as both cowness and *gavetarabheda* are co-existent to each other thus: Where there is *cowness*, there is *gavetarabheda* and where there is *gavetarabheda* there is *cowness*. Further, this *lakṣaṇa* extends to *abhidheyatva* too, which is not *vyāvartaka*. *Abhidheyatva* is all-pervasive. There is no category which is not *abhidheya*. As such a category other than *abhidheya* cannot exist. When *abhidheyatvam* is accepted as *lakṣaṇa* of a *padārtha*, *padārtha* becomes *lakṣya*, *padārthatvam* becomes the *lakṣyatā-avacchedaka*. In *abhidheyatvam*, the definition of definition viz *lakṣyatā-avacchedaka-samaniyatatvam* happens thus: Wherever, there is *padārthatvam*, there is *abhidheyatvam*, and wherever there is *abhidheyatvam* there is *padārthatvam*.

13. According to Vaiśeṣika ontology, an effect-substance, ie any created thing, is without any *guṇa* or *quality* at the first instant of its production or emergence, and that it is only after that first instant that a product may come to acquire a quality. So, according to his own tenets, a substance is without any quality at the moment of its emergence. How can then he define a substance as that having the property of quality? Or, the definition should be modified to avoid this defect; otherwise, it would amount to saying that a substance

at the moment of its emergence is different from itself at its subsequent moments.

14. This amplification of the definition of substance is not vulnerable to the charge of *avyāpti*. The *jāti* of *dravya*, viz, *dravyatva* or substanceness is present in every *dravya*. Also, *sattā*, the universal existence also is there in a substance. To avoid the defect of overapplicability in *sattā*, it is said *sattābhinna*. A *dravya* at the moment of its emergence and/or destruction may not have in it any *guṇa* but it does have *dravyatva* - the universal substanceness. This substance is also present in every substance where a *guṇa* is present. So, it is *guṇa samānādhikaraṇa*. This avoids the defect of *ativyāpti*.

15. The idea is this: the characteristic of substance is defined as *guṇasamānādhikaraṇasattābhinnajātimatvam* to avoid the defect of *ativyāpti* in quality as also in action. The opponent points out that by the above definition the defect of *ativyāpti* cannot be avoided, and in order to establish this, he provides two examples: (a) The conventional expression *one colour* is well known. Here, in *colour*, *colourness* or *qualityness* inheres and also its adjunct *one* exists. *One* comes under number (*saṅkhyā*) which is one of the 24 qualities. Thus *colourness* becomes the common substratum of *saṅkhyā guṇa* which is different from *sattā*. Thus, in colour, there is *sattābhinnajāti* which is also the *guṇasamānādhikaraṇa*. Further, this *lakṣaṇa* of *dravya* is found in *rūpa* also. (b) In the example, *rūpam rasāt pṛthak*, *rūpa* has *pṛthaktva* as its qualifying adjunct which is also one of the 24 qualities. *Rūpatva jāti* inheres in *rūpa* and *pṛthaktva* also is in *rūpa*. So, *rūpatva* becomes the *samānādhikaraṇa* of *pṛthaktva guṇa*. Thus, in *rūpa*, there is *sattābhinnajāti* while being also the *guṇa-samānādhikaraṇa*. This is refuted as follows: *Guṇa* inheres only in *dravya*. Of course, there are conventional expressions like *one colour* etc. The intended relationship here is *samavāya*, ie inherent relationship. As this relation is not between the substratum *colour* and the *oneness*, there will be no overapplicability in *colour*.

16. According to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, *jāti* inheres only in *dravya* (Substance), *guṇa* (Quality) and *karma* (Action). If it is said merely that quality is *that which possesses sāmānya* (generality), then, there would occur *ativyāpti* in *dravya* and *guṇa* as they too are *sāmānyas*. To avoid this, the definition is qualified by the statement *while being different from dravya and karma*. If *guṇa* is defined merely as *something other than dravya and karma*, then *ativyapti* will occur in *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya* and *abhāva*. To avoid this defect it is qualified by *sāmānyavān* as *sāmānya* inheres only in *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*.

17. Naturally, a doubt may arise as to why the second definition is given while the first definition itself is free of defects, and, hence

should be sufficient. Nīlakaṅṭha suggests that though the first definition is logically sound, the second one seems to be better by virtue of its brevity and simplicity (*lāghavatā*). Also, the first definition is based on *bheda* (difference) and *sāmānya* (generality) while the second one is based on *sāmānya* only.

18. As in the earlier verse, here also, Annaṁbhaṭṭa provides alternate definition for *Karma*. The first definition has two conditions; (a) *saṁyogabhinnatva*; (b) *saṁyogasamavāyi kāraṇa*. The first condition prevents the defect of *ativyāpti* in *saṁyoga* inasmuch as the Vaiśeṣikas hold that conjunction can be due to *karma* or due to *conjunction*. So, if *Karma* is merely defined as the *asamavāyi kāraṇa* of *Saṁyoga*, then, the definition would also extend to instances where conjunctions are due to conjunctions. This *ativyāpti* is avoided by the first condition. Again, if the second term is not inserted, then, the definition would apply to *substance* as well inasmuch as *substance* which is not *karma* is also a condition of conjunction (though *samavāyi* - inherent). Thus, the insertion of *asamavāyi* keeps out *substance* from the definition, and obviates the defect of *Ativyāpti* in *substance*.

19. Actions like *bhramaṇa* (rotation), *recanā* (purging or breathing out), *syandana* (flowing) etc are not considered by Annaṁbhaṭṭa as distinct forms of *karma*; rather, they are only various varieties of *gamana*. Hence, the charge of incomplete enumeration is not sustainable.

20. *Sāmānya* is the general feature found in many entities. This has been explained more elaborately later - under section IX-17. *Sāmānya* as *sattā* resides in all *dravyas, guṇas* and *karmas*. Of the *Sāmānya*, the *Sattā sāmānya* is the widest; *sāmānyas* like *jāti* reside only in their respective entities, eg *dravyata* in *dravya, gotva* in *go* etc. It is in this sense that *sattā-sāmānya* is said to be the widest. According to Vaiśeṣika theory, this *Sāmānya* resides only in the first three of the seven *padārthas*.

21. *Viśeṣās* are the differentiating features subsisting in eternal substances and they are infinite inasmuch as the eternal substances in which they inhere, are infinite.

22. According to Vaiśeṣika Theory, *Samavāya* is a unitary entity and as such does not admit of any division. (For definition of *Samavāya*, see section IX-18)

23. *Antecedent negation* is the non-existence of a thing before its production, eg the expression, *the cloth will come into existence*, when the cloth is about to be produced. The expression, *this jar is destroyed* is an example of *destructive negation*. Thus, the existence of a thing is confined to the intermediary period of *antecedent negation* and *destructive negation*. *Absolute negation* is non-existence of a thing at all times - past, present, and future, as when we say: *On this spot there is no jar*. *Mutual negation* is mutual dissimilarity, like the

expression, *a jar is not a cloth.* The existence of a jar in a cloth, or of a cloth in a jar, is denied as there is the total absence of any semblance between jar and cloth.

Here ends the Section I where Annaṁbhaṭṭa deals with the enumeration (*uddeśa*) of the *sapta padārthas* and their further sub-divisions as recognised by the Vaiśeṣika School of Thought. Section II deals mostly with *lakṣaṇā* (definition) and *parīkṣā* (critical examination) of the categories.

24. That is to say, there is no hard and fast rule regarding the sequence of enumeration; it may start from any category.

25. The opponent points out the defect of *avyāpti* if the definition of earth were to be taken for granted. In support of his objection, he puts forward the argument mentioned in the Dīpikā. If the thing then becomes odourless, what would be the nature of the product? Since both the component parts are earth, the product too would be only earth, but without smell as the two smells cancel each other. Here, thus, is an instance of earth without any smell. Then, how can the definition of earth as having smell for its characteristic be sustained, as the definition suffers from the defect of *avyāpti* as pointed out above? This is the idea.

26. The argument that there is variegated odour (*citra gandha*) in the substance consequent on the odour apprehended in the substance being the odour existing in the component parts, is unacceptable.

27. According to the Naiyāyikas, a product in the first moment of its creation and destruction, is supposed to be without any attribute.

28. Where there is water mixed up with earth substance there is odour and where there is the absence of such mix-up there is also the absence of odour — this is the method of affirmation and negation.

29. The defect of *avyāpti* in water that is just produced and destroyed is avoided by expanding the definition as *water endowed with its universal jāti (generic attribute) which is co-existent with cold touch. Jalatva* (which is the *jāti* of water) is always co-located with cold touch, that is to say, both cold-touch and *jalatva* have the same substratum. Water which perishes immediately after it comes into existence has in it its *jāti Jalatva* which admittedly co-exists with cold touch. Thus, there is no defect of *avyāpti.*

30. Again, this definition suffers from the defect of *ativyāpti* inasmuch as the cold surface of a piece of stone, for example, is cold to the touch but it is not water; else, that piece of stone should be considered as a watery substance which is absurd. Thus, the definition extends to objects not intended for. Here, the explanation is the same offered to explain the presence of smell in water mixed

with earthen particles. Here also, the cold feel of the stone is due to its contact with water.

31. *Prāṇa,* though one, is spoken of as five according to its different locations and functions.

हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिसंस्थितः ।
उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ॥

The Air that is inhaled and exhaled through the mouth and the nostrils is *Prāṇa,* and is located in the heart. The air that presses down water, waste matter, foetus etc is *apāna* and is located in the anus. Some opine that it functions from the navel (*nābhi-apanayanāt mūtra purīṣādeḥ apāno adhovṛttiḥ vāyuḥ nābhisthānaḥ*). *Samāna* helps in the digestion of food etc by stimulating gastric fire in the stomach and is located in the region of the navel. *Udāna* takes the digested food etc upward from the navel and which, located in the throat, rises up the throat and enters into the head. *Vyāna* is the vital air that courses through the entire nervous system and is diffused through the whole body.

32. *Upādhi* is defined as *being pervasive of the thing to be proved while not being pervasive of the reason.* In a good syllogism that which is *vyāpaka* to the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) must also be *vyāpaka* to the reason (*hetu* or *sādhana*). If it is found to be *vyāpaka* to *sādhya* but *avyāpaka* to *sādhana,* then it becomes a bad *hetu,* suffering from the defect of *upādhi.*

33. That is, in air which is the subject here. It is a known fact that air, though the substratum of perceptible touch, does not possess manifested colour. So, this necessary condition of having manifested colour does not extend to the reason: *because it is the substratum of perceptible touch.* Therefore, the argument, *air is visible* cannot be sustained by a reason vitiated by the defect of *upādhi.* This is the idea.

34. Keeping in view the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of recurrent creation and dissolution, Annaṁbhaṭṭa discusses here the origin and dissolution of the four Mahābhūtas of gross Earth, gross Water, gross Tejas and gross Air. Creation as also dissolution follows a set pattern. But there is a divergence of views among the followers of the Vaiśeṣika Doctrine with regard to the operative cause that leads to the disintegration of a Dyad and a Triad. The Traditional view is that the destruction of *asamavāyi kāraṇa* between the two atoms leads to the disintegration of a Dyad. Then, the destruction of *Samavāyi Kāraṇa* of Triads (ie the destruction of the Dyads themselves which constitute the *Samavāyi Kāraṇa* of a Triad) leads to the disintegration of Triads. Thus, first, there takes place the destruction of *asamavāyi kāraṇa* between two *paramāṇus;* then, takes place the destruction of *samavāyi kāraṇa.*

According to the *Navīnas* (Moderners), everywhere the destruction of *asamavāyi kāraṇa* leads to the disintegration of gross effect substances. Thus, the destruction of a triad is invariably preceded not only by the destruction of the *samavāyi kāraṇa* (or the binary product) but also by the destruction of *asamavāyi kāraṇa* between the two atoms.

35. The argument goes like this:

(1) Every visible substance is composed of parts, eg a piece of cloth which is composed of threads. The finest mote in the sunbeam as it passes through a lattice window is a visible substance which is the triad. Therefore it is composed of parts, that is, of dyads. Here there is no instance to cite the contrary; as such it is quite logical.

(2) Again the dyad too is composed of parts, viz, the atoms, like a thread. Whatever produces a large object is composed of parts, eg the threads in a cloth. A dyad generates a visible object (like a triad). Therefore, a dyad is composed of parts. Here also, there is no instance contrary to this argument. Hence it is not open to any objection. Thus, thread in relation to cloth, and dyad in relation to triad are the *mahadāraṁbhakas* of the large magnitude, like the cloth in the case of the former and triad in the latter case. The conclusion is that on the strength of arguments above, the existence of atoms is established.

36. Now, it may be argued that atom also is composed of parts on the basis of earlier argument that whatever generates an effect, is itself composed of parts, like the dyad, because the atoms produce dyads. Annaṁbhaṭṭa answers such arguments by saying that the argument that the atom too is composed of parts, would land us in *regression ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*) inasmuch as there would be an endless series of generating causes which is absurd. Further, assumption of a genesis of atoms compels us to assume infinite divisibility of a material substance. If such be the case, then, a tiny mustard seed would be as much an infinitely divisible thing as the largest mountain. The difference in sizes between substances can be explained only if the atom is accepted as the smallest unit not admitting of any division. It is nothing but the greater or smaller number of atoms that makes one thing bigger and another smaller. A thing like mountain Meru is larger because it contains larger number of parts than a mustard seed which is smaller to Meru because mustard seed contains lesser number of parts. To calculate these numbers we must have a common unit like an atom. If we do not recognize the atom as an indivisible unit and, instead, go on dividing the atom *ad infinitum*, then, the number of parts in Meru mountain and mustard seed will be equal but the parts will vary in size and the question why one is larger than the other will remain unresolved. This is solved thus:

A thing is larger or smaller according to the size of parts in them are larger or smaller.

37. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, being an Orthodox System of Thought, accepts vedic authority like other Orthodox Systems and quotes the vedic passage as an authority to prove its contention of recurrent creation and dissolution. Annaṁbhaṭṭa mentions two kinds of dissolution, *avāntara pralaya* and *Mahāpralaya*. In *avāntara pralaya* all gross substances are destroyed leaving intact only the *nityas* like the atoms, ākāśa, space, time, soul with their *saṁskāras,* and minds. In *Mahāpralaya* all *bhāva kāryas* (positive effects) get destroyed. Only imperishable substances like the *paramāṇus* (atoms) without their quality, souls without their perishable *saṁskāras,* minds, *ākāśa,* space, and time are left intact.

38. For want of a more appropriate term for *ākāśa,* it is translated here as *ether.* Multiplicity in *ākāśa* is not admitted since it is a continuum and statements such as *this ākāśa* or *that ākāśa* are due to the delimiting factors in relation to *ākāśa.* This cannot be a ground to postulate multiplicity in *ākāśa* which is a unitary entity.

39. The Text defines 'Time' as *atīta* etc to avoid *ativyāpti* in *ghaṭa* etc. Everything exists in relation to time and space. So if time is merely defined as the cause of conventional expression, then *ativyāpti* occurs in *ghaṭa* also, since *ghaṭa* is the cause of conventional expression of the word *ghaṭa.* To avoid this, *atītādi* is prefixed to the definition. Time comes to bear the terms like past, present, and future under certain conditions, though time is only one. Also, *Kāla* has no perceivable quality though a *dravya.*

40. Though *dik* is one only, it is indicated as *east, west, etc* in relation to the position of the sun. Space in the direction of *udayācala* is known as *east,* in the direction of *astācala* is known as *west,* in the direction of the *Meru* is known as *north,* and in the direction opposite to the *Meru* is known as *south.* Like time and ether, *Dik* (direction) also is inferred.

41. The syllogism in this instance is as follows: 'Every effect is produced by a causal agent, eg a pot; A dyad which is the least component of the element Earth is an effect; Therefore it is produced by a Causal Agent.' The major premise here is supported by such instances as a pot, cloth etc. And there is no instance to prove the contrary. The premise therefore is quite logical. This Causal Agent can be only God as no human or sub-human being can possibly be an agent in the production of a dyad which is formed of two atoms inasmuch as atoms are not perceived by any human or sub-human agent. Thus, the existence of a super-human agent has to be postulated to explain the creation of the world and that is proof enough for the existence of God.

The number of dyads is infinite; it, therefore, follows that only an omniscient soul can have an immediate apprehension of the infinite number of atoms of all the Elements. Thus the causal agent is the immediate knower of everything which again proves the existence of Īśvara.

42. This definition of mind is free from the defect of *ativyāpti* in the first four *dravyas* beginning with *Pṛthivī* all of which are endowed with both the quality of touch and action; the last four are not endowed with either; thus, the definition does not extend to them also. Hence this definition is faultless.

43. *Manas* is the last substance in the list of *dravyas*. As a *dravya*, it must have some magnitude. Now, a magnitude can be either the smallest, or the medium-sized or the largest size. The *Paramāṇu* is the smallest size, a perceptible substance is of the medium size, and gross elements like the sky etc are of the largest magnitude. Annambhaṭṭa asserts that mind is atomic but rejects the possibility of it being of intermediary magnitude, because, as he says, it will render *Manas* non-eternal inasmuch as a substance having a intermediary magnitude is a thing having parts and a thing having parts is perishable; hence, *manas* cannot be of medium magnitude. Similarly, *manas* cannot be of the ubiquitous magnitude, because, in such a magnitude there is the absence of *asamavāyi kāraṇa*. Now, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine, every *bhāva kārya* (positive product) has its *asamavāyi kāraṇa*. Cognition (which is a *bhāva kārya*) is due to the conjunction of the *Ātmā* with *manas* and this conjunction is the *asamavāyi kāraṇa* for an effect like cognition. Further, conjunction between two all-pervading substances is not accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. And a cognition cannot rise without conjunction. Therefore, it has to be admitted that the *Ātmā* which is all-pervading gets involved in conjunction with *manas* which is not all-pervading; or else, cognition cannot take place. Thus, *manas* cannot be a substance having the largest magnitude. Another ground to rule out the possibility of admitting *manas* as having the largest magnitude is the absence of sleep if conjunction were to be admitted between two substances of largest magnitude inasmuch as such a conjunction will be eternal and, as such, consciousness too will be eternal which is contrary to experience. Hence, the *Ātmā* having been already admitted to be ubiquitous, the other substance, viz, *manas* ought to be admitted to be non-ubiquitous. Therefore, for the reasons mentioned above, *manas* is only of atomic size.

44. In the order of enumeration of the Vaiśeṣika *padārthas*, *guṇa* comes second. According to the Vaiśeṣika, *guṇa* as a *dharma* (characteristic of a thing) exists in a dravya by *samavāya saṁbandha*

(inherent relation), but is, at the same time, different from *Karma,* and *viśeṣa.*

45. The eye can apprehend *number* too. By inserting *only* in the definition, the defect of *ativyāpti* is avoided as *number* is recognised by touch too and not by the *eye only.*

46. What the opponent intends to say is that each of the component colours in a cloth of variegated colour is non-pervasive in the sense that it does not characterise the whole of the thing forming its support. Therefore, since component colours being non-pervasive, the compound colour is nothing but a collection of these various component colours. Then, where is the necessity to postulate a distinct colour like the *citra colour*?

47. The above argument can be sustained only on the assumption that component colours are non-pervasive entities. Annaṁbhaṭṭa refutes this by affirming that colour, as a rule, is a pervasive entity.

48. The view-point of the opponent is that what we see as the *citra* colour is really the collection of varied colours of the different parts of cloth. It is only the various coloured parts that masquerade as the *whole colour of the cloth.* Acceptance of this view-point poses a problem to Annaṁbhaṭṭa. If the cloth as a whole does not possess any colour of its own, then cloth can never become an object of visual perception; for, a substance without some manifest colour cannot be visually perceived. But it is perceived; then, which colour is it? It cannot be the colour of any of its component parts for the reason mentioned above. Therefore, the colour of the cloth must be the one which is the total effect of all the colours of its component parts. This *total effect of all the colours* is a simple distinctive colour over and above the colours of its component parts. And, according to Annaṁbaṭṭa, this distinctive colour is known as *citra rūpa.*

49. The insertion of *alone* in the definition is intended to avoid the defect of *ativyāpti* in *contact* of the tactile sense with a tactile substance. The tactile sense is supposed to apprehend only touch, either warm or cold. According to the Vaiśeṣika Ontology, contact also is a *guṇa*; but *contact* is not the same as *warm* or *cold.* So, insertion of *alone* removes this difficulty, as *contact* is apprehended by the visual organ also.

50. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the change that takes place due to application of heat (*pākaja* change) is affected directly in the ultimate (ie atomic) constituents of gross earth-substance. He gives an example of an unbaked jar. When it is subjected to some degree of heat, its colour changes from black to red under the influence of heat. This change we see in the gross jar is because of the change that undergoes directly in the atoms which are the ultimate

constituents of the gross object. *Tejas-particles* induce motion in earth *paramāṇus;* this motion effects the separation of atoms in a *dvyaṇuka.* With the disintegration of *dvyaṇuka, tryaṇuka* also disintegrates, which finally leads to the disintegration of the gross jar itself which is the ultimate effect in this causal-series. Thus, it is the destruction of contact of *paramāṇu* with *Tejas* particles that finally results in the destruction of the jar — this is known as *pākaja*-effect induced by *pāka-kriyā.* As the *Paramāṇu* separates from *dvyaṇuka,* its former black colour gets destroyed and in its place appears red colour under the influence of contact with *Tejas.* These *paramāṇus* with their changed colour are the starting point of another series of causal changes which finally culminates in the emergence of a red jar. Here, the change is only in the quality of atoms and not in the substance as such because a *paramāṇu* is indivisible and changeless. This change of quality is a positive effect (*bhāva kārya*) and has its *samavāyi kāraṇa* in the *paramāṇu* as a *dravya* or substance; its *asamavāyi kāraṇa* is in its contact with *Tejas* particles or *pāka.* This contact inheres in a *paramāṇu.* The *nimitta kāraṇa* or the instrumental cause, is in the *Adṛṣṭa* of the *jīva* for whom the jar is being produced. The change of colour in a *paramāṇu* is due to *pāka* consisting in *asamavāyi kāraṇa.* The red colour in a *dvyaṇuka* is due to the red colour of its constituent atoms and the *samavāyi kāraṇa* of the red colour of a *dvyaṇuka* is the *dvyaṇuka* itself and the nimitta *kāraṇa* is the *adṛṣṭa* that was operative in the case of the change of quality in the *paramāṇu.*

While the Naiyāyikas accept the Vaiśeṣika theory that the four specific qualities of earth substance (viz *rūpa, rasa, gandha* and *sparśa*) are affected by the application of heat (*pāka kriyā*), they differ from the Vaiśeṣikas with regard to the process of change in colour from black to red. According to the latter, *pāka kriyā* (ie change in colour due to heat) takes place only in earth *paramāṇus.* But the former hold that like the atoms, the jar too undergoes a similar change at the same time.

51. Further, *parimāṇa* is a real feature of a thing and is not something just fancied about; eg when we say, *this thing is big,* we really intend to describe the thing with certain specification with reference to its size which is not a mere subjective whim but an objective reality. As Realists, the *Vaiśeṣikas* term this feature of a substance as *parimāṇa* or *dimension.* To exclude Īśvara, time, *dik* and *adṛṣṭa* which are the common causes of all products, the word *'special'* is inserted in the definition. The dimension of atoms known as *pārimāṇḍalya* - *infinitesimality* - and the dimension of *vibhu-dravyas* - (all-pervasive substances), are eternal; all the rest are non-eternal.

52. It has been argued that *distinctness* can as well be considered

a kind of *abhāva* (absence) known as *anyonyābhāva* (ie mutual absence). Vaiśeṣikas do not accept this theory as it would go against their enumeration of qualities as twenty four; further, the apprehension *this is distinct from that* is a positive experience; it being so, to consider it a mere *absence* is doing violence to our consciousness; hence, it is preferable to accept this awareness as a *quality* rather than as a kind of *absence.*

53. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, conjunction (*saṁyoga*) is a quality inhering in a substance. It is an objective reality due to which the expression signifying conjunction is possible, eg when the book is on the table. It is again of two kinds, born of action or direct, and born of contact itself or indirect; eg the contact of a hand and a book is born of action and is the *direct saṁyoga. Indirect saṁyoga* is due to saṁyoga itself, that is to say, the direct contact of a book with the hand indirectly results in the contact of the book with the entire body of which the hand is only a part.

Further, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, *saṁyoga* is a *avyāpya vṛtti,* ie non-pervasive property. This non-pervasiveness is when the thing and its absence have the same substratum; eg when the hand is in contact with the table, the absence of that contact also is in the table (taking the entire table as the substratum), or, it also might be that even when the hand is in contact with the table, there is the awareness that the hand is not a part of the table. Thus, *avyāpya* comes to be defined as being co-existent in the same locus where there is also the absolute negation.

54. *Sneha* is the special quality which helps solidification by bringing about a peculiar combination among particles of powder. To the argument that fluidity is the agglutinating agent and not *sneha,* Naiyāyikas answer that if it is so, liquefied gold should be the cause of agglutination of powder etc. But liquefied gold does not seem to possess this quality of agglutination. So, the agent that causes agglutination is *sneha.*

55. Since *soundness* too is perceived by the organ of hearing. *Soundness* being the generic attribute of sound (*jāti*), gets excluded by the insertion of quality in the definition.

56. Sound is three-fold according to its source of origination. The peculiar *saṁyoga* between two material bodies (like a stick and a drum) produces one type of sound. The second variety of sound is produced due to *vibhāga* - disjunction, eg when a bamboo is split. The third variety is when a series of sound is produced by the initial sound. When a drum is hit by a stick, it produces the first sound by means of *saṁyoga.* This first one generates the second sound which in turn generates the third sound and so on and on

till the sound reaches the far-off auditory organs. This is the third variety of sound.

57. The word *vyavahāra* in the definition means apt usage of appropriate words. *Vyavasāya jñāna* is the simple knowledge of a thing, like, *this is a jar.* In *Anuvyavasāya jñāna,* the cognition *this is a jar* becomes the subject matter of the consciousness *I know,* ie it is *viṣaya jñāna-viṣayakaṁ jñānam.* According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣka doctrine, *anuvyavasāya jñāna* is subsequent to *vyavasāya jñāna.* According to them, the first cognitive state is not self-luminous, ie it does not become the subject of an internal perception. Perceiving a table is a state of cognition; at that moment there is no precise cognition *I see a table.* It is only at a subsequent instant that he has the consciousness that *he sees a table.* This subsequent subjective perception is *anuvyavasāya jñāna.*

58. Mental impression is threefold: *vega, bhāvanā,* and *sthitisthāpaka.* Of these, only the *bhāvanā* variety is to be taken here.

59. *Saṁskāradhvaṁsa* is also born of *saṁskāra,* as without *saṁskāra* there can be no *saṁskāra-dhvaṁsa.* Therefore, there is *ativyāpti* in the definition *saṁskāramātra janyam.* To avoid this, *jñānam* is added to the definition.

60. Identification of the cognition of a thing or a person with its or his recollection of past impression is *pratyabhijñā* - reminiscence. Recognition thus results when immediate cognition arising from the contact of organ with the object of perception is identical with the recollection of past impressions. For instannce, when we say: verily, *this is that man, this* refers to the cognition arising from the immediate perception of man consequent on the contact of organ; and *that* refers to the recollection of past impressions relating to the same man. Thus, by inserting the term *alone,* the defect of overapplicability in reminiscence is avoided. Remembrance (*smṛti*) is born of mental impression alone whereas *pratyabhijñā* is born out of perception also.

61. The idea is this: The above definition of *pramā* applies to a cognition of *jar* when we interpret *tadvati* to mean *ghaṭavati;* but this cannot apply to a cognition of *ghaṭatva* itself as existing in a *ghaṭa,* because, *ghaṭatva* is not the *adhikaraṇa* of *ghaṭa* or any other thing. The expression *ghaṭe ghaṭatvam* amounts to saying: *ghaṭa vṛtti ghaṭatvam, potness residing in a pot. Vṛttitvam* or *ādheyatā* is in potness. Through the link, viz *ādheyatā* (the quality of residing), pot can be accepted to reside as *prakāra* in *potness if ādheyatā* were accepted as a *saṁbandha* of pot and potness. But *ādheyatā* as such is not recognised as a *saṁbandha* (relation) at all. So, pot cannot reside in potness as a *prakāra.* Accordingly, *ghaṭavati* (*ghaṭatve*) *ghaṭa prakāraka jñānam* does not happen. As such partial applicability in the true apprehension *potness in a pot* has to be accepted.

62. When *tadvati* is interpreted to mean *tatsaṁbandhavati, pot* becomes the substratum of *ghaṭatvasaṁbandha,* because *ghaṭasaṁbandha,* exists in *ghaṭatva;* so *ghaṭatva* becomes the *adhikaraṇa* of *ghaṭasaṁbandha.* Thus, *tatsaṁbandhavati* (*ghaṭasambandhavati ghaṭatve*) *taṭprakāraka jñānam* (*ghaṭaprakāraka jñānam*) happens.

63. *Apramā anubhava* is when a cognition has for its *prakāra* its inherent jāti while, in reality, the thing suffers from the absence of that very *prakāra*; eg the cognition of a snake. Snake must have the characteristic of snakeness in it in order to render that cognition valid. Suppose, what really exists before one is a rope and not a snake; the snakeness which is the *prakāra* in the above cognition is absent in a rope which has for its feature only ropeness. Hence, the cognition of snake is faulty inasmuch as there is no snakeness in it; hence it is *apramā anubhava.*

64. The idea of the objection is this: *conjunction* possesses the characteristic of partial *pervasiveness.* Therefore, the *adhikaraṇa* has both conjunction and also *the negation of conjunction.* For example, when one says, *the monkey is sitting on a tree,* one gets the knowledge that the tree is in conjunction with monkey. But the definition of *apramā* also applies to this apprehension; because, here we have *kapi saṁyogaprakāraka anubhava* in an *adhikaraṇa* where there is also the absence of *kapisaṁyoga* in the lower part of the tree.

65. Having mentioned valid apprehension, there arises the need to mention the means of valid apprehension. So, the means are being classified and explained by the Text.

66. There are two types of causes: common cause - *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa,* and uncommon or special cause - *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa.* That which is the cause of every effect is the general or common cause, eg space, time, destiny etc. That which is the specific cause of an effect is called the special or uncommon cause, eg yarn in the production of cloth.

67. That is, when so defined, it means that wherever there is product, there is product. Thus *ativyāpti* occurs in *kārya* as *niyatatva* is found in effect also.

68. The idea is this: The absence of dispensable antecedent is *ananyatāsiddha.* There will not happen the absence of dispensable antecedents when there is the presence of indispensable cause; for example, the existence of ether and *kapālarūpa* etc in the production of a jar, are the dispensable antecedents. In these *anyathāsiddhas,* both invariability and antecedence are found, thus causing the defect of *ativyāpti* in the definition of *kāraṇa.* To avoid this, the term *ananyathāsiddha* is added to the definition.

69. A mango, possessing all the qualities except smell, gets the quality of smell when subjected to heat. Here the causes of the

production of odour in the fruit must be the antecedent non-existence of smell inasmuch as there cannot be any other antecedent non-existence except the antecedent non-existence of smell, in view of the maxim of the Naiyāyikas that without the existence of antecedent non-existence no effect can be produced; otherwise, we should be able to produce another jar from the clay of an already existing jar. Another mango possessing all the four qualities except colour and smell, is subjected to warming. In the process, the fruit gets both colour and smell. Here a doubt arises as to which antecedent non-existence is the cause in the production of smell. In places other than the *application of heat,* the antecedent non-existence of smell is determined to be the cause in the production of smell. Therefore, here also, the antecedent non-existence of smell is essential in the production of smell. Therefore, the antecedent non-existence of colour is *anyathāsiddha* here. This is the example for the third variety of *anyathāsiddhatva.*

70. Annaṁbhaṭṭa defines *effect - kārya* - as the *Pratiyogin* or *counter correlative* of its own antecedent non-existence. *Pratiyogin* is used in the context of either *abhāva* (absence or non-existence) or *saṁbaṅdha* (relation). In the former, *pratiyogin* refers to the object whose absence is intended to be established. For *ghaṭābhāva,* the *ghaṭa* is the *pratiyogin* of its *abhāva.* For the *abhāva* of *ghaṭābhāva, ghaṭābhāva* is the *pratiyogin.* Effects like a pot, a table, etc come into being at a certain point of time which proves its antecedent non-existence as otherwise expressions such as 'will come into existence' would be redundant. So, before the effect comes into existence, there was its absence; this is known as antecedent non-existence or *prāgabhāva* and an effect like a *ghaṭa* is the *pratiyogin* of such antecedent non-existence.

71. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School recognises that every positive effect has three causes, viz, *samavāya, asamavāya,* and *nimitta;* eg in a product like cloth, yarn is the inherent cause; the contact of two yarns is the non-inherent cause; and causes other than these two, like the weaver, shuttle etc are the efficient causes. Inherent cause is always a substance; non-inherent cause must be either a quality or an action and nothing else; while *nimitta kāraṇa* may be of any kind. *Abhāva* has only *nimitta kāraṇa.*

72. *Samavāyi kāraṇa* is defined as *that inhering in which an effect emerges,* eg the yarn which constitutes the intimate cause of its effect cloth, because the cloth is connected with the yarns by inherent union. Similarly, the colour on the piece of cloth being a quality, resides in the cloth by intimate relation. Therefore, the piece of cloth is the inherent cause of the colour on it.

73. Here *taṅtusaṁyoga* inheres in yarn with cloth which is the effect of the contact of yarns. Thus, both the cloth and the *taṅtusaṁyoga*

exist in the same substratum, ie *tantus.* Therefore, *tantusaṁyoga* is the non-inherent cause to cloth.

74. The example cited here is the relationship of *tanturūpa* to *paṭarūpa.* Here the colour of yarns inheres in yarns along with cloth which is the inherent cause of *paṭarūpa,* that is to say, the colour of yarns produces the colour of cloth in cloth inhering in yarn along with cloth. Therefore, *the colour of yarn is the non-inherent cause to the colour of cloth.*

75. A cause which is other than either the *samavāyi* or the *asamavāyi kāraṇa,* is the *nimitta kāraṇa,* eg the activities of the weaver, the shuttle, the loom etc.

76. *Karaṇa* is defined by Annaṁbhaṭṭa as an uncommon or special cause. Keśavamiśra in his Tarkabhāṣā defines *karaṇam* as *sādhakatamam,* ie the most immediate cause in bringing about an effect, that is to say, it is the most efficient cause. That which directly and immediately brings about the result by its own action is *karaṇam,* eg an arrow in killing a bird. Here, arrow is the special cause which brings about the instant death of a bird, because, it alone immediately brings about the result killing the bird by its own activity of striking the bird dead. Thus *karaṇa* is a cause which is most essential in producing a result and without the activity of which the effect is not produced in spite of the other causes being present. This is the view held by the modern Naiyāyikas. But the ancient Naiyāyikas define it as *vyāpāravat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam* ie *karaṇa* is a special and operative cause. *Vyāpāra* is an operation which, not being a substance, is the product of a thing, and produces the effect of that thing.

The example for this is as follows: The sense organ is *karaṇa.* The contact of a sense-organ with its corresponding object is the *vyāpāra.* The percept is the effect. The contact of sense-organs happens to be both cause and effect. It becomes cause with reference to the effect of organ and becomes also effect with reference to sense organ. That which is known as *vyāpāra* by the ancient Naiyāyikas is known as *karaṇa* by the modern Naiyāyikas.

77. The four examples given in the text are in illustration of *saṁjñā,* - name; *jāti* - class; *guṇa* - quality; and *kriyā* - action.

78. According to the Nyāya doctrine, direct perception is always dependent on some relation between an *Indriya* (sense organ) and an *artha* (object). This relation is the operative cause in bringing about a cognition. The cognition may either be *laukika* (ordinary) perception of *bhāva padārthas* (positive entities) like that of a *dravya, guṇa, karma* or *jāti.* Again, we may have perception of a quality like *śabda* in *ākāśa* which is not perceived by the senses; there occurs also the perception of the universal *soundness* abiding in sound. We may have also perception of negative entities like, the *absence*

of a pot or a table etc. In each case what is necessary is a certain kind of relation between the *artha* (object) perceived and the respective *indriya* (sense organ) involved in the act of perception. This perception is again twofold: *Savikalpaka* (determinant) and *Nirvikalpaka* (indeterminant) which has been dealt with earlier.

79. The colour is intimately united with the jar which is conjointed with the organ. Hence the contact of the eye with the colour of the jar is *saṁyukta samavāya.*

80. Here, eye is in contact with the jar with which is intimately united the colour of the jar in which inheres its genus. *Ghaṭarūpatva* is, therefore, perceived by the eye by means of the contact *saṁyukta-samavetasamavāya.*

81. *Vīcītaraṅga nyāya* is the principle of a wave urging forward another wave. In the ocean one wave propels another, till the first and all the subsequent waves reach the shore. In the same way, there is a successive operation in the case of the production of sound till they reach the auditory orifice. *Kadaṁbamukula nyāya* indicates the simultaneous blossoming forth of the buds in a kadamba tree when a cloud thunders in the sky.

82. In this cognition, the eye is in contact with the *spot of earth* of which *the negation of jar* is the attribute, and, therefore, here, the connection is, *contact with the attribute.*

83. Hence, here, the connection is, *contact with the qualified.* Both these cognitions though differing in form, are identical in meaning. They are conjointly expressed in the Text as *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya bhāva.* With the contact of the eye with the spot of earth in the above two cognitions, the negation either on account of its possessing the property of *Viśeṣya* or of *Viśeṣaṇa* becomes perceived on the spot of earth. The relation between the spot of earth and the negation of pot is no other than *Viśeṣaṇa-Viśeṣya bhāva.*

84. The Nyāya School of thought does not accept the necessity of postulating a distinct source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) to cognise *absence* (*abhāva*) as this could as well be achieved by perception in which the operative causal relation is between the *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya.* The absence is apprehended on the same locus (*adhikaraṇa*). And this perception of *abhāva* of a certain thing on a certain locus, is not to be taken to be merely due to the defect of the eye or due to insufficient light; but it ought to be preceded by *Tarka,* that is to say, by the thought like the following: *if a pot were on the ground, I should be seeing it right now; but I do not see the pot.* This *Tarka* brings in the awareness of the absence of the pot on the ground. It is in order to emphasize such effective perception of absence that Annaṁbhaṭṭa mentions in his Dīpikā about the existence of the *pratiyogī* (counter entity) of the negation of apprehension.

This further proves that non-perception is necessary for the immediate apprehension of *abhāva;* here, non-apprehension is an auxiliary condition (*sahakārī*) of the eye which alone perceives the *ghaṭābhāva* on a spot of earth. Therefore, admission of a separate pramāṇa like *anupalabdhi* is redundant when the same can be had by *pratyakṣa* — this is the Naiyāyika stand-point.

85. Inference is treated after direct perception inasmuch as the former depends on the latter.

86. By raising the above objection the opponent means to say that in *saṁśayottara pratyakṣa* a kind of intermediary *parāmarśa* operates inasmuch as perceptual experience arises following consideration of certain particulars of the object, thus causing the defect of *ativyāpti* in *saṁśayottara pratyakṣa.* This defect in the definition is avoided by prefixing *parāmarśa* with the adjunct, *pakṣatāsahakṛta.*

87. In *saṁśayottara pratyakṣa,* there is no *pakṣatājanyatva,* because, man and his hands etc are perceived simultaneously, and as such, no *sādhya* is left to be ascertained, and also there could be no desire to infer. Thus the defect of *ativyāpti* is removed. Again, if it is merely said, *parāmarśājanyam anumitiḥ,* the defect of *ativyāpti* occurs in *parāmarśadhvaṁsa,* as it is also *parāmarśajanya.* To avoid this, the term *jñānam* is inserted in the definition.

88. When a particular variety of gem capable of neutralising the burning power of fire is placed near fire, the gem obstructs the burning power of fire; but, if some stimulator gem is placed near the counter-acting agent, it effectively neutralises the latter. Here, the absence of a desire to establish a thing — *siṣādhayiṣāvirahatva* is given as a delimiting adjunct - *viśeṣaṇa* to indubious knowledge - *siddhi,* and not to the absence of indubious knowledge. The absence of stimulating-gem is given as a delimiting adjunct to the obstructor-gem. When the obstructor-gem is present in association with the stimulator-gem, there will be the power of burning in fire even like power of burning remaining intact when there is the absence of obstructor-gem in association with the absence of stimulator-gem. Similarly, of the two, viz, (1) indubious knowledge, and, (2) a desire to predicate a thing in the *pakṣa,* the former is the obstructing agent - *pratibandhaka,* while the latter is the stimulator agent - *uttejaka.* Inferential knowledge is brought about consequent on the absence of indubious knowledge in association with the absence of a desire to establish or predicate a thing.

89. Take for example, smoke and fire. The said *vyāpti* becomes applicable to smoke. What could be the negation that co-exists in the mountain with the reason, smoke? It can be the negation of pot, but not the negation of fire, because where there is smoke, there is also fire. Fire thus cannot become the counter-entity of

its negation. With that fire (which does not become the counter-entity to its own negation that co-exists with reason, smoke) there is co-existence to smoke. So, the said *vyāpti* is in the smoke).

90. When fire is intended to be established on a hill because of the presence of smoke, it is a valid inference. Here, fire is the *sādhya,* (probandum) hill is the *pakṣa* (or subject) and smoke is the *hetu* or *sādhana* (probans). The perception of smoke on the hill leads to the inference of existence of fire on the hill, that is to say, on the perception of *hetu* on the *pakṣa,* the *sādhya* is inferred. But, this perception of hetu (smoke) on the *pakṣa* (hill) leads to correct inference of the existence of *sādhya* (fire) *only if* the *hetu* in question is invariably associated with *sādhya* everywhere. So, it is not the mere presence of smoke by itself that leads to inference; it must be *smoke as qualified by the invariable association with fire.* This relation is *vyāpti* and the smoke is the *vyāpya,* ie that which is characterised by *vyāpti.* So, *pakṣadharmatā* (the special feature of the *pakṣa* - hill) is defined as the *presence of vyāpya (smoke) in the pakṣa (hill).*

91. The opponent is questioning the sustainability of the statement: one having repeatedly seen in the hearth etc the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, arrives at the certain generalization: *wherever there is smoke there is fire.* This statement is wrong inasmuch as there exists a deviation in things like *vajra.* In the inference, *wherever there is pārthivatva there is lohalekhyatva', pārthivatva* is *vyāpya* and *lohalekhyatva* is *vyāpaka.* This *vyāpti jñāna* is gained by repeated perception of their co-existence. But this *vyāptijñāna,* gained by repeated observation, is defective inasmuch as it is vitiated from *vyabhicāra doṣa,* ie presence of *hetu* in a place where there is the absence of *sādhya.* Here, in *vajra, pārthivatva,* is present but *lohalekhyatva* is absent, ie *hetu* is present where there is the absence of *sādhya.* Therefore, *bhūyodarśana* cannot be accepted as the right means to establish *vyāpti.*

92. The meaning is this: the suspicion, *why not there be smoke, though no fire exists?* is untenable since it breaks the law of relation of cause and effect between fire and smoke. Smoke is the effect of fire. So, there is *kāryakāraṇa bhāva* between smoke and fire. Therefore, entertainment of *vyabhicāra śaṅkā* in a context like this is untenable.

93. Consideration of the mark - *liṅgaparāmarśa* - (in the Text) means *tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa,* that is to say, the consideration derived from the *third mark.* Then, naturally the question arises as to the consideration of the other *two marks.* The *knowledge of smoke in hearth* is the *first* consideration of the mark. The knowledge of *smoke in the subject is the second* consideration of the mark. The knowledge

this mountain is smoky pervaded by fire is the *third* consideration of the mark. This is also known as the *consideration of the third mark - tṛtīyaliṅga-parāmarśa.* The argument is that by having two knowledges (1) of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire and (2) (by the knowledge) of the existence of smoke in the mountain one can have the inferential knowledge: *the mountain is fiery.* Thus the need for the assumption of the consideration of the third mark (*viśiṣṭa*) to infer fire in a mountain is only a superfluity.

94. On observation of sooted ceilings etc one can easily infer the existence of smoke, as without smoke there would be no soot, that is to say, soot is the effect of smoke. Through this inference of smoke, one infers the past existence of fire like, *mahānasaḥ atīta vahnimān, atīta dhūmavatvāt* ie there existed fire in the hearth, because of the existence of smoke, by applying *vyāptijñāna, where smoke will be, there will also be fire.* In this inference no *liṅga* is perceived to exist. We first infer the existence of *liṅga* by observing the soot, and then, through the help of this *liṅgajñāna,* the existence of fire is inferred. If *liṅga* is accepted as the special cause of inference, then no inferential knowledge could arise in the absence of *liṅga.* But here is an example where, even in the absence of *liṅga* inferential knowledge arises by means of *lingajñāna.* Therefore, *liṅga* is not the special cause. This is with reference to the *hetu existed in the past.* Again, a man, from within his room, hears peals of thunder. On hearing the thunder roar, he infers the existence of clouds in the sky though he does not actually perceive them, and proceeds to infer that there would be rain. Here is a case wherein the inferential knowledge arises without actually seeing the *liṅga.* It is only the *knowledge* of the *liṅga* that helps to infer the future event of having rain. Thus, *liṅga* is not and cannot, for the above mentioned reasons, be the special cause of inferential knowledge as without the *liṅga* also *anumiti* arises.

95. To explain: potter's stick is the special cause in the production of a pot, because it has *vyāpāra.* Here the rotation of the potter's wheel produced by the stick is the *operation,* and this is born of that, and this *vyāpāra* produces the pot which is to be produced by the stick. That is to say, *stick is the special cause of jar* by means of its *vyāpāra.* Similarly, *vyāptijñāna* is the special cause of inferential knowledge because it has subsumptive reflection as its *vyāpāra.* Here subsumptive reflection is the *vyāpāra* of *vyāptijñāna* because it is produced by the latter, and *parāmarśa* produces inferential knowledge which is to be produced by *vyāptijñāna,* ie *vyāpti jñāna* produces *parāmarśa,* which in turn becomes the cause of *anumiti. Vyāptijñāna* thus becomes the cause of *anumiti* by means of its *vyāpāra,* viz, *parāmarśa.*

96. *Vyāpti* is twofold: positive concomitance and negative concomitance. The concomitance between the thing to be proved and the reason is the positive concomitance. The concomitance between the absence of the thing to be proved and the absence of the reason, like: 'where there is the absence of the thing to be proved there is also the absence of reason' is negative concomitance. The reason having both these concomitances is the positive-negative reason, eg smoke. The reason having only positive concomitance is the purely positive reason, eg *a jar is nameable because of knowability.* The reason having only negative concomitance is purely negative reason, eg *earth differs from everything else because it possesses smell.* This is stated next by the Text.

97. The idea is this: The inference *pṛthivī itarabhedavatī* is characterized by the *sādhya*. If the *sādhya* itself is unknown, how can such a knowledge arise? For instance, one cannot know a *daṇḍin* unless one first knows what a *daṇḍa* is.

98. The thirteen bhedas are: *8 dravyas* (other than the *dravya* where the itarabheda resides,) *guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya.* When predicated severally, the difficulty that would arise if *itarabheda* is taken as a unit, would not arise; what is predicated is that the collection of thirteen *itarabhedas* are in earth and these thirteen *itarabhedas* are predicated severally. The fourteen *bhāvapadārthas* imply thirteen reciprocal differences (*itarabhedas*) inasmuch as any one of them is the *anuyogin* (seat) of these *itarabhedas.* If water is taken as the subject, in it reside the thirteen *bhedas* except *jalabheda;* similarly, when light is taken as the subject, in it reside thirteen bhedas except *tejobheda.* Thus *jalabheda* is known in *tejas* and *tejobheda* is known in *jala.* In this way all the 14 *bhedas* are *prasiddha* severally and not as a unit.

99. In the hearth the existence of fire is ascertained when we say, *mahānasam vahnimat.* This forms the *sapakṣa* for the inference in which smoke is the reason.

100. The absolute non-existence of fire in a tank is known for certain when we say, *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ.* This constitutes the *vipakṣa* for the inference in which smoke is the reason.

101. In this argument *fire* is the thing to be proved. *Knowability* is the reason. But the reason is found to exist in a lake *also* where there is the absence of *fire.* Thus, reason exists in a place where there *is* the thing to be proved, it also exists in a place where there is *the absence* of the thing to be proved. This obstructs the knowledge of the invariable concomitance: *wherever there is knowability there is also fire.* So, this reason is defective and is known as the *common strayer reason.*

102. In the argument: *sound is eternal because of soundness, eternality*

is the thing to be proved and *soundness* is the reason. This reason does not exist in its similar instances like space etc nor in its contrary instances like pot etc.

103. The difference between the uncommon strayer and non-exclusive strayer reasons is that in the former both similar and contrary instances are available though the reason is not present in *pakṣa;* in the latter both similar and contrary instances are absent. The term *sarva* is so wide and inclusive that nothing is left to serve as a similar or contrary instance.

104. In the inference, *sound is eternal, because it is produced, sound* is the *pakṣa, eternality* is the thing to be proved, and *producibility* is the reason. But producibility never co-exists with eternality as it is invariably concomitant with non-eternality. Thus, when a reason which is offered to establish a thing to be proved actually serves to prove the very negation of it, we call it a *viruddha hetu.*

105. In the counter argument, *sound is non-eternal, because it is product, like a jar, producibility* is the counter reason that proves the negation of eternality of sound which is the thing to be proved in the earlier inference. So, in the argument, *sound is eternal because it is audible,* the reason *audibility* admits of another reason capable of disproving the *sādhya* established by it. So, it is a defective reason.

106. A lot of controversy has arisen as to what is primarily signified by the *śakti* of a *pada,* viz, whether the *śakti* of a word signifies (a) the *jāti* only; or, (b) the *jātiviśiṣṭa vyakti,* or (c) the *ākṛti* (the form)? According to the *Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas* and the Advaita Vedāntins, the *śakti* of a word denotes only the generic attribute. That is to say, the *śakti* in the word *cow* signifies the generic attribute of *cow,* viz *gotva.* If the word were to mean an individual, then, it must have as many *śaktis* as there are individuals meant by that word. Thus the *śakti* of a word would be infinite corresponding to the infinity of individuals. This, however, militates against the general law of *lāghava* (parsimony) that one word should have only one primary meaning. Also, without the knowledge of the class-attribute the apprehension of an individual is impossible. The apprehension of an individual arises along with the knowledge of the corresponding generic attribute, as they are inseparable. Thus the primary meaning of a word is with regard to the *genera* and the apprehension of the individuals takes place subsequently by means of *arthāpatti pramāṇa.* The stock example cited is: *daṇḍīpuruṣaḥ - a man with a stick.* It is a well-known maxim that without the prior knowledge of the attribute, the knowledge of the individual as determined by that attribute, is impossible. Unless one has knowledge of the *stick,* one cannot arrive at the knowledge, *man with a stick.* This proposition obviously

leads one to admit the need of *arthāpatti pramāṇa* in order to apprehend an individual as determined by a particular adjunct. Similarly, the *śakti* in the word cow *signifies* only the *generic attribute* and it is only by means of *arthāpatti* that one apprehends the *vyakti* as possessing the generic attribute, *cowness*. But this argument that the significative potency in a word signifies only the generic attribute, is rejected by the Naiyāyikas. The *śakti* in the word *cow* does not, by itself, signify only the generic attribute inasmuch as the generic attribute is non-distinguishable from the individual. Moreover, it is also obvious that the generic attribute can be apprehended only through the apprehension of an individual. Also, when a man is told, *bring a cow,* he does not bring the *jāti* inherent in the cow, but fetches the individual possessing the *jāti*. Thus, the word *cow* helps him to apprehend the cow in its totality in which the ideas of *jāti,* the *vyakti* and the *ākṛti* (form) merge to give a composite concept of the object. That is to say, the *śakti* of a word signifies all the three, viz it suggests the form, denotes the individual, and connotes the genus. Thus, say the Naiyāyikas, acceptance of a distinct pramāṇa like *arthāpatti* to apprehend an individual is only superfluous.

107. *Vṛddha vyavahāra* or the usage of elders is one of the means to understand the meaning of a word. When the first elder commands the second elder to fetch a cow, the second elder goes out and brings in a cow. The boy who observes all this, arrives at the following syllogism: *Every activity is preceded by an understanding of what one is called upon to do; because it spurs one to activity; even like my own activity; this is an activity; therefore, it must have been preceded by an apprehension of what one is called upon to do — yā yā pravṛttiḥ sā sā tatkartavyatā-jñānapūrvikā; pravṛttitvāt; matpravṛttivat; iyam pravṛttiḥ; tasmāt tat kartavyatājñānapūrvikā.* Thus reflecting, the boy concludes that the act of bringing the cow is the result of the knowledge that precedes the action. This knowledge that prompted the second elder to the activity of bringing the cow arises only on the hearing of the command from the first elder because in the absence of such a command no activity was observed. The boy comes to the above conclusion through the following syllogism: *gavānayanakartavyatājñānam gāmānayeti vākyaśravaṇajanyam; vākyaśravaṇānantaribhāvitvāt; yo yadanantarabhāvī saḥ tajjanyaḥ, yathā mṛdanantarabhāvī ghaṭaḥ mṛjjanyataḥ; pravṛttijanakajnānañca vākyaśravaṇajanyam; tasmāt vākyajñānajanyam - the knowledge that one is called upon to fetch the cow is the result of the hearing of the sentence, 'bring a cow:' because of its dawning subsequent to the hearing of the sentence; whichever is produced being preceded by something that is produced by that, even as a jar which follows clay is the product of clay, the knowledge that prompts one to activity is born of the*

hearing of the sentence; therefore, inasmuch as the knowledge follows the hearing of the sentence, the sentence produces the knowledge. Reasoning thus, the boy comes to know that (a) the sentence from the first elder produces the knowledge in the second elder that he is called upon to do a certain activity and (b) that knowledge prompts him to activity. To put it in other words, *the sentence produces the knowledge, and the knowledge prompts man to activity.* But the boy has not yet understood exactly the meaning of words like *cow* and *horse.* Here by means of *āvāpa* and *udvāpa* he comes to know the particular significance of the corresponding words found in a sentence. *Āvāpa* is *padāntara prakṣepaḥ;* ie the substitution of a fresh word in a sentence, and *udvāpa* is the elimination of an already existing word in a sentence. In the sentence *gāmānaya,* the word *go* is substituted by a fresh word *aśva.* Thus substituted the sentence reads, *aśvamānaya.* The inquistive boy who is ignorant of the meanings of the words in the sentence, observes the second person bringing a cow on hearing from the first person *gāmānaya.* Though the boy concludes from this that the proposition set forth by the first elder has given rise to the cognition which prompted the second elder to fetch the cow, he is unable to apprehend the exact meaning of the words *gām* and *ānaya* in the sentence. Then he again hears the first elder commanding the second elder: *aśvamānaya.* The boy observes the second elder fetching the horse on hearing the sentence. The boy compares the words in the above two sentences and observes the corresponding activity of the second elder, and arrives at the conclusion that the word *ānāya* which is common in both the sentences, indicates, *the activity of bringing* and the words *go* and *aśva* indicate *cow* and *horse* respectively.

108. Now, the above explanation forces us to admit that only those statements having copula in *liṅ, loṭ* and *tavya pratyayas,* ie verbs with potential, imperative and mandatory suffixes, motivate one to activity and thereby convey a meaning which *inter alia* means that statements which do not motivate one to activity do not also convey any meaning. This leads one to the conclusion that only such statements as motivate one to an activity are authoritative sentences and statements which are without any verb and consequently are not capable of prompting one to activity, are unauthoritative statements, lacking the force or power to convey any meaning. To refute this contention, Annaṁbhaṭṭa quotes the statement: in *Kāñci....* as an example. Statements like these only restate an already established fact and are not made with a view to motivate one to activity; still they convey meanings. So, the argument that only such statements as are having copula in *liṅ, loṭ* and *tavya* suffixes are authoritative sentences, cannot be sustained. Also, Annaṁbhaṭṭa does not assert

that the usage by the elders - *vṛddha vyavahāra,* alone is the means to apprehend the meaning of a word. He also quotes another example: *A bee in a bloomed lotus.* Here, the meaning of a hitherto unknown word *madhukara* is apprehended by virtue of its contiguity to the well-known word *vikasita padma.* The various means of apprehending the significative potency of a word are: grammar, comparison, dictionary, statement of a trustworthy person; usage of elders, supplementary statements, commentary, and contiguity of a well-known word—*śaktigrāho vyākaraṇa-upamāna-kośa-āptavākyāt- vyavahārātaśca; vākyasya śeṣāt-vivṛteḥ-vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ.*

109. In the example of *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ, pravāha* is taken as the *vācyārtha* and the *tīra* as *lakṣyārtha.* Similarly, why not interpret the two meanings of *saindhava,* viz, *salt* and *horse,* as *vācyārtha* and *lakṣyārtha* respectively? This doubt is cleared by Annaṁbhaṭṭa in his *Dīpikā* in which he says: 'On account of the absence of relationship, ie on account of non-existence of any relation between the two meanings of the word *saindhava.* Only that which has connection or relation with *vācyārtha* can be *lakṣyārtha.* In the example of *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ,* bank is connected to *current* which is the *vācyārtha* of *gaṅgā;* but it cannot be said that the two meanings of *saindhava,* viz, *salt* and *horse,* are related to each other in any sense. Here both the meanings must be admitted as *vācyārtha* only, viz, the word *saindhava* has two *śaktis,* one signifying *salt* and another signifying *horse.* So too are the words like *Hari* having many *śaktis.*

110. The statement: *mañcāḥ krośanti,* when taken in its primary meaning, means, *Cots are crying* which is absurd. This absurdity can be avoided only through the implied meaning which the statement yields through its association with the primary meaning. By implication, the above statement means: *The child on the cot is crying.* Here, the word *mañca* implies the meaning of the *child* by virtue of its relation with the *cot.* The relation here between the cot and the child is *ādhārādheyabhāva.* ie the relation between the *supported* and the support. Thus, in order to get a sensible meaning, the primary meaning has to be abandoned entirely and substituted by a totally different meaning. This method of discarding the primary meaning and substituting it by implied meaning is known as *jahallakṣaṇā.*

In the example: *chatriṇaḥ gacchanti* - men holding umbrellas are going, the primary meaning is in the *doership* consisting in the activity of *going* in those who are holding umbrellas. Since the above sentence is employed with the intention of including also those who accompany them without umbrellas, the primary meaning implies also men without umbrellas. Thus, when a sentence conveys something more than what its bare primary meaning conveys, it is known as *ajahallakṣaṇā.*

The third variety is *jahadajahallakṣaṇā.* The great Vedic dictum:

Tattvamasi is the example cited. The word, *Tat* in the dictum signifies Consciousness conditioned by *Māyā* (illusory power) and takes on such attributes as omniscience, omnipotence etc. The word *tvam* signifies the Consciousness conditioned by the limitations of *aṅtaḥkaraṇa* or *avidyā* and takes on such attributes as partial omniscience, partial omnipotence etc. Here, the attributes ascribed to Consciousness signified by *Tat* and *Tvam* are mutually contradictory and arise consequent upon the conditioning adjuncts of *Māyā* in the case of *Tat* and *avidyā* or *aṅtaḥkaraṇa* in the case of *Tvam*. The real sense of the dictum *Tattvamasi* is that *Tat* is the same as *Tvam* but this sense of Oneness cannot be had as long as the above terms are qualified by contradictory attributes arising on account of the respective limiting adjuncts. When these limiting adjuncts are removed, the dictum conveys its real sense, viz, oneness of Consciousness signified by *Tat* and *Tvam* in *Tattvamasi*. This method of abandoning a certain part while retaining another part is known as *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* or *bhāgatyāga lakṣaṇā*.

111. It cannot be said that the intended sense in statements like *agnirmāṇavakaḥ* is obtained by *lakṣaṇā* since there exists no direct relation between the student and the fire. The statement really intends to convey the sense that the student is as brilliant and powerful as fire itself. Here, the relation is between the qualities found in the student and the qualities inherent in fire. This meaning cannot be had through *lakṣaṇā* as here there is no *śakyasaṁbaṅdha*. Therefore, the *vṛtti* through which this intended meaning is got must be a distinct one, and is known as *gauṇī vṛtti*. But the Naiyāyikas argue that *gauṇī vṛtti* is only a form of *lakṣaṇā* since here too *śakyasaṁbaṅdha* can be established, though indirectly. The quality found in the student is similar to the quality inherent in fire. Thus, Naiyāyikas say, there is no need to accept *gauṇī vṛttii* as distinct from *lakṣaṇā* to explain the above.

The rhetoricians recognise yet another kind of *vṛtti*, viz, *vyañjanā* or the suggestive mode of expression. This is resorted to when the intended sense of the word cannot be had either through *abhidhā* or through *lakṣaṇā*. For example, the statement, *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* may also be interpreted to mean *the cowherd's hamlet is cool and sacred*. This meaning cannot be had either through *abhidhā* or through *lakṣaṇā*. So, the *Alaṁkārikas* say that the mode through which this suggested meaning is obtained is known as *vyañjanā*.

112. Annaṁbhaṭṭa says in his *Dīpikā* that implication becomes necessary only when the true intention of a person is not revealed by the primary meaning of the sentence. It is a common experience that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is essential to have a correct understanding of the sentence. That is why *tātparya*

jñāna is said to be one of the causal requisites that help the comprehension of the correct sense of the statement. For example, the statement: *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām - protect the curd from crows,* implies that all birds and creatures must be kept off the curd. Here the word *kākebhyo* is only a suggestion implying every other bird and creature from which the curd is to be protected. Thus in order to get at the exact intention of the speaker one has to go in for the implied meaning. In certain cases the intended sense springs from the context in which the sentence is used, eg the statement, *saindhavamānaya.* The word *saindhava* signifies two objects, viz, *salt* and *horse.* Therefore, when one is told to bring *saiṅdhava* one will be at a loss to understand whether the speaker intends *horse* or *salt.* That can be ascertained only if one knows the intention of the speaker. In some places, the intention of the speaker is understood by supplying a particular word conveying the appropriate meaning to make the meaning sensible, eg when one says, *dvāram - door;* another word *pidhehi - close* must be supplied to get at the exact intention of the speaker; because, the meaning of the sentence springs from *consistency among the words* in the sentence. If the word *pidhedhi* is not supplied to *dvāram* to complete the sentence, there will be the absence of consistency between the words in the sentence and consequently the intention of the speaker to close the door will not be clear.

113. The etymological meaning of *paṅkaja* is anything born of mud. So, if we take *paṅkaja* in its *yoga* mode, ie in the purely etymological sense, then it may mean many things that are born in mud, viz, lotus, lily, etc. Therefore, to restrict the meaning of *paṅkaja* to lotus only, the *rūḍhi* mode must be applied to the word, that is to say, the word *paṅkaja* signifies, through unbroken tradition, *lotus only* and nothing else.

114. According to *Naiyāyikas* a *vākya* is a combination of *padas,* and *vākyārtha* is obtained by the coherent construction of the meanings of words in the sentence. They say that the coherent construction of the meanings which are already got from the *words* is *vākyārtha,* that is to say, first the words give only unconnected meanings, and it is only after this, that the connection among the meanings is understood. Thus the meaning of the sentence as a whole is merely the synthetic construction or *anwaya,* of the meanings of the constituent words of the sentence. This is known as *abhihitānvaya vāda.* Thus, when we hear the sentence, *gām ānaya,* first, the meanings of the constituent words are comprehended one after another. Thus, by *gām* is meant the *cow* as the *object* and by *ānaya* is meant the activity of *bringing.* This is first apprehended. Then, by synthesizing the meanings of these words, the synthetic meaning of the whole sentence, viz,

gokarmakam ānayanam - the activity of bringing of an object known as cow or, *ānayana karma gauḥ,* cow is the object of the activity of fetching, takes place. Thus there is no need to accept significative potency in construction also. Annaṁbhaṭṭa further tells us that the different meanings expressed successively by the words are synthesised by means of memory. Thus when we come to the last word, the memory of the meanings of the preceding words helps us in synthesising them with the meaning of the last word, thus enabling us to construe a coherent meaning of the whole sentence. This theory is accepted by the Vedānta and the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṁsā systems also. Yet another theory known as *anvitābhidhāna vāda* is propounded by the followers of Prabhākara, which theory holds that every word in a sentence conveys the meaning connected with the meanings of other words in the sentence in a syntactic manner. Thus when a *bāla* hears the sentence, *gām ānaya,* the syntactic meaning of the whole sentence is first apprehended by the observance of *vṛddha vyavahāra.* It is only after this that the *bāla* tries to know the meanings of particular words through the process of *āvāpa* and *udvāpa.*

A sentence means an action; every sentence revolves round a *copula,* without which a sentence never conveys any meaning. Thus a verb, either mandatory or prohibitory, is the central unit of a sentence. All the other words give a sensible meaning only when they are related to the *copula.* Thus in the sentence, *gām ānaya, go* has to be understood as the object of the verb *ānaya.* Only thus connected to the verb, the sentence conveys the sense, *bring a cow.* Thus, in a sentence, first there is *anvaya* with one another in a syntactic manner and then the (*abhidhāna*) expression of the meaning of the whole sentence occurs.

115. In this passage Annaṁbhaṭṭa enumerates, defines and explains the three conditions recognised in the Nyāya School of thought as necessary for the understanding of a statement — *Śābda bodha.*

116. Above is given, in brief, the accessories necessary to arrive at valid verbal testimony. These accessories are three as mentioned above, with *tātparyajñāna,* ie the knowledge of the intention of the speaker, as the fourth one. What is *ākāṅkṣā?* To put it simply, it is the eagerness that is observed in one to know the remaining part of the sentence when one part of the sentence is known. Annaṁbhaṭṭa says in his *Dīpikā* that *ākāṅkṣā* consists in the inability of a word to convey complete meaning of the sentence in the absence of some other word. The Text gives an example of a simple statement like *ghaṭaḥ.* When one says just *ghaṭaḥ,* the curiosity to know further details like: *what about the jar* arises. This is satisfied only when we supply words like *bring* etc. This alone completes the sentence. This desire to know is *ākāṅkṣā.* Well, it is seen that even without

a desire to know, one may understand the sense of a statement. Therefore, *ākāṅkṣā,* signifies an awareness of the relation between words in a sentence, eg in the sentence, *bring a jar,* the term *bring* is not able to produce, without the term Jar, the awareness of the relation between those two words in the sentence. This inability in the word to produce *anubhava* or apprehension between the two words in the absence of the other word is *ākāṅkṣā* as the *Dīpikā* puts it. As an example, Annaṁbhaṭṭa cites collection of some terms such as, *a cow, a horse, a man, an elephant* etc. These do not bring about any understanding of the sense of the statement inasmuch as there is the absence of *ākāṅkṣā* in them.

The second accessory is *yogyatā,* compatibility. A sentence is said to possess *yogyatā* with another when the intended sense of the sentence conveyed by the two words are not inconsistent in any way. The sentence: *agninā siñcet* lacks compatibility on account of the inconsistency found in the sentence. The action of sprinkling is inconsistent with the notion of fire, and the construction of a syntactic meaning from such a sentence as this which lacks compatibility is impossible. Therefore, *yogyatā* is one of the accessories necessary for rendering the sentence authoritative.

The third accessory is *sannidhi,* juxtaposition. A sentence becomes authoritative only when the words are uttered in quick succession. If one says *gām* and utters *ānaya* after a long interval, the impression made by each word does not remain fresh till the combination of the words in the sentence is effected. Thus, to ensure the unbroken apprehension of the meanings of all the words, they should be uttered in quick succession. Secondly, if the gap between the utterances of words is too long, they cannot form a sentence either. Therefore, juxtaposition of words by means of utterance in quick succession is one of the essential accessories to render a sentence authoritative.

The fourth is *tātparyajñāna,* the knowledge of the intention of the speaker. In the statement *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām,* (protect the curd from the crows), the intended meaning of the speaker is to protect the curd from all animals and birds from being eaten and not merely from crows. Thus, a knowledge of the intention of the speaker is one of the accessories to render a sentence authoritative.

117. To elaborate: *gatva* is common in all *ga-letters* due to which a notion of identity between them rises - like the cognition: *This is that flame,* arising on account of the similarity of subsequent flames with the preceding ones, which similarity depends on the sameness of class. Also, even if the *letters* are accepted as *eternal,* the Vedas cannot be considered eternal on account of the non-eternality of the sentences in which is found a particular order of arrangement

of letters and words. Therefore, the Vedas are the utterances of *Īśvara.*

The Vedas are the collection of sentences that are set in a particular order. This setting of sentences in a particular order as found in the Vedas must have been effected by some one. As no human origin is possible in the case of works of such transcendental wisdom they must be the work of God Himself. Thus the Vedas are the compositions of Īśvara. They have thus a beginning and all get destroyed at the end of a *kalpa.* Vedas are, thus, non-eternal.

118. The Naiyāyikas hold that the Vedas are *pauruṣeya.* They establish this through the inference given in the *Dīpikā:*

(i) Veda is the *pakṣa; pauruṣeyatva* is the *sādhya; vākyasamūhatvāt* is the *sādhana; Mahābhāratādi* - is the example. The Vedas are the collections of sentences; therefore, he argues, the authorship also must be found in them keeping in view the maxim that wherever there is *sādhana* there must also be the *sādhya.* Therefore, the Vedas are *pauruṣeya,* ie utterances by Īśvara. This argument is refuted by the Mīmāṁsakas. They argue that the above *anumāna* is defective as it is vitiated by the *smaryamāṇakartṛkatva upādhi;* here, *smaryamāṇakartṛkatva* is the *upādhi* as it is pervasive of the *sādhya* while being non-pervasive of the *sādhana.* To explain: wherever there is *pauruṣeyatva,* as in *Mahābhārata* etc there is also *smaryamāṇakartṛkatva;* because, *Vedavyāsa* is remembered as the author of the *Mahābhārata.* This is *sādhya vyāpakatā.* Wherever there is vākyasamūhatva there is not found *smaryamāṇakartṛkatva;* this is *sādhana avyāpakatā.* Though both *vākyasamūhatva* and *smaryamāṇakartṛkatva* are found in Mahābhārata etc in the Vedas is found only *vākyasamūhatva* and not *smaryamāṇakartṛkatva.* Thus, in the Vedas is found *sādhya vyāpakatā* as well as *sādhana avyāpakatā.* So, the above inference is vitiated by the *smaryamāṇakartṛkatva upādhi,* and, as such, the inferential knowledge arrrived at by such an inference cannot be valid. Naiyāyikas refute this by pointing out that *smaryamāṇakartṛkatva* is found in the Vedas also since sages like Gautama and others remembered that the Vedas were the compositions of Īśvara.

(ii) The doctrine of the eternality of letters put forward by the Mīmāṁsakas is also refuted by the Naiyāyikas. The reminiscence *this letter ga is verily that* on the basis of which the theory of the eternality of letters is established, takes place on account of the knowledge of *similarity of class. Letter ga* is infinite, it being pronounced by an infinite number of persons an infinite number of times, and each letter is destroyed the very next moment of its utterance. But the *genus gatva* that is the class attribute of all *gakāra-s* that are uttered and destroyed, is the same. It is on account of the recognition of this common class *gatva* that the reminiscence *this letter ga is verily*

that letter ga arises. In illustration, the *Dīpikā* mentions *Dīpajvālā*. There is nothing like a continuous flame; nor does one ever take a second dip in the same current of water. But the perception of unbroken continuity of similar class of objects gives birth to the knowledge of a continuous flame in case of a flame, and river, in case of flowing current of water.

(iii) Naiyāyikas hold that *smṛtis* are authoritative since they are based on the Vedic Texts. Then what about those *Smṛtis* whose sources are not found in the Vedas? The *Dīpikā* answers this by saying that the Vedic Texts which provide authority to the *Smṛtis* but are untraceable now, existed no doubt, but in course of time some branches of the Vedas became obsolete owing to the discontinuance of their study by the later generations. These forgotten sections of the Vedas might well have been the sources of the *Smṛtis* for which no Vedic authority can be cited now. Therefore, *Smṛtis* do not become unauthoritative simply because Vedic sources are not traceable now. In such cases their existence must be inferred as having existed and known to Manu etc when they composed their *Smṛti* Texts. Of the three types of *Smṛtis*, viz, (a) that which follows the *Śruti*, *śrutyanusārī*, (b) that for which Vedic Source is untraceable, and (c) that which is contrary to the Śruti, *Śruti-viruddha*, the first two varieties are authoritative; the first variety being in assonance with the Vedic Text; and the second variety deriving its authority from inferred Vedic Text. The third variety is rejected forthwith as unauthoritative as it is contrary to the teachings of the Vedas.

119. Vaiśeṣikas admit only two *pramāṇas*, viz, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. They include *śabdapramāṇa* in *anumānapramāṇa*. Annaṁbaṭṭa gives the argument of the Vaiśeṣikas in his *Dīpikā* in the form of an *anumāna* in which *the words* or *the meanings of words* in a sentence form the *pakṣa swasmāritārthasaṁsargavanti* - *the connection of meanings remembered through those words* - forms the *sādhya; ākāṅgsādimatpadakadambakatwāt* - *on account of group of words possessing such accessories as verbal expectancy etc* forms the reason; *madvākyavat* - *even like my sentence* - forms the example. Putting forward this inference, the Vaiśeṣikas argue that while the valid verbal knowledge can be had through inference, taking recourse to a distinct *pramāṇa* like *śabda* to arrive at a valid verbal knowledge is superfluous. But the Naiyayikas refute this argument by pointing out dissimilar apperceptions that arise respectively through *inference* and *word*. If the argument of the Vaiśeṣikas that *śābdajñāna* also arises through *anumāna*, is accepted, then the apperception that arises through *anumāna* must be: *imamartham anuminomi* - *I know this by inference*. But this is dissimilar to the apperception that rises among men, for, it is observed that one gets the notion, *śabdat amumartham pratyemi* -

this I know through word, whenever *śābdajñānā* is gained. Therefore, *śabda* is a distinct means of proof.

120. Before concluding the section on *buddhi,* Annaṁbhaṭṭa deals with the problem of epistemology. Every school of thought has to deal with the moot epistemological question: *How do we know?* The Naiyāyikas answer this question by maintaining four *pramāṇās* as the instrumental causes of valid knowledge, viz, *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna* and *śabda.* Having dealt with these in his Text and *Dīpikā* in some detail, Annaṁbhaṭṭa now proceeds to discuss the validity and non-validity of knowledge gained by these causal apparatuses.

How can it be said that the knowledge got through any of the above mentioned four *pramāṇās* is not a misapprehension? It is observed sometimes that, on further verification, the knowledge hitherto held to be valid proves to be erroneous. Then, how to ensure that a certain knowledge is *yathārtha* or *ayathārtha?* This problem is discussed by Annambhaṭṭa in his *Dīpikā.* He first states the view-point of the Mīmāṁsakas in this connection before coming to refute their arguments and to establish the Naiyāyika view-point.

121. An objection is raised that the classification of erroneous apprehension is inexhaustive inasmuch as dream also could be included in the category of erroneous apprehension since it is a state other than recollection and never a true reproduction of any experience in the waking state; nor can it be identified with memory cognition; as such it falls under *anubhava,* and is quite different from the above three varieties. Why not, then, include dream as the fourth one?

Annaṁbhaṭṭa rejects this argument though he has no objection to dream being known as a form of erroneous *anubhava;* he calls it *mānasa* (*viparyaya*) ie it is an illusion of the mind (*not* an illusion of the outer senses as sensory illusion is due to some sense-affectation).

122. *Sukha* is the seventeenth quality and is known to be of four kinds: (a) *vaiṣayika* exemplified by sensual pleasure arising from direct contact of the senses with their respective objects; (b) *mānorathika* mental delight, that arises from contemplation on desirable or charming things; (c) *ābhyāsika,* Joy that springs from habitual exercises of certain kinds, like, pleasure derived from habitual practice of *yogic āsanas* etc; (d) *ābhimānika,* pleasure derived from wielding of power, pelf etc.

123. Conjunction and some other qualities like numericals of two etc also reside in many, but they are *not eternal.* So, the term *nitya* in the definition of generality (or universal) excludes them. The atom is eternal and resides in many; but it is not *one residing in many,* so, by the term *aṇekā* in the definition, *ativyāpti* in atom is avoided. The absolute negation is however eternal, one, and resides in many. Therefore, the word *anugatam* in the text must be interpreted to mean, *samavetam,* ie existing in many in inherent relation. This

interpretation excludes absolute negation which does not reside in things by the relation of inherence. According to Kaṇāda, it is the universal called the *Sattā Jāti* that produces the notion of *existence* in the case of the first three categories, viz substance, quality and action. *Sāmānya* is a common general feature residing in things by the relation of inherence. As *jāti*, it is the *eternal non-particular real* abiding in *many* substances simultaneously; hence it is one. Cows are many and variegated but cowness (in cow or blueness in a quality like blue) are the common features found in many particulars like cow and blue colour which get destroyed after sometime; but their *jāti* (cowness in case of cow, bluenss in case of blue) neither originated nor gets dissolved; this universal feature is the same in all the substances; hence it is a unitary principle. This is found to exist in the first three categories.

124. *Viśeṣa* is the fifth *Padārtha* in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It resides in the atoms and other eternal substances such as *ākāśa* (ether), *dik* (space), *kāla* (time), *soul* and *manas* for the purpose of differentiating one from the other. According to this School of Thought, there is need for a differentiating agency like the *viśeṣa* in case of atoms which have similar qualities and the same universal.

125. *Samavāya* is the sixth padārtha in the Vaiśeṣika system. *Ayuta siddhi* is the relation between two things as long as the parts are in the whole, eg threads which bring into existence a piece of cloth. Here, threads are the parts; the cloth is the whole. Threads are independent of the cloth, but the cloth is not independent of threads, as the cloth exists only in the threads; this relation between the two is *Ayuta siddhi* and the related things are *Ayuta siddha*. Similarly, the relation between the quality and the qualified, like the red colour which is a quality (*guṇa*) existing in a substance like a flower. Though a substance can exist independently, quality cannot exist apart from the substance; so, they are *Ayuta siddha* inasmuch as a quality, as long as it lasts, has to subsist in a substance. Similar is the relation between action and substance of which it is an action. The *ayuta siddhi* relation between *jāti* and *vyakti* is the fourth one. Individual cows cannot exist independent of the universal *cowness* which can exist independent of particular cows. Therefore, they are *ayuta siddha*. Lastly, the relation of mutual inseparability between *viśeṣa* and *eternal substance*. They are *ayuta siddha* for the reason that things related are themselves eternal entities.

126. That to which negation occurs and which is the counter correlative to its negation may be termed as *pratiyogī*. The characteristic attribute in that *pratiyogī*, is *pratiyogitā*, or *pratiyogitvam*. Pot is a *pratiyogī*, because non-existence or negation may occur to it, and also because it becomes the counter correlative to its *abhāva*. When

pot becomes the *pratiyogī*, it possesses *pratiyogitā*. When we say, *pratiyogī pot does not exist*, the *pratiyogitā* residing in the *pratiyogī pot* is delimited by the adjunct *potness*. The knowledge that *cloth does not exist* happens when *pratiyogitā*, residing in the *pratiyogī cloth* becomes delimited by the adjunct *clothness*. Similarly, when we say, *there is antecedent negation of pot in the earth*, the *pratiyogitā in the pot* will be delimited by the adjunct, viz relation of time prior to the birth of the pot. And, when we say, *Pot does not* exist in all the three times, *pratiyogitā* in the pot should be delimited by the adjunct, viz relation of time pertaining to past, present and future. When *pratiyogitā* is delimited by the relation of all the three times, there happens absolute negation. That is to say, *atyanta-abhāva* is that to which *pratiyogī*, does not exist at all.

127. *Pramāṇa - prameya - saṁśaya - prayojana - dṛṣṭānta - siddhānta - avayava - tarka - nirṇaya - vāda - jalpa - vitaṇḍā - hetvābhāsa - chala - jāti - nigrahasthāna - tattwajñānāt - niḥśreyas - adhigamaṇa* |

128. *Ātma - Śarīra - indriya - artha - buddhi - manas - pravṛtti - doṣa - pretya - bhāva - phala - duḥkha - apavargaḥ prameyam* |

129. *Sādharmya-samā, Vaidharmya-samā, utkarṣa-samā, apakarṣa-samā, varṇya-samā, avarṇya-samā, vikalpa-samā, sādhya-samā, prāpti-samā, aprāpti-samā, prasaṅga-samā, prati-dṛṣṭānta-samā, anutpatti-samā, saṁśaya-samā, prakaraṇa-samā, ahetu-samā, arthāpatti-samā, aviśeṣa-samā, upapatti-samā, upalabdhi-samā, anupalabdhi-samā, nitya-samā, anitya-samā,* and *kārya-samā*. ||

130. *Pratijñāhāni, pratijñāntara, pratijñāvirodha, pratijñā-sannyāsa, hetvantara, arthāntara, nirarthaka, avijñātārthaka, apārthaka, aprāptakāla, nyūna, adhika, punarukta, ananubhāṣaṇa, ajñāna, apratibhā, vikṣepa, matānujñā, paryanuyojyāpakṣepaṇa, niranuyojyānuyoga, apasiddhānta,* and *hetvābhāsa*.

131. Take for instance the sentence, "Agriculture produces food." Agriculture consists in activities like tilling the land, sowing the seed etc. Here, the result is not born immediately after these activities, but through such intermediary causes like the crop and paddy stock. Similarly, in sacrifice too, one comes to the conclusion that the fruit of heaven is attained not immediately, but later through the intermediary cause called *apūrva* which is born of the performance of the sacrifice.

132. *Ātma vā are draṣṭavyaḥ, śrotavyaḥ, mantavyaḥ, nididhyāsitavyaḥ* |

133. *Tameva viditvātimṛtyumeti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate'yanāya* |

134. *Tat prāptiheturvijñānam karma coktam mahāmune* |

135. *Nityanaimittkaireva kurvāṇo duritakṣayam, jñānam ca vimalīkurvannabhyāsena ca pācayet; Abhyāsāt ca kvacitjñānāt, Kaivalyam labhate naraḥ* ||

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